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The thesis of this dissertation is that not only was

Darwin the first Social Darwinist, but that only through

appreciation of the roles of confusion, metaphysics, the
social and political context, and the work of Alfred Russel

Wallace can

a

better understanding of Darwin's achievement

be accomplished.

By revealing and then analyzing the Social Darwinist

aspects of Darwin's science of transmutation the position
of most critics

— who

hold that Darwin's Social Darwinist

followers perverted his "pure" science--is debunked.
Darwin's development of

a

race war theory was done for

scientific reasons which cannot be stripped away to reveal
a

non-political "core" without utterly transforming his

ideas.

For instance, Darwin developed

vi

a

biological ranking

of indigenous peoples which helped fill in evidential gaps

for the theory of evolution as well as provide confirmation
for his radical form of reductive materialism.

Darwin's Social Darwinism has been noticed by
critics

,

a

few

but is usually dismissed as either ephemeral or

indicative of commonly-held "backround" political biases.
The first view is shown to be inadequate by revelation of
the deep relation of his metaphysics to his science.

The

second is exploded through an examination of the work of

Alfred Russel Wallace.

He opposed Darwin's concept of race

war, and his opposition was rooted in his commitment to an

emergentist metaphysics.

Once the juxtaposition of the

social and political aspects of Wallace's work to that of

Darwin is provided, the wider context of their work is

revealed by an examination of Darwin's use of Malthus, the
politics of emerging professional classes, Victorian birth
control, and the work of T.H. Huxley.

Revelation of the intimate social and political
details of the scientific work of Darwin and Wallace helps
to create an understanding of how nineteenth century

science was constituted and demonstrates that the

particular historical relations of science and ideology
make the concept of "pure science" an oxymoron.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

When not denied entirely, the social and political

dimensions of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution have
been seen by many as categorically separate from his

scientific enterprise.

Yet it is remarkably easy to show

that Darwin was the first Social Darwinist and various

authors have already provided sufficient evidence for the
view that Darwinism was social at its inception.

However

little headway has been made in reforming the generally

held view of Darwin as

ideological)

a

"pure"

(non-political and non-

scientist or in understanding his doctrine of

Natural Selection as essentially Social Darwinist.
result stems from

a

This

failure to recognize and appreciate the

unity of Darwin's scientific and social ideas.

("Social

Darwinism" and "Natural Selection" are capitalized in order
to emphasize the historical particularity of Darwin's

version of the survival of the fittest doctrine, and to
separate it somewhat from more contemporary versions.)
This dissertation will reveal Darwin's ideology by

examining some major social and political aspects of his
scientific work and then put this augmented understanding
into perspective through juxtaposition with the work of

Alfred Russel Wallace.

Finally, through an examination of

1

the wider social and political context in terms
of the

Malthusian approach to class relations, the

professionalization of the medical trade and the politics
of birth control,

the work of Darwin and Wallace will

assume their proper places in Victorian science.

Only

through an understanding of the complicated relationship of
science and society in its concrete details will

a

better

understanding of the scientific enterprise be achieved.
The work of Alfred Russel Wallace is important not

only because he was the co-discoverer of Natural Selection
and worked closely with Darwin to defend the new science

from its detractors, but also in terms of its contrasting

scientific, social and political bias.
gives

a

Wallace's work

useful local perspective on Darwin's project from

within Victorian evolutionary biology.
Yet despite good work by

a

few scholars showing

various social and political presences within Darwin's
writings, the vast majority of critical works boldly assert

Darwin was no Social Darwinist.

In cases where Darwin's

social and political dimensions are too obvious to be
ignored, cornered critics often dismiss this appearance as

merely an aspect of commonly held ideology and therefore of
little moment.

Given Darwin's importance in the history

and philosophy of science it is not difficult to comprehend

why his image has so far resisted the wrinkles of his

particular story.

Darwin is truly one of the giants of

modern science and has for many symbolized what is best in
2

science.

The widespread success of Stephen Jay Gould's

popularization of Darwin's work attests to the appreciation
of Darwin even beyond the confines of biologists and

university intellectuals.
Darwin's case demonstrates that icons of science

deserve critical consideration.

Even as philosophy and

sociology of science revoke claims to "value-free" science,
it

is

safe to say that the term "pure science" is not yet

an oxymoron.

Quite simply, despite existing criticism of

the desire to have "pure" heroes, it remains to be

explained how the two views of Darwin: pure scientist and
Social Darwinist, continue to exist side by side within

contemporary thought.
This gallery of opposites is not

however.

a

new phenomenon,

Conflict between substance and the image of

purity bothered Darwin also: Wallace confronted Darwin with

alternatives to politically-motivated views manifested in
The Descent of Man

.

short this discussion

He responded to Wallace by cutting
(see Chapter Three)

with claims that

he was unable to investigate the connection of science and

politics because he only did "pure science."

It

is crucial

to any adequate understanding of Victorian science to

realize that the suppression of particular social and

political dimensions of evolutionary theory was done in

a

context in which alternative views were readily available
and anxious to be heard.

Thus the issue of Darwin as

Social Darwinist takes on additional interest for anyone
3

who wishes to understand how science, ideology and history
are related.

Since Darwin's work is currently revered as an example
of superior science,

the denials of "impurity" or the only

slightly more honest dismissal of the social and political
aspects of his theory as "of the times" reveal

a

view of

science that is at the very least historically untenable.

Furthermore, once the historical picture is corrected it
can be shown that Darwin's social and political aspects

were not mere accidents or tangential aspects but rather

were structurally one with his theory.

This thesis breaks

new ground by exploring particular instances in which

Darwin's science, metaphysics and politics form

a

unity.

While several critics find social and political ideas in
his work, none develop an understanding of how the various

aspects coalesce.

Science and values are more intimately

related than many would admit.

It

is the

intricate and

particular details of the history of science that once
revealed and analyzed will allow an accurate understanding
and fuller appreciation of the scientific enterprise.

Thus the first step to understanding Victorian and

present science requires settling the historical question:
This dissertation will

Was Darwin

a

Social Darwinist?

begin with

a

sampling of the literature on this topic

juxtaposed with

a

Social Darwinist.

demonstration that Darwin was indeed
Yet the case is

a

complex one, for

Darwin's ambivalences over how to handle particular
4

a

scientific problems and cultural topics contributed to his
and others' confusion and has helped to allow

misunderstanding of his work to accumulate and persist.
At

its core,

however, Darwin's ideological science can

be shown to have arisen from particular epistemological and

metaphysical beliefs about materialism, hierarchy, progress
and morality.

Thus the ideological features of Darwin's

work hold more interest than their mere appearance would
have in their own right, and this is due to their

suppression by Darwin, some of his followers and many of
his commentators.

Not only did some of these ideas fill

gaps within his theory, both conceptual and evidential, but

they helped make Darwin's work harmonize with views and

concerns of the newly professionalized groups of biologists
and physicians.

This harmony, for all its benefits,

promoted class prejudice and racial bias.
Although scientific racism in the Darwinian context

is

currently lightly dismissed or ignored altogether the
origins of human evils deserve scrutiny not merely to set
the record straight but to put the scientific enterprise

into proper perspective.

The work of Alfred Russel

Wallace, for all its unconventional aspects, presents an

antidote to the view that evolutionary biology was

monolithic and unaware of alternative views.

If

this

thesis does nothing else it will have succeeded if Darwin
can be understood within the social and political context
he shared with gentler souls such as ALfred Russel Wallace.

5

A.

Organization

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter Two will
begin with the problem of values in science and then

a

review of the literature on the topic of Darwin as

Social

Darwinist.
is an

a

To most commentators this conception of Darwin

unpleasant one as it links the brilliant and kind

biologist who wrote very technical and wonderful works on
such things as earthworms to

a

panoply of arguments

supporting such evils as sweat shops, poverty and disease.
But in fact the particular form of Darwin's ideas on

human social evolution held far more repulsive themes,

because it was intimately connected to concepts of

imperialism and race war.

If

racism may be defined as the

belief that the races of humankind are to be ranked in
terms of their moral

nineteenth century terms:

(in

intellectual, artistic and ethical) value, then Darwin was
a

If the ultimate form of racism may be defined in

racist.

terms of

struggle between races for survival, and that

a

the superior characteristics of one race will enable it to

extinguish the others, then Darwin can easily be shown to
have been

a

racist of this most extreme sort.

This is an

ugly fact of history that remains to be dealt with.

Section "B" of Chapter Two will start with Darwin's
concept of race war and

a

discussion of the critical

response his ideology has generated.

6

It will be shown that

while Darwin's politics come up for discussion but

infrequent ly

,

the problem his racial views present for an

appreciation of science in general surfaces hardly at all.
Yet Darwin was

a

racist and his work does not entirely

disguise this fact.

His use of racist data and theory from

anthropology, paleontology, biology, philosophy and other

disciplines should be obvious to anyone who reads his work.
Section "C" details the use of the new science of

craniometries and the moral concept of sympathy in Darwin's
quest to resolve questions of "man's" place in nature, the

progress of civilization and the species, the status of
savages, and various problems of social change in terms of

evolutionary theory.

Darwin's ambivalent attitude towards

progress, degeneration, perfection, telos, hierarchy and
even craniometry itself will be demonstrated and found to
be a key to understanding the difficulty of sorting his

theory out.
The insight of section "D" is that social and

political aspects are intimately enmeshed with Darwin's

biological theory and thus cannot be simply stripped away,
leaving

a

pure core of scientific theory behind.

Darwin's work is essentially Social Darwinist.

Thus
He needed

something to fill in gaps of his theory and various social
and political concepts as well as many forms of racial

evidence were used to help give coherence and plausibility
to his enterprise.

7

In particular,

the problem of the relation of humans

to apes is discussed in terms of Darwin's ambivalent

solutions.

Not only did "contaminated" ideas help by

filling in gaps of evidence or gulfs in theory, but they

contributed to acceptance of the theory by appealing to
like political minds.

Much later on, in Chapter IV, the

issue of acceptance within the then newly formed clique of

professional biologists will be shown as

a

factor which

also contributed to the value of racially biologized social

theory for Darwin.
All of Chapter Two together shows that although Darwin

was the first to claim that his theory was "pure" and

non-political in the widest possible sense, at the most
basic levels his version of Natural Selection was rife with

metaphysical assumptions which were altogether enmeshed
with social and political positions.

In particular the

Malthusian version of the materialist thesis Darwin
promulgated played

a

large role in his politically

conservative social theory.
By reducing human culture to a materially-determined

collection of inherited traits and retaining (ambivalently,
as we shall see)

the view that nature expresses

a

continuous hierarchy of organisms, Darwin saw the

competition between races as
and part of its proof.

a

facet of Natural Selection

This meant that the domination of

"savages" in Africa, the "new world" and elsewhere by

Europeans was explicable through science; even more,
8

it was

.

.

demanded by scientific principles, and in the end it was
taken to be an instance of proof

Section "E" concludes Chapter Two's argument with

a

summing up of the discussion so far and sets the stage for
a

presentation of the context of his views within the

biological, medical, and wider political communities.

Chapter Three elaborates on the social and political
ideology of Alfred Russel Wallace in order to reveal the
richness of Victorian thought about issues raised by the
new transmutation theory even within the small community of

biologists.

Because the secondary literature on Wallace is

even more impoverished than the work done on Darwin's
social theory, much of the chapter will be devoted to

explicating Wallace's views on Natural Selection in
relation to indigenous peoples, technology, progress,

capitalism and allegedly unique human qualities.
Because Wallace did not share Darwin's radical

materialism he came to very different conclusions
concerning the relation of evolution to human society.

Wallace saw culture as ultimately independent of Natural

Selection and thus he tended to more openly discuss
politics in the course of describing "man's" relation to
evolution.

Thus his ideology is much more accessible than

Darwin's as well as less hierarchical, and ultimately less
racist
The first section of Chapter Three starts with

Wallace's biography because he is unknown to most readers.
9

.

The working class origins of Wallace will
become an issue

when the wider social context of Victorian

professionalization of the sciences

is

broached in Chapter

Four

Section
peoples.

B

sets forth Wallace's views on indigenous

Unlike Darwin, Wallace spent many years living

amongst the local inhabitants of the "uncivilized" world.

Throughout his career he maintained an enthusiasm for

non-European cultures that is difficult to believe possible
if one takes Darwin's views as a benchmark for the period.

On issues ranging from slavery and cannibalism to the

politics of extinction, Wallace aimed at decoupling

evolutionary theory from the politics of domination.
The next section,

"C," examines Wallace's view

that indigenous peoples, the working class, and women

shared

a

common position in the hierarchy of oppressive

capitalism.
society,

a

He comes to understand eugenics as

a

threat to

pernicious politics based on an unsound

interpretation of Natural Selection.
(In this dissertation "Natives" and "Native" are

capitalized in order to combat the inherent racism in the
words by giving them the formal recognition usually

accorded similar appellations for peoples of the
"civilized" world, such as "European."

For similar reasons

"primitive," "man," and "man's" are flagged with quotation
marks

.

)

10

The fourth section,

"D," examines Wallace’s

metaphysical views which put him in direct opposition to
Darwin.
These beliefs form the theoretical grounding

for

a

socialist and feminist politics which set him apart from
more conservative members of his field, such as Darwin.
is easy to

It

demonstrate that an anti-racist, anti-sexist and

even ultimately ant i-Eurocent r ic politics emerged from his

particular synthesis of science and emergentist metaphysics.
Once summed up in the last section of Chapter Three,
"E," Wallace's work leads to consideration of the wider

social and political dimensions of Natural Selection.

Chapter Four begins with

a

demonstration that Darwin's use

of Ma 1 thus engaged an overt political dimension.

Whether

one considers the debate over birth control, the movement
for workers'
for

a

rights, or the battle by the medical community

monopoly of reproductive technology,

a

proper

historical understanding of the social context of Malthus'
claims for the inevitability of poverty must be seen as

controversial during the nineteenth century.

Thus Darwin's

unqualified use of Malthus betrays his claim to "purity"
and reveals the political subtext bound up with his version
of Natural Selection.

That Darwin was

a

major force in the creation of

scientific racism is not to be denied and this fact should
not be dismissed as

a

event of the time.

It

minor or noncontrover sia 1 ideological
is only by examining the scientific

achievement of Darwin and Wallace in the full scientific,
11

.

social and political context that

Darwinism and science may emerge

12

a

proper appreciation of

CHAPTER

II

DARWIN WAS A SOCIAL DARWINIST

A.

Pure Science, Politics and History

For the most part the relation of Darwin to Social

Darwinism has been ignored and in Shapin and Barnes' terms:
the literature on this topic is "impoverished."

1

When the

relationship is considered, even superficially, the general
impression given by the secondary literature is that
Darwin's theory of Natural Selection was one thing, and
Social Darwinism was another.

As Shapin and Barnes so

cleverly put it:
...we can conclude this brief survey by observing
that Darwin's defense is far better staffed and
funded than its opposition. [2]

Foremost in the minds of these two critics is that the

suggestion of ideological "taint" is viewed as an assault
by most of Darwin's commentators.

that Darwin was

a

The usual assumption is

great man and scientist, and hence

"pure" thinker and thus certainly not

a

a

Social Darwinist.

Much ink has been used to defend Darwin's character by

claiming that he created his theory for "purely scientific
purposes."

The philosophical problems inherent in

13

a

debate

.

,

over states of mind, or motives and beliefs 3
do not seem to
have bothered those who tackle the problem
in this manner.
The defense in the Darwin case has rested upon
three assertions.
The first is that of internal
purity: Darwin's intent ions and beliefs in 1859
were innocent of "ideological" taint... [4]

More sophisticated commentators ultimately rest their
case on the claim that Darwin worked as

gathering data in

a

a

true scientist,

neutral and scientific manner.

The second [defense] is purity of ancestry:
"influences" upon the Origin were entirely
wholesome and reputable; in particular, nothing
"ideological" was gleaned from Malthus. [5]

Implicit in this asserted innocence is the claim that
the theory of Natural Selection is scientific, and hence

value-free, while the Social Darwinists promulgated
social theory by abusing science.

a

Social theory is taken

to be a non-scient if ic enterprise, which in this case

perverts the pure work of the scientist for political
purposes
The third assertion is purity of germ-plasm:
nothing untoward could properly be deduced from
the theory of the Origin truth does not blend
with error; insofar as truth was used to justify
social Darwinism, it was misused. [6]
;

But if Social Darwinism may be defined as the idea

that human individuals in their relations to each other,

and societies in their relations to other societies, are
all subject to Darwin's law of the survival of the fittest
in the same or similar ways that all non-human living

beings are

then Darwin was

a

Social Darwinist

Furthermore, Darwin clearly promulgated
14

a

•

race-driven

version of evolutionary theory as applied to
humans: he

believed that the nations/races of "man" were locked in

a

struggle for survival and that only the fittest— the
white
races

would survive.

(And by logical extension only the

strongest white race would ultimately dominate world

politics

.

)

Demonstration of this needlessly-controversia 1 view of
Darwin's social theory is simple.

Consider the following

portion of Darwin's letter to William Graham in 1881:
I
could show fight on natural selection having
done and doing more for the progress of
civilization than you seem inclined to admit.
Remember what risk the nations of Europe ran, not
so many centuries ago, of being overwhelmed by
the Turks, and how ridiculous such an idea now
is!
The more civilized so-called Caucasian races
have beaten the Turkish hollow in the struggle
for existence.
Looking to the world at no very
distant date, what an endless number of lower
races will have to be eliminated by higher
civilized races throughout the world. [7]

The details of how this view was an intimate and yet

overt part of Darwin's theory of evolution will only be

revealed as this dissertation progresses.

The usage of the

term "race" includes familiar categories such as Caucasian
and Negro, however it also included nationalities and even

fine divisions according to location ("Negroes in general"
and "Negroes born in Africa").

See Figure

2,

Vogt's

Craniometric Data.
Thus the claim that Darwin was no Social Darwinist is

clearly just plain false.
already noted this result.

Furthermore other writers have
Yet in his article of 1985:

15

s.

"Darwinism

I_s

Social" Robert M. Young waxes despondent over

the current situation of Darwinian scholarship:^
...I want to begin by registering a certain
weariness, even impatience, that it's still
necessary to argue that: first, the intellectual
origins of the theory of evolution by natural
selection are inseparable from social, economic
and ideological issues in nineteenth-century
Britain ... second the substance of the theory
was, and remains, part of the wider philosophy of
nature, God, and society, where conceptions of
nature and God are themselves changing in complex
ways which are integral to the changing social
order; and third, the extrapolations from
Darwinism to either humanity or society are not
separable from Darwin's own views, nor are they
chronologically subsequent. They are integral.
,

Young may be excused for his tiredness, for he himself

wrote on the topic

a

"dozen times" between 1968 and 1973

.

He lets us know that he felt like a "Rip Van Winkle " who in

woke to find the field unchanged in its

the 1980'

prejudice that Darwin should not be associated with Social

Darwinism

9

In attempting to clarify the problem for himself Young

writes that he thinks that the idealized picture of science
and an obsolete view of history has hampered an accurate

appraisal of Darwin.
The zeal with which current scient ists-histor ians
seek to separate Darwin's genius and achievements
from the work, ideas, and influences of Spencer,
Chambers, and Wallace seems to me to betray a
pathetic, sycophantic hagiography--Great Man
history which I had thought was waning in the
history of science... [10]

—

Whether it be Young, Barnes and Shapin, or Adrian
Desmond, acute critics plead for the view that those who

wish to understand Darwin must consider his ideology as
16

^
well as the wider social and political
context of his work
as part of his science

.

All four critics have contributed greatly to
an

increased awareness of the context of Darwin's work.

Young

does an excellent job of showing that Darwin
conceptualizes

human society in terms of Malthusian struggle and

individualistic capitalism.
a

And Barnes and Shapin provide

good focus upon the structure and nature of the claims

against considering Darwin

a

Social Darwinist.

Desmond

provides one of the the best accountings of the political
context by focusing on the intricate relations between

Continental physiology, reform politics and the movement to

democratize the medical community in England.
But while these authors raise the problem of context

and make contributions towards understanding the social and

political struggle surrounding the acceptance of

a

biologized evolutionary scheme, it has been left up to this

dissertation to investigate more specific manifestations
and structures of the social and political within the

scientific work of Darwin.
be augmented so that

possible.

Thus

a

a

The work of these critics must

deeper understanding of Darwin is

systematic exploration of the role of

gap-filling, hierarchy, materialism, professionalization,
and moral theory upon Darwin's development of his theory of

human society is the project of this chapter.

This

analysis reveals the racist nature of Darwin's use of the

17

concept of the "savage," and opens up an
unexamined

territory within the theory of Natural Selection.

Illustration

1:

Portrait of Charles Darwin, age

B

•

Darwin and Social Darwinism

Despite often repeated words of wisdom on the

importance of social context many sensitive and intelligent
still misunderstand Darwin's position.

A good

example of an academic who holds that Darwin could not have
been

a

Social Darwinist is that of Johannes Fabian.

In

Time and the Other he takes the field of anthropology to
task for dominating other cultures through discourse which

due to its use of time disallows Natives the opportunity to

engage in

a

reciprocal dialogue with anthropologists.

Despite his sensitivity to issues of colonialism and

domination, he asserts that Darwin was not
Darwinist.

principle

,

a

Social

Not only that, he implies that Darwin, in

cannot be

non-directional

,

a

Social Darwinist because he uses

or non-teleologica 1

,

time.

He asks us to

see that

...Darwin's own keen awareness that Time, once
naturalized, could and should not be rehistorized
(which is precisely what the social evolutionists
would try to do). [13]

Fabian's mis-cue raises one of the most fascinating
aspects of Darwin's work--namely that Darwin himself is

inconsistent on many key concepts, and in particular is

ambivalent about history's direction.

More of this topic

will follow, but for now it is enough to realize that

readers, even sophisticated and pol i t ica 1 ly-sensit ive ones,
who wish to convince themselves that Darwin was no Social
19

Darwinist can find material in his work to
support that
view, provided they miss or ignore other passages
and

are

unaware of the context and deeper structure of the
Darwin's
survival of the fittest doctrine.

John C. Greene recognizes this problem and although
the following passage presents the pros and cons in reverse

order from Fabian, it is instructive:^^

How is it possible that Darwin scholars can
disagree so violently about a historical question
that is presumably subject to historical inquiry
and ver if ica t ion?
The main difficulty is that
The Descent of Man... is ambiguous ... Those who
view Darwin as a "social Darwinist" have no
difficulty in finding passages that seem to
out-Spencer Spencer... On the other side of the
argument, there are equally striking passages in
which Darwin seems to recognize the role of
education, public opinion, religion, humanitarian
sentiments, and social institutions generally in
social evolution, especially in civilized
societies ... Darwin seems to contradict himself...
.

.

.

While it is not clear why Social Darwinism cannot

encompass education, religion, etc., at least the point is
granted that Darwin's work is sufficiently complicated and

inconsistent that competent readers can be mislead.

Greene's argument above will be altered in this

dissertation to understanding Darwin's ambiguities and
inconsistencies in terms of his ambivalences over solutions
to various interrelated scientific,

problems.

Also,

social and political

it is important to realize that

Darwin is primarily

a

in the end

Social Darwinist and this is no

accident--f or various deeply held metaphysical and

epistemological decisions drive him to accept biases he

20

probably already held for deeper ideological
reasons.
Going along with Barnes and Shapin, it is unproductive
to

speculate about the inner beliefs of Darwin, or the
forces

determining such beliefs (perhaps construed in terms of
class, gender, and fear of criticism (see Bowlby about

Darwin's psychosomatic response to stress)).

it

is enough

to make the theory of evolution explicit on the issues
with

which we are concerned.
Furthermore, the worry that Darwin's ideology was
shared to such an extent within his culture that it would
be anachronistic to criticize him for,

say, his belief in

race war, the inferiority of women or his assumption that

society is best understood in terms of biology, is

unfounded.

Put another way,

such

a

"defense" of Darwin

would be bad history, and not only because Alfred Russel

Wallace offered an opposing ideology.

In Nancy L.

Paxton's

George E 1 iot and Herbert Spencer Eliot's rejection of
racism, sexism and biological determinism is shown to be
part of an ongoing debate within the intellectual

community, and also an aspect of

a

larger discourse which

included the widespread readership of her novels. 15
There are many reasons why Darwin's work has been

misconstrued.

Modern philosophy of science, in the

instance of logical neo-positivism, attempted to understand
science as

a

value-free pursuit.

Robert Young points to

nineteenth century antecedents and the resurgence of

21

positivism even in the 1980's as sources of various
attempts to sanitize Darwin's work.
At the moment it appears to me that the right
[who like the left attempt to separate science

from social and political aspects] is winning
hands down. .That Darwin was a Social Darwinist
is not news, however often it is conveniently
forgotten.
The point about this is a deeper one:
the search for the neat, isolable influence or
cleave plane is a search for the will o' the
wisp.
It is a positivist search, and positivism
was a historical movement in the nineteenth
century just as physicalism in the philosophy of
science was in the 1940s-1960s, with its search
for a decontextua 1 ized neutral observation
language.
I
fear that Darwin studies are lapsing
into a positivism about the origins, originality,
and unequivocalness of Darwin's theory. [16]
.

Despite recent changes in theory, in general the

prevailing view inside academia and out has been, up to
recent times, that science must in principle be "pure."

As

the contemporary critic Helen Longino points out, the major

task of contemporary philosophy of science is to

...reexamine the ideas of "good science" and "bad
science" and the assumption that value-laden or
ideologically informed science is always bad
science. [17]

While Longino dismisses current feminist analysis of
science and Marx's view that science is

a

the ruling class as mere "perspectives,"

1

book

(1990)

8

the task of her

is to find out how deeply values permeate

She recounts how the theme of value-free science

science.
runs in

social product of

a

strong current through the recent history of the

philosophy of science.

Until the demise of the logical

positivists, Hempel's program promised

a

logical certainty

for science free from contamination by values.
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At

least

since Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions and
the work of Feyerabend, Hempel's view has been
seen as

problematic and the issue of social and political
influences on science has become acute.
In the context of the Darwin debate Longino's
work

holds special interest because she wants to save the

Positivist project of producing

a

theory of objective

science even though she rejects Positivism and refuses
to take the path of the other major group, the wholists

(Kuhn et al.).

Her approach depends on

a

distinction

between contextual and constitutive values.

Despite

asserting that it is "nonsense" 19 to claim that science can
be value-free,

she attempts to control the damage that

admission of the value-driven nature of the enterprise
entails by separating what might be called "legitimate"
values from other forms of values.

Science can remain objective, according to Longino,

when it
...is free of personal, social, and cultural
values, that is, independent of group or
individual subjective preferences regarding what
ought to be
I call
the values generated from an
understanding of the goals of science
constitutive values to indicate that they are the
source of the rules determining what constitutes
acceptable scientific practice or scientific
method. [20]
.

.

.

The other sort of values, the personal, social and

cultural ones, are "contextual" values in her scheme.

Longino's distinction attempts to incorporate recent
sociological studies of science which have shown that
23

^
science is

a

social practice, not

a

set of rules.

she accepts that scientific reasoning,

forms,

is context dependent,

^

Thus

like all other

social and hence driven

inevitably by values and interests.
One nice feature of Longino's scheme is that it points
to the importance of historical investigation into how

science actually proceeds, as only this path will allow the

revelation of values, both constitutive and contextual,
that drive ever-changing science to yield knowledge, which
is now seen to be an historical

product.

Unfortunately, in the end Longino's distinction will
not do the task it sets for itself.

In the broadest sense

her scheme attempts to peel contaminating
"bad")

(a

euphemism for

value-inputs away by isolating the "purely"

scientific values from "contextual" values through the
device of calling what might be called "second order" group

decisions and values objective while what might be referred
to as "ground level" or "first order" values are held to be
at

least potentially subjective.

Constitutive values take on an ethereal quality: they
appear to be outside of time and place arising from
plenum:

"the goals of science."

It

a

vague

seems improbable, and

Longino admits that the concept is rejected, that science
can be reduced to

a

rule-driven activity.

How then do we

get from "the goals" to particular rules and then to

techniques?

She does not give any derivations.
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Worse yet, her appeal to "acceptable scientific

practices" is circular.

If a

group accepts

practice, for

a

example: Darwinians accept craniometries as scientific,
does this make the acceptance non-ideologica
1

scientists could point to

,

even if the

"deduction" from the goals of

a

science?

A

value of

guantitative data" and "repeatable experiments"?

deduction from "seeking truth," the positive

Consider further the case of craniometries.

One

possible goal of science, to explain the functioning of the
human brain, plus the value of accepting quantitative data
over qualitative descriptions and theories, plus the

principle that the human mind may be understood in terms of
its physical structure, yielded craniometries.

Granted

this chain of arguments is not complete, or even untainted
by ideological concerns, but none the less it seems clear

that some sort of "neutral" argument of this type satisfied

many of the best scientific minds of the later nineteenth

century.

But craniometries, despite its acceptance and

"derivation" was ideological to the core.

(Craniometries

will be be discussed in detail later in this chapter.)

The

point to be made here is that even if the required logical

argument can be constructed,

a

suppressed ideological

rationale may run parallel to it and both together yield an

activity that scientists call science.

Longino's

distinction simply does not work.
As we shall see,

Darwin's example shows the trouble
Just because

with Longino's distinction.
25

a

group of

scientists for the most part share
they generate

a

a

set of values so that

group of methods, technigues and

instruments as appropriate does not mean that the social
and political dimension is obliterated.

Problems with Longino's view can also be demonstrated
by her unaer standing of instrumentation.

She claims that

instruments provide unequivocal raw data so that on this
basic level all scientists, regardless of personal values
or social pressures,

"see" the same thing:

Whether we are reading an instrument or observing
a troop of baboons, there is always some minimal
level of description of the common world to which
we can retreat when our initial descriptions of
what is the same state of affairs differs. [23]
This might, perhaps, be true in the trivial case of normal

science in

a

hardened field, to use Kuhn's phrase, but

where science is interesting, scientists might not even
agree that anything at all is being observed, if

a

new

instrument is functioning properly or whether it is reading

anything at all. 24
Other scholars argue for the social construction of
truth 2 S and even if this is not entertained as

a

real

possibility, and Longino rejects the social

constructivists' program, the fact remains that much
current science is based on unwritten and unarticulated
(and unarticulable)

rules and procedures.

This sometimes

accounts for the periodic failure to reproduce experimental
results.

Furthermore, the idea that open discussion

between scientists of such differences will reveal cultural
26

.

and social biases that can then be
peeled away is utopian
at best.

Real science can be messy and uncertain, even

when everyone is telling the truth to the best
of their

ability

and this is by no means guaranteed when groups

compete for limited research funds, control of patents, and
a

portion of name recognition with the media and public.
The ultimate problem for Longino is that within the

ambiguous situation of new science there is not always one
group that establishes "objective" basic agreement on
values that determine practice and method.

compete with their own visions.

Various groups

This raises the issue of

what to call the schemes that are dropped later because
they didn't work or in the end were seen as dead ends or

maybe even based on false ideas--perhaps we could even
use the phrase "imaginary."
on

a

Just because

a

group decides

guiding definition or set of procedures does not mean

that the constitutive values are separable from the

contextual ones.
it

Thus where we need the distinction most

is hardest to find.

To say that

a

hardened normal

scientific situation allows the distinction yields little
comfort

Another aspect of contemporary science raises the same
issue, though in

a

different way.

Since the release of new

scientific information is part and parcel of strategic

maneuvering to obtain grants and to maintain research
advantages over competitors, the release of misleading
information, posturing and other forms of corporate warfare
27

.

are common practice even within academic science

With

the intense pressure to keep ahead, scientists often guess,

gamble that new data will show up, and hope new instruments
work, etc.

It

simply is not true that at the most basic

level there is agreement about what they are seeing, why

they are seeing it, or how to understand what they are
doing.

Darwin's approval of craniometries must be

evaluated in this light.
The strategic control of the flow of information to

protect

a

research strategy is not

a

new aspect to science.

In one of the early battles over evolution Richard Owen

bested Robert Grant by "showing" that Ornithorhynchus was
mammalian.

Owen discredited evolution by emphasizing the

lactation organs of the duck-billed platypus as opposed to
its egg-laying system, depriving Grant of an example of

gap-filling organism between mammals and reptiles. 2 9

a

On

the basis of this success and further disruption of the

evidence for evolution by his demonstration that the
accepted data on the low facial angle of chimpanzees was

a

result of failing to account for the differences between

young chimps and fully developed ones, Owen was lionized by

political conservatives.

In both cases the arguments might

be considered "purely scientific," but they carried social

and political implications, and these helped power Owen's

ascension to prominence within the scientific societies
(which were dominated by entrenched old-money and old-order

conservatives

)

28

In a

reconstruction of the inner workings of history
Adrian Desmond describes in great detail how
Owen set

about

shaping the next scientific debate over
the possibility of
evolution: the Stonesfield jaws. Despite
biologists' and

historians' descriptions of Owen's "objective"
and "correct

identification" of the jaws as mammalian, the event was
ideological to the core.
Formerly historians have seen this episode
Looking only at published
papers, they stripped away the social framework,
ignored Grant's input, and attributed Owen's
success to his more "correct" identification.
But correctness is an anachronistic
eva luat ion
At its starkest, the political
protagonists were perceiving anatomical
differences in divergent ways. But is this so
surprising? As Jacyna reminds us, a microscope
does not present a privileged close-up of
reality so much as a set of images within a
cultural tradition, and it is this educative
process that supplies the social dimension to
perception: social prestructuring allows meaning
to be extracted from the magnified image.
30
as unproblematic.

.

.

.

[

]

First, the blending of politics, perception, technique
and technology shows that ideology climbs back down through
the deductions from the "pure goals of science."

Second,

even though the classification of an organism has

a

clinical aspect

— filing

things in the right cabinet--there

is a strategic importance to some debates due to qualities

outside the particular classification instance itself.
this case the jaws' assignation took much more credence

away from the theory of evolution than one failure of

evidence would merit--even if this result was not openly
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In

discussed and remained on the level of repressed and
ideological reasoning.
Third, as part of this debate Owen was actually able
to control the timing of the release of papers so that he

"set Grant up."

Grant had convinced an ally, Harlan, to

travel and talk to the Geological Society.
by Buckland,

Owen, coached

intercepted Harlan and convinced him to retract

his original opinion about the fossils.

The point here is

that the scientific debate was engineered with

a

particular

result in mind.

Previously Owen has been portrayed as acting
in "consultation with
Harlan" in the interests
of international cooperation.
But the letters
suggest that Owen and Buckland conspired to
present just such an image. Of course, Harlan's
change of camps might well have been an attempt
to gain greater recognition for American efforts.
But Owen and Buckland' s original intention was
far from furthering diplomatic relations or
creating a "transatlantic" science. They had
contrived to present the society with a fait
accompli--Har lan the radical's guest, recanting
at his first appearance .. .With science integrated
into wider political strategies, it was essential
to weaken the paleontological base of serial
,

transmutation...
It

[31]

is difficult to see how to separate the constitutive

from the contextual when both run together.
Also, Longino gets Darwin wrong.

New theories of geological change began the
challenge that culminated in the publication of
Outrage at yet
Darwin's Origin of Species
this time into a
humans,
of
another displacement
from
pulpits and
species of primate, thundered
press.
Street
reverberated through the Fleet
theorists
Almost immediately, however, social
embraced Darwinism and used it to legitimate
social inequality. [32]
.
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As we shall see,

Darwin was ahead of the social theorists.

Longino's case shows how the view that Darwin and
science
are pure in their hearts is thriving still.
The fear of links between Darwin and Social
Darwinism
is

in part a result of the history of the
twentieth

century.

No one who values Darwin's work wishes to see

Natural Selection linked to the abuses of eugenics
or the

concept of race war.

Thus one can understand why John

Greene refers to writers who make these connections as

extremists."
history.

But wishing it is not so does not change

The parallels between the ideas of Spencer,

Darwin and the eugenicists are disturbing as they are real.

Analysis of the movement of Darwin's ideas into

Germany is particularly susceptible to distortion.

In The

Scientific Origins of National Socialism Daniel Gas man 34
claims that Darwin's ideas were perverted by those who

passed them on to the politicians.

In particular he

examines the work of the biologist Ernst Haeckel, who

popularized the new theory of evolution.

From the point of

view of this thesis, Haeckel is important for understanding

Darwin's work because his uncanny reproduction of

unpublished Darwinian ideas demonstrates how the structure
of Darwin's argument for Natural Selection inevitably led
to particular scientific,

social and political positions.

The exhuming of this relationship between these two men

allows aspects of the structure of the theory of Natural

Selection to come to light.
31

.

Despite Gasman's attempt to distance Darwin
from
Haeckel, Ernst Haeckel's Social Darwinism can be
shown to be

essentially Darwinist.

Haeckel's particular development of

Darwinian theory vividly points out how other scientists,
even as far away as Germany, understood the inherent
logic

uniting competition due to overproduction of young, radical

reductive materialism, social progress, craniometries and
racism into

a

theory of the transmutation of species.

Besides illuminating an understanding obscure to twentieth

century readers but common to many scientists of the time,
Haeckels

'

s

response to Darwin's work indicates the

accessibility and acceptability of Darwin's ideas to those
around him who shared

a

common socia 1 / scient if ic world

view

32

Illustration

2:

Photogravure of Ernst Haeckel 35
33

.

—

,

Haeckels' discovery of love at the atomic IsvpI

Contemporary evaluations of Darwin's work often
screen
out the political dimension--as has been shown
earlier in

quotations from authors who deny his Social Darwinism.

But

worse yet, even critics who manage to acknowledge
the

existence of social and political aspects treat them as
add-ons," artifacts tangential to Darwin's accomplishment;
his "real" scientific work thereby remains "pure."

Darwin's work can be segregated in this way only if the

intellectual and historical specificity of his work is
denied.

The usual way to achieve the common, and

distorted, view is to suppress the politics of Malthus,

embrace his competitive model, and apply it only to
"animals" only, reserving application to "man" in tne case
of prehistory or even further back in time.

The more

problematic aspects of human "social evolution" are left to
the margins of biology or even to the social sciences, and

are seen as controversial and "non-essential" aspects of

Darwinism
In arguing for the interconnectedness of radical

reductionist metaphysics

(a

non-emergent

materialism)

Malthusian competition and racism, my thesis is based on
the idea that an accurate historical view of Darwin must

result in

a

reevaluation of what is essentially Darwinist.

The unearthing of the fact that Haeckel reproduces many of

34

the suppressed aspects of Darwin's
theory that are crucial
to understanding the racist imperative

within Darwinism

makes visible one level of evidence for

looking at Darwin's work.
a

a

new way of

Independent of this, however, is

proof made available by an accurate reappraisal
of the

historical specifics of Darwin's work--and this forms
the
bulk of the present chapter.
It will

be shown that Darwinian Natural Selection is

the view that

progressive evolution is powered

(1)

primarily by competition resulting from the overproduction
of young relative to resources,

(2)

behavior, human or non-

human, is subject to and ultimately determined by

competition for resources,

(3)

all qualities result from

the characteristics of

a

emergent qualities

qualities that are the result of

(or

material base,

(4)

there are no

systems but do not inhere in the parts of the systems)
(5)

mental powers are

a

,

and

function of brain size and

organization (this last point follows, more or less, from
items

3

and

4)

.

We are now ready to turn to the work of

a

true disciple of Darwin, Ernst Haeckel.

Ernst Haeckel

(1834-1919) was, quite simply,

class biologist, zoologist and educator.

a

Trained as

world
a

medical doctor, like Darwin and T. H. Huxley, he turned to
an academic life of theoretical and applied science and

produced classic texts in zoology, as well as

interpretations of evolutionary theory and best-sellers in

popularized philosophy.

Gasman tells us that Haeckel was
35

one of the most renowned scientists and
writers in

Germany." 37

Indeed, his Riddle of the Universe sold

180,000 copies in its second edition; over the years

Haeckel acquired four gold medals from scientific
societies, four doctorates, and eighty diplomas. 38
of Haeckel's scientific contributions include:

A few

the

description of one hundred and fifty new species of single
celled organisms in Die Radiolarien

,

contributions to the

emerging ideas on protoplasm, and research coming close to
the discovery of phagocytes. 39

Despite his impressive credentials, Haeckel's concept
of the domain of science looks odd to late twentieth

century readers.

Even some of his contemporaries were

offended by his ideas.
assumed

In particular,

his scientific views

form of materialism that could best be described

a

as a non-denominat iona

1

form of pantheism.

This hybrid

concept included such notions as: "Des ire .. lust and
ant ipathy

.

.

.

are common to all atoms" and furthermore,

Haeckel held that there was no fundamental distinction

between the organic and the inorganic. 48

Gasman claims

that these ideas are incompatible with the materialism held
by Darwin, and places Haeckel's work somewhere in the realm
41
of religion rather than science.

Over time, some of

Haeckel's prestigious work has fallen out of favor, as did
perhaps his most famous thesis that ontogeny recapitulates
phylogeny.

Even so, as Stephen Jay Gould's work has shown

36

^
in the case of recapitulation theory,

Haeckel's work

continues to have an impact on current science.
According to Gasman it is Haeckel who
perverted
Darwin

s

ideas, transforming evolutionary theory into

racist form of Social Darwinism.

a

"Darwinism in Germany

was... often transformed almost beyond recognition," 43
and

...insisting on the literal transfer of the laws
of biology to the social realm. .Haeckel and his
immediate followers held to ideas which were
remote from the familiar naturalism of Spencer,
Darwin, and Huxley. [44]
.

and

Although he considered himself to be a close
follower of Darwin... and invoked Darwin's name in
support of his own ideas and theories, there was,
in fact, little similarity between them. [45]

Gasman claims that it was Haeckel who borrowed widely
held beliefs of racial superiority from other disciplines
in order to create a scientific racism.

Haeckel .. .decisively contributed scientific
authority to the cause of racism. By bringing
biology and anthropology to its support, in works
that were widely read and credited, he succeeded
in investing the ideas of racial nationalism with
academic respectability and scientific assurance.
It was Haeckel, in other words, who was largely
responsible for forging the bonds between
academic science and racism in Germany in the
later decades of the nineteenth century. [46]
and
To identify Darwin, instead of Haeckel as the
matrix of Hitler's social Darwinism ... is to
ignore, in addition to the enormous success of
the Weltr^tsel and Hitler's reference to Haeckel,
the obvious reality that since the publication in
1866 of Haeckel's Nattir 1 ich Schflpf ungsgeschichte
the Germans understood Darwin and Darwinism
,
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:

through the distorted lenses of Haeckel. When the
Germans refer to Darwin, more often than not they
in fact mean, not Darwin, but Haeckel... [47]
The view that Darwin promulgated

a

scientific theory--

and because scientific non-racist or at least esse nt ia 1 ly

non-racist

— so

that it must be the Social Darwinis ts who

add the racist and nationalistic elements, is not unique to

Gasman.

In fact most commentators hold a view of

evolutionary theory similar to that of George

Fredrickson
What emerged in the racial thinking of the
metropolitan British between the 1850s and the
1880s and in that of the northern middle class
between the late 1860s and the 1890s was a
greater sympathy, or at least tolerance, for the
settler or white southern point of view. The
growing popularity of "scientific racism," with
its stress on biological differences as
determining the natural capacities and destinies
of racial groups, was the most obvious
manifestation of this tendency. The
pseudo-Darwinian conception that the contest of
human races entailed a "struggle for existence"
leading to the survival or dominance of "the
fittest" became a late-Victor ian shibboleth in
both Britain and the United States. [48]

Likewise, D.R. Oldroyd

(

Darwinian Impacts

)

intones:

in fact, what is customarily referred to as
Social Darwinism might in many cases better be
described as Social Spencerism. [49]

Oldroyd also says:
Turning now from economic matters, it does not
require much stretching of the imagination to
appreciate that the arguments of Social Darwinism
might readily be extrapolated to the conclusion
that the evolutionary progress of mankind may be
furthered by inter-racial or international
struggles. [50]
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Oldroyd tries to place racism at two
removes from
Darwinism by suggesting that it was an
extension of Social
,

Darwinism which in turn was an illegitimate
extension of
51
Darwinism itself.
The movement known as Social Darwinism
was made
up of people who tried
in many different or
even contradictory ways--to apply the theories
of Darwinian evolutionism to descriptions
of the
way society is constituted, or, more riskily,
to
say how they thought it ought to be structured.

—

The passage above assumes, rather characteristically
of the secondary literature,

that moral prescription in the

description of society was not performed by Darwin, so that
such "extensions" of evolutionary theory were not

originally parts of biological theory.
Thus Gasman's book is interesting on three counts:
(1)

as one of the more extended accounts of Darwinism to

deal with the social and political dimensions of the

biological theory, and

(2)

as an in-depth look at the

transmission of scientific ideas into and within the
National Socialist State, and

(3)

by drawing attention to

the metaphysical core of materialism in Darwinism.
(1)

and

(3)

Items

concern us most here.

Gasman uses

a

two-pronged attack to differentiate

Darwin from Haeckel.

Haeckel's pantheism as

On the one hand Gasman cites
a

break with Darwin's materialism.

On the other he claims that the racist content of Haeckel's

Darwinism is Haeckel's alone.
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As we shall see. Gasman is wrong
on both counts.

It

will be shown that it was Darwin, not
Haeckel, who

initially brought the legitimating authority
of the

biological sciences to bear for racism through
evolutionary
theory.
From a theoretical perspective it is
easy to see

why this must be so for in the end Haeckel's work
remains
true to Darwin's in its deep structure.

mater ia 1 ist s of

a

Both are

particular radical-reductive sort, both

accept racial differences as the equivalent of biological

varieties, and both therefore conceptualize political
struggle as an instance of Natural Selection.

Both could

be said to be Malthusian radical reductive-materialists.
In his writings Haeckel refers to his scientific and

popular philosophical work as based on
Spinoza.

a

concept taken from

Haeckel dwells on the evils of dualism and the

virtues of monism.
is an essential

By "monism" he means that the universe

unity, one substance.

He explains:

I. Pure monism is identical neither with the
theoretical materialism that denies the existence
of spirit, and dissolves the world into a heap of
dead atoms, nor with theoretical spiritualism...
which rejects the notion of matter, and considers
the world to be a spatially arranged group of
"energies" or immaterial natural forces.

II. On the contrary, we hold, with Goethe, "that
matter cannot exist and be operative without
spirit, nor spirit without matter." We adhere
firmly to the pure, unequivocal monism of
Spinoza:
Matter, or infinitely extended
substance, and spirit (or energy), or mental
attributes are principle properties of the
all-embracing divine essence of the world, the
universal substance. [52]
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The first thing to note is that
Haeckel performs

a

classic and crude metaphysical move by defining
spirit in
terms of a scientific entity, in this
case
energy.

The

materialist basis is not undercut by the appeal
to energy,
for energy is seen as a quality of matter
i.e. movement,
which amounts to a description of location over time 55

—

.

This definition allows Haeckel to assert some
bizarre

sounding theses.

For instance

psychological entities.

— he

claims that atoms are

This must strike contemporary

readers as ridiculous, and tends to confirm the belief that
Haeckel was some sort of mystic obscurantist,

a

non- sc ien t i f ic writer, and surely no true Darwinian.

However, such as assessment would miss the truth.
Monism, perhaps better understood as

a

materialistic

pantheism (Haeckel asserts that they are one in the same
thing)

,

must ultimately be thought of as anti-mystical.

Haeckel wants to draw theists into the camp of the

atheistical scientists.

Thus he starts with the idea that:

"Pantheism teaches that God and the world are one ." 54
far he is appealing to those with

a

So

religious bent.

However, he goes on to say: "This pantheism is sharply

opposed in principle ... to all possible forms of theism..."
And then:

"It fol lows ... that pantheism is the world-system

of the modern scientist

SS

This odd claim gets explained

.

as follows:

Atheism affirms that there are no gods or
goddesses, assuming that god means a personal,
extramundane entity. The "godless world-system"
41

substantially agrees with the monism or
pantheism of the modern scientist; it is only
another expression of it, emphasizing its
negative aspect, the non-existence of any
supernatural deity.
In this sense Schopenhauer
justly remarks
Pantheism is only a polite form
of atheism. The truth of pantheism lies in
its
destruction of the dualist antithesis of God and
the world, in its recognition that the world
exists in virtue of its own inherent forces. The
maxim of the pantheist, 'God and the world are
one,' is merely a polite way of giving the Lord
God his conge " [56]
;

.

Thus, rather than arguing for

theism, Haeckel considers himself

because he calls his materialism

a

a
a

mysticism, or even

a

"polite" scientist
monism, or pantheism.

He sees the world as reducible to two things: matter and

energy.

Thus science, in what we might call

a

"traditional

sense," is the only form of true knowledge for Haeckel.

If

people want to think in terms of gods, Haeckel is pleased
to let them call the world of science god, or God.

Whatever they like.

Gasman refers to Haeckel's pantheism

as a religious view, but this is

a

gross distortion,

especially if one considers the fact that Haeckel is

comfortable with the idea of being called an atheist.
metaphysical terms, Haeckel is better referred to as

In
a

reductive materialist with pantheistic overtones.
Furthermore, the link between pantheism and

evolutionary theory was established at the beginning.
Adrian Desmond describes the origins of transmutation
theory in terms of the deist materialism of radical medical
students and teachers in the 1820's, 30's and 40's.

As

opposed to conceptualizing order as static and imposed from
42

without,

a

creationist order which on an ideological
level

supports

a

static and God-sanctioned clerical, aristocratic

and royal hierarchy, the radicals
claimed orderly change

arose from the activity of atoms.
(God)

The presence of god

was restricted to initial creation and
initial law

giving, and thus science and democracy were seen as
the

"natural" extension of the presence of the divine
in all
things.

This radical and pantheistic view assumed that

animal evolution and human social change or revolution was

inherently progressive and Darwin was exposed to these
ideas during his medical training in the "new physiology"
at Edinburgh.

We are now ready to deal with Haeckel's strange

sounding claim that atoms are psychological entities.
First remember that Haeckel was an expert on unicellular

organisms.

These "monera" presented the nineteenth-century

scientist with serious conceptual difficulties going far

beyond questions of structure and taxonomy.

Some monera

react to their environment in rapid and complicated ways.

They are only one-celled, thus do not have nerves, and yet
they respond to stimuli with movement that Haeckel thought

was comparable to that of an animal with
He reasoned that the monera

considered psychological.

'

s

a

nervous system.

movements must therefore be

Granted, he continued, it was

very low level of psychological response:
The phenomena of the lowly psychic life of the
unicellular protist and the plant, and of the
lowest animal forms--their irritability, their
43

a

reflex movements, their sensitiveness
and
instinct of self-preservation--are
directly
determined by physiological action in
protoplasm of their cells— that is, by the
physical
and chemical changes which are
partly due to
heredity and partly to adaptation.
[58]

Haeckel next makes the additional
claim that there is
no difference in kind between psychic
activity in monera
and humans.
This may be defined as the "continuity"
or

non-emergence" thesis, and as we shall see it is
also at
the center of Darwin's metaphysical
views.
Haeckel

writes:

And we must say just the same of the higher
psychic activity of the higher animals and man,
of the formation of ideas and concepts, of
the
marvelous phenomena of reason and consciousness;
for the latter have been phy logenet ica 1
ly evolved
from the former, and it is merely a higher
degree
of integration or centralization...
59
[

Thus Haeckel shows himself to be

a

]

reductive

materialist of an extreme sort, despite vague references to
"integration" and "centralization."

This detour through

the work of Haeckel would have been more speculative in

terms of an analysis of Darwin's work had not the latter's

notebooks become available to us.

The happy fact that he

recorded his private thoughts allows us to witness

remarkable parallel in ideas.
accidental, but

a

a

That the coincidence was not

result of the structure of the theory of

Natural Selection, points to Haeckel's faithfulness to

Darwin's project.

Darwin had very similar views on the existence of
psychological functions in plants and microscopic animals.
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I

ri

]

his notebooks

,

which were unavailable to Haeckel or

anyone else at the time, Darwin jots down:
Instinct is a modification of bodily structure
(connected with locomotion) / ((no! for plants
have instincts)
[60]
)

/

.

He not only attributes instincts to plants, but

consciousness to planaria.

Furthermore, he finds it

interesting to think of psychic powers as physically

divisible and

a

type of entity that may be conceptualized

numer ica 1 ly
A Planaria must be looked at as animal, with
consciousness, it choosing f ood--crawl ing from

light. --Yet we can split Planaria into three
animals, & this consciousness becomes
multiplied ...
61
[

Yet this shared view of continuity and reductive

materialism would remain interesting but perhaps less
compelling were it not for the fact that both thinkers made
a

further and rather astounding extension of the

materialist thesis.
We are about to witness an unusual philosophical move
by Haeckel.

From the standpoint of science, the following

assertion or speculation was risky for there could be no
direct observation in this instance.

Yet both Haeckel and

Darwin felt compelled to make the intellectual move out of
the particular impetus of ideas they already held.

Haeckel extends the reduction of psychology (as

equivalent to the actions of atoms and motion) --to the
location of some forms of psyche at the atomic level.

As

we saw above, Haeckel makes an understandable and perhaps
45

:

plausible case for locating psychological
functions at the
level of protoplasm, as does Darwin.

Haeckel calls the

chemical compounds which support psychic
activity

"psychoplasm."

From here he argues that atoms, too, react

to their environment in fixed ways,

and that this should be

considered the lowest, or most basic form of psychological
activity
Every shade of inclination, from complete
indifference to the fiercest passion, is
exemplified in the chemical relation of various
elements towards each other...

Haeckel continues:
The irresistible passion that draws Edward to the
sympathetic Ottilia, or Paris to Helen, and leaps
over all bounds of reason and morality, is the
same powerful "unconscious" attractive force
which impels the living spermatazoon to force an
entrance into the ovum... the same impetuous
movement which unites two atoms of hydrogen to
one atom of oxygen for the formation of a
molecule of water.
62
[

]

In the end Haeckel conceptualizes psyche as the energy

component of the mat ter /energy unity:
Even the most elaborate and the most perfect
forms of energy that we know--the psychic life of
the higher animals, the thought and reason of
man depend on material processes, or changes in
the neuroplasm of the ganglionic cells; they are
inconceivable apart from such modifications.
63

—

[

While one might raise eyebrows at the assertion that
human love is nothing different in kind from atomic

attraction, the line of reasoning leading from the organic
to the inorganic basis of psyche is not outrageous if one
is willing to assume the continuity thesis.

This extreme

reductive materialism works with the principle that since
46

]

—

:

there is nothing but matter and motion
(or energy), all
aspects of all things--inc luding organisms
& man— must
result from either a quantitative addition
of material

building blocks, or else the arrangement of
such blocks and
the interactions of their accompanying
energy.
it should
be noted, however, that it is only the
continuity
thesis

that prevents the emergence of new qualities
due to

threshold effects or organization.

Commentators have failed to notice the fact that this
radical reductive-materialism lies at the heart of

Haeckel's work, and have missed the significance of this
sc ient i f ic/

me t a phy s i ca

view for Darwin.

1

But this remarkable

extension of materialism to the current theory about atoms by
Haeckel would be more of

a

curiosity except for the fact

that Darwin shared the same view.

Remarkably enough, Darwin has left us evidence that he
wondered about the possibility that thought, because

physiological

(a

secretion of the brain 64 ), is similar to

or perhaps merely a more complex form of

— atomic

forces:

...is the attraction of carbon, hydrogen in
certain definite proportions (different from what
takes place out of bodies) really less wonderful
than thoughts --One organic body likes one kind
more than another--What is matter? The whole a
mystery. [65]
.

and

Why may it not be said thought perception will,
consciousness, memory, etc. have the same
relation to a living body (especially the
cerebral portion of it) that attraction has to
ordinary matter. [66]
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.

It

should be noted that even if

might be made for

a

plausible argument

assertion of identity between atomic,

cellular and psychological "attractions" there was no way
to verify the claim for the atomic level at the very least.
In this sense the assertion was pure speculation and it is

exactly here that one might expect values to find entry
into scientific work.

Agreement in such

a

vacuous arena

provides compelling evidence for unity of approach for both
thinkers

Speculation about atomic attraction must also be
placed in the context of contemporary physics.

Atomic

theory of the time centered around the work of John Dalton
(1766-1844), who laid the basis for the Periodic Table and

modern physics by developing the view that atoms of any one
type are uniform and combine with other atoms in strict

proportions to form molecules.

One of his great

innovations was conceptualizing

a

elements.

proliferation of

(See Andrew G. Van Melsen's classic work From

Atomos to Atom (New York: Harper and Row, 1952))

Precisely because atomic theory of the time centered
on various set proportions of elements for particular

molecules and

a

large array of elements, the analogy Darwin

and Haeckel drew between sexual attraction and atomic

bonding was strained at best.

hydrogen and one oxygen atoms

The instance of

— presents

water— two

an analogy for

sexual union not readily observed in nature.

The human

sexes combine in one proportion (indulge me here) while
48

atoms combine in

a

wild array of groupings.

Also, there

are only two sexes, while there were dozens of elements.

While their argument could be cleaned up with ad hoc
remedies and the analogy could be spun extensively through
poetic license it is clear that the lack of focus on

details made their speculation more reasonable that any

extended inspection could allow.
Even if Darwin resists overt articulation of these

metaphysical observations in his published work, it cannot
be said that Haeckel's ideas concerning psychological

attributes of atoms and microbes distinguishes his work
from that of Darwin.

Haeckel merely makes explicit the

radical reductive materialism that Darwin leaves implicit.
It

is significant that Darwin himself even thought about

this issue and it is furthermore revealing that he was not

willing to put it into print.
accident.

This suppression was not an

Yet Haeckel saw through to the suppressed and

made it visible.

Where Darwin winced, Haeckel published.

Darwin put considerable effort into concealing the radical
nature of his materialism.

In his notebooks he reveals the

following strategy for his public work:

fi

7

To avoid stating how far, I believe, in
Materialism, [and] say only that emotions,
instincts degrees of talent, which are hereditary
are so because brain of child resembles parent
stock. --(& phrenologists state that brain alters)

There were political reasons for suppressing his

materialist beliefs.
his materialism

— which

Despite the Malthusian dimension of

destroys the democratic potential of
49

Natural Select ion— in the context of British politics

materialism was considered hostile to clerical,
aristocratic and even owning/manuf actur ing elites.
By "netting" man and ape together in a
materialist evolutionary sweep Darwin invited
being identified with Dissenting or atheistic
lowlife, with activists campaigning against the
"fornicating" Church, with teachers in court for
their politics, with men who despised the
"political archbishops" and their corporation
"toads."
Ultimately Darwin was frightened for
his respectability.
These fears of a fierce
reaction were justified. [68]

Darwin found himself in

a

tight spot, for as we shall

see his radical reductive materialism plays an important

part in providing cohesiveness and evidence as well as

a

social basis for acceptance of the Natural Selection

doctrine.

Thus it is no accident that both Haeckel and

Darwin speculate about the love affairs of atoms even if
they present different public facades on this matter.
At this point Gasman's development of his third focus:

the materialism of Darwin, and his subsequent claim that

Haeckel was

a

pantheist and therefore not

a

Darwinian
Next we

scientific materialist, can be seen as erroneous.
need to examine Gasman's first major exploration,

a

into the social and political dimensions of biology.

look
He

claims that Haeckel added the elements required for the

support of racism to Darwin's essentially scientific and

non-racist theory of evolution.
Haeckel's social views must strike many

a

contemporary

reader with horror, for he felt that the chronically sick,
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:

vagrants, the insane, and the poor should not
be allowed to

reproduce, and better, should be eliminated. 69
shared the first half of this view.

But Darwin

He says:

With savages, the weak in body and mind are soon
eliminated. .We civilized men. .do our utmost to
check the process of elimination; we build
asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, the sick;
we institute poor-laws
Thus the weak
member s ... propagate their kind. No one who has
attended to the breeding of domestic animals will
doubt that this must be highly injurious to the
race of man.
It is surprising how soon a want of
care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the
degeneration of a domestic race... [70]
.

.

—

Darwin hoped that legislation, guided by the dictates of

biological theory, would prevent injurious forms of

reproduction
.when the principles of breeding and
inheritance are better understood, we shall not
hear ignorant members of our legislature
rejecting with scorn a plan for ascertaining
whether or not consanguineous marriages are
injurious to man. [71]
.

It

.

is easy to see how the radical materialist thesis

determined an interest in projects to control social
behavior by "weeding out" undesirable characteristics.
Eugenics was

a

logical outcome.

For instance, Darwin felt

certain that such characteristics as thievery were

inherited and this implied

a

particular solution to this

specific origin of crime.
I have heard of authentic cases in which a desire
to steal and a tendency to lie appeared to run in
families of the upper ranks; and as stealing is a
rare crime in the wealthy classes, we can hardly
account by accidental coincidence for the
tendency occurring in two or three members of the
same family. [72]
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Thus Darwin and Haeckel both thought
that poverty and
other social problems were biological
problems with eugenic
solutions.
It is interesting that the idea
of legitimate

theft in particular circumstances does not
intrude here
into Darwin's ideas.

He flattens out the concept to one in

which all theft is wrong, inheritable and determined,
and
socially disadvantageous. Justice is taken at face
value

despite

a

social context in which many people questioned

mainstream va lues--think of Marx, Dickens, the woman's
movement, Utopian Socialists, or even George Eliot.

However, unlike Haeckel, Darwin was generally opposed
to an active and overt social policy of "eliminating" the
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—
sick and poor for the sake of
the race's genetic well
being, despite the obvious clarity
of thought that led to
the idea:
The aid which we feel impelled
to give to the
elpless is mainly an incidental result
of the
social instincts. .nor could we check
our
sympathy, even at the urging of hard
without deterioration in the noblest reason,
part of our
nature... we mus t therefore bear the
undoubtedly
bad effect of the weak surviving and
propagating
their kind. [75; my emphasis]
.

While one might be tempted to think this
constitutes

a

major difference with Haeckel's point of view,
such is not
the case.
First, Darwin admits that a reasonable,
i.e.

rational, person would opt for destroying the poor.

He

does this openly in the passage above; note my
emphasis.

Second, his argument that the weak should be allowed
to live depends on

a

evolutionary theory.

doctrine given in terms of
This means that he is not opposed, in

principle, to the elimination of the poor, but rather he
holds that particular and historical evolutionary results
i.e. Victorian morality, prohibit such social policies in

Britain at this particular time.
The ideological adjustment Darwin makes to

evolutionary theory becomes more visible at this point.
Whereas the 30's radicals saw natural evolution implying
social revolution leading to progress, Darwin's Malthusian

version sees change as gradual and decoupled from progress.
By emphasizing overproduction of young and the resultant

inevitable shortage of resources Darwin implies that social
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change

for instance helping the poor
through a shift in
resources from the wealthy to the less
well off— will not
improve matters, in principle 76 although
it does raise the
issue of human ability to create
artificial deviations from
the "natural” course of events.
The social hierarchy thus

necessarily static, even within the context
of dynamic
evolutionary forces that drive Britain to
dominate much of
the world.
is

Within this argument for stasis however, lies
the
intractable problem of gradual change or evolution.

The

poor expand their numbers faster than the upper
classes,

resulting in "degeneration."
The moral sense, or sympathy, is

evolution's "hard reason."

a

brake on

Thus if "man's" evolution

"progressed" in the appropriate manner, Darwin would be

compelled to assent to new results--for example, if
sympathy were overcome by rational thought based upon an

understanding of genetics, then the poor might be
legitimately destroyed.

In fact,

in describing the

extermination of the indigent peoples of South America
we shall see)

(as

he conceptualizes the slaughter in terms

of an unavoidable struggle for survival.

In these cases

sympathy is checked by cultural differences causing
of recognition.

a

lack

Recognition creates empathy, which results

in sympathy.

The moral sense, or faculty, presents an interesting

facet of Darwin's theory.

According to him it is
54

a

very

recent acquisition in

t ernts

of the development of

"civilized man" and he leaves its status
ambiguous.
On the
one hand
it is a product of evolution
and hence temporary:
merely one particular organic development
subject to
changes as evolution requires. On the
other, Darwin treats
it like an end in itself--a
"highest" or "noblest"
,

development— which hints that Natural Selection
ceases

at a

certain point and morality takes over.

Thus Darwin writes:

"degeneration of

a

domestic race ..." 77

"Domestic" entails

the existence of

a

place outside the natural order, beyond

the domain of animals and plants as unaffected
by "man."

Perhaps all he meant was that British morality

provides an evolutionary advantage over other cultures that
have not evolved to the point of being ruled by
Victorian

sympathy, and the evolutionary disadvantages of allowing
the poor to propagate are more than compensated for by
the

advantages yielded by sympathy.
an abyss here.

But Darwin is teetering on

In addition to flirting with group survival

as opposed to the success of individuals,

if he follows

reason, he believes logic demands mass murder.

If he

follows his moral feelings, he finds that he shortchanges
the clarity of rationality.

Rationality in this case resides in the assumption,
long the basis of evolutionary thought, that nature must be

viewed as "as

a

working out of pre-existing laws." 7 ®

It

irrational or "unlawful" for the less fit to displace the
more fit.

This would be so if selection only operated at
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is

the level of the individual,
hence Darwin’s mention of
doniesticity--the breeder culling the herd.

Central to this dilemma is an ambivalence
and a
conumdrum.
The ambivalence is between "knowing"
that the
poor should be actively eliminated and
feeling that killing
one's countrymen is somehow wrong. But
both of these flow
from the logic of Natural Selection, and
this is the

conumdrum.

How can an essentially rational

(law-following)

process— evolution— have an irrational (law-breaking)
result?

The answer lies with two things: one, the

assumption that there is

a

telos to evolution and two,

Darwin's ambivalence over whether Natural Selection selects

individuals or groups.
Although Darwin is credited with doing away with final
ends, the claim for

a

"noblest" nature as

a

result of

nature which limits and yet defines evolution reasserts
telos.

Also, despite contemporary claims, such as that by

Malcolm Jay Kottler that "...Wallace supported, while
Darwin rejected the possibility of group selection""^ it
clear that the doctrine of sympathy invokes the mechanism
of group selection on several levels.

It

is interesting

that even Darwin’s contemporary champions display

personality over this issue.

a

split

Kottler's text definitively

claims that Darwin rejected group selection, as noted
above, but his end note on this passage reads:
In the Descent Darwin did adopt group selection
to account for the origin of the moral sense in

humans ...

[

80

]
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To be consistent,

Darwin could appeal to the special

survival advantages of morality, but
then he cannot
legitimately appeal to its extra-evolutionary
status as
nobler" as the definitive reason this
path must be
endorsed.
Darwin is trapped between Victorian
mores and
various scientific demands of his theory.
On the one
hand, he fears for the "degeneration"
of English (human)
stock, on the other the obvious solution
appalls him.

Nor

could he turn the other way, placing more
emphasis on the

artificial or extra-evolutionary aspects of civilization,
because then it is impossible to claim inferiority
of the
poor due to their being less fit, for they survive and

reproduce.

He is stuck, conceptually.

To his credit,

he

was not as consistent as Haeckel was in regards to

elimination of the "weak."
Commentators miss the point that morality was for
Darwin ambivalently held both as
its highest result

— its

a

result of evolution, and

escape; Oldroyd says;

Darwin and Wallace said that evolutionary change,
according to the mechanism they envisaged, gave
rise to a 'better' adaptation of organisms to
their environment.
They also agreed that the
evolutionary process produced a constantly
increasing complexif ication of organisms. But
they wholly rejected the idea that the
evolutionary 'progress' of organisms had any kind
of moral dimension.
81
'

'

[

]

We shall develop Darwin's views on progress and evolution
later,

in section "C,":

"Progress, Craniometries and Race."

But right now it should be emphasized that both Darwin and

Haeckel argue that any cultural aspect is an evolutionary
57

.

artifact

produced through strict application
of biological
law and reducible to biological
components.
,

The relation of reason, morality,
and Natural

Selection in Darwin is complicated and
contradictory, and
presents an excellent example of Darwin's
ambivalent
attitudes.

He suggests that morality supersedes
reason,

but this is undercut by the materialist
metaphysics.

Any

behavior, moral behavior included, by altering the
material
base (the brain)
is an inheritable characteristic
,

providing human variation and is selectable as such and
so
is enmeshed in Natural

Selection.

Indeed, what could be

extra-evolutionary, if one accepts radical materialism?
The problem of the level of selection, group or

individual, merely multiplies possibilities, but does not
a

1

ter the fundamental point here.

instance, that sympathy results in

One can argue, for
a

structural change of

the brain and provides survival advantage.

This is so

despite the lurking problem that group selection (or action
by the group)

disconnects individual selection and so no

longer can human evolution be evaluated purely in terms of
the traits of the individuals: the "unfit" individuals

survive

Reason is assumed by Darwin to accord with Natural
Select ion--on the one hand, through admission of the

rationality of extermination of the poor.

On the other, by

resisting morality, reason seems to be out of sync with the
reality of group or individual advantages.
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Darwin seems to

assume, unref lect ive ly

based and

that reason-because materially

,

product of evolution— is in principle
and a
££iori in harmony with Natural Selection,
but he also
undercuts this idea because reason is
inadequate to the
a

situation which also includes the
emotional and moral life
of "man

"
.

Darwin's harmony principle for reason is
questionable
at once
even outside the present sympathy problem:
reason
can be used to argue for multiple courses
,

of action,

some

advocating short-term selective advantage, some middle,
some long range.

It

is by no means clear that accidental

environmental shifts can be anticipated by reason, so to
take

a

reasonable, or adaptive course now is not

necessarily
the future.

a

productive way to gain selective advantage in
Perhaps his hesitancy to eliminate the poor is

based on such considerations.

In any case,

implicit in

this situation is the problem of how to understand the

human ability to conceptualize the future, create

a

plan

and act accordingly, as opposed to the plant and animal

procedure of having

a

strategy selected for them by

nature's history of contingencies.

Jeffrie G. Murphy
Meaning of Life

)

(

Evolution

,

Morality

,

and the

is correct in writing that Darwin waffles

on whether morality is a part of Natural Selection or
o o

not.

However, he fails to understand the complexity of

Darwin's ambivalent understanding of morality, selective
advantage, and the nature of reason.
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In the end Darwin is,

.

I

believe, committed to

a

Malthusian radical reductive

materialism even though this creates
conundrums and
complications he cannot solve. Thus other

Darwinists, such

as Haeckel, rightly call their less
ambivalent social

programs essentially Darwinist.
Darwin's commitment to

a

Malthusian approach must be

understood in relation to the social history of the
Poor
Law Amendment Act of 1834.
The act was designed to end outdoor relief
and
force the "genuinely" sick poor into the
workhouses.
These were made so abominable
through physical discomfort, family breakup, and
prison regime that none but the chronic would
endure them. By keeping more people at work, it
was reasoned that competition would increase and
wages decrease, in line with the low workhouse

relief.

[83]

The act was widely attacked at the time, and accused of

being

a

nothing.

right-wing attempt to hurt those who had
(See Chapter IV.)

In terms of Darwin's

reason" argument, several aspects must be noted.

"hard

First,

even without active measures being taken, governmental

policy could, by removing "unnatural" support

("care

wrongly directed"), help to put the poor in their "proper"
place (in nature).

Second, sympathy is viewed as

ineffectual and irrational, so an increase in the hostility
of the environment through a lowering of wages is seen as

sensible, realistic and neutral.

Third, the end result

implicitly hoped for was increased profits for

industrialists
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.

Even though Darwin places sympathy
above rational
arguments for culling the poor, he is still
committed to
the restrictions Malthus places on
the poor's well-being.
Thus domestic social policy on Darwinian
terms favors the

industrialist and foreign policy favors
colonialism.
The ranking of individuals, cultures and
races according to
complexity," technological status and moral
codes becomes
a basis for the scientifically
sanctioned, but perhaps

emotionally distasteful domination of the local poor,
the
individuals of

a

different culture, and the non-European

(the Native)

While Darwin felt that poor Englishmen should be

allowed to die off at

a

"natural" pace, out of the moral

obligation engendered in sympathy, he felt otherwise about
the poor, and even the rich, of races which were not

English, or at least European.

Darwin understood the

slaughter of the indigent peoples of the world by the

colonizing Europeans as an unavoidable and unalterable

evolutionary struggle.

In fact,

he saw the over-powering

of the "savages" as proof that they were inferior 84
.

At the present day civilized nations are

everywhere supplanting barbarous nations,
excepting where the climate opposes a deadly
barrier; and they succeed mainly, though not
exclusively, through their arts, which are
products of the intellect.
It is, therefore,
highly probable that with mankind the
intellectual faculties have been mainly and
gradually perfected through natural selection.
The idea that the destruction of indigenous peoples

could be understood in terms of
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a

battle of national or

1

individual racial strengths was not

a

new one for Darwin

and may have even predated his version
of evolutionary
theory.
In an early work he writes:

Wherever the European has trod, death seems to
pursue the abor igina 1
The varieties of man seem
to act on each other in the same way as
different
species of animals--the stronger always
extirpating the weaker. [85]
.

.

.

Lest one think that the phrase "supplanting
barbarous

nations" indicates the abstract viewpoint of one

unacquainted with the realities of the colonization
process, we need only attend Darwin's misgivings over the

extermination (he uses this term) of Natives to know
otherwise

:

This [the slaughter of the male Indians] is a
dark picture; but how much more shocking is the
unquestionable fact, that all the women who
appear above twenty years old are massacred in
cold blood!
When I exclaimed that this appeared
rather inhuman, he answered, "Why, what can be
done? they breed so!"
Every one here is fully convinced that this
is the most just war, because it is against
barbarians. Who would believe in this age that
such atrocities could be committed in a Christian
civilized country? [86]

Despite the scruples voiced above, Darwin acknowledged
that the "just war" ideology was rational to some extent,
or at least understandable:

This expression [most just of all wars, because
against barbarians] it must be confessed, is very
natural, for till lately, neither man, woman, nor
horse, was safe... [87]

Later on in the Journa

he adopts the stance of the Descent

when he admits that the domination of the savage is cruel,
but necessary.
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.

,

All the aborigines have been
removed to an
island. .This most cruel step seems
to have been
quite unavoidable, as the only
means of
stopping. .robberies. .murders.
[88]
.

.

.

.

.

Note that the premise of colonialism,
the Malthusian
expansion of British hegemony throughout
the world, goes
unremarked but assumed none the less.
In the end he saw the "savage" as

degenerated form of humanity.

a

lower, or perhaps

However he does place the

"savage" one cut above the criminal.

Unlike the criminal,

the savage's depravity is not willful:

...the brightest tints on the surrounding woods
could not make me forget that forty hardened...
[criminals] were ceasing from their ... labours
like the slaves from Africa, yet without their
holy claim for compassion. [89]
Thus Darwin had no illusions about what "supplanting"

meant, and his compassion was blunted by an acknowledgment
of necessity.

This necessity had two components: the sense

of a natural, and hence uninterruptable

,

process, and the

rational needs of the conquering Europeans.
The assumption of conventional moral disapproval of

slavery is held side by side with the imperative for

British expansion.

In terms of the equation of evolution,

slaves and the lower classes are particulars instantiating
the variable which under the Malthusian law must suffer and

then die.

Darwin is consistent in his pity tinged with

regret that so many must perish so that civilization will

survive
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In terms of his evolutionary
theory,

Darwin's

Malthusian and reductive-materialist view
precludes the
analysis of colonization as a political

event having causes

and results that function outside
evolutionary concerns and
strictures as morality might. At this pole
of the

ambivalence of "man's" place in nature, sympathy
is seen as
an advantage the European conquerors
have over
the Natives.

This flattening of possibility occurs because
in this

context he allows the metaphysical demand for

reduction

a

of all aspects of culture to competitive advantage
to

overpower post-evolutionary possibilities.
Political decisions to attack another nation or to
annex land from Natives may be construed on Darwinian

grounds as technological events.

Due to particular social

organization (social technology) and the availability of
military power (material technology)
a

,

the combatants enter

struggle that begins with the premise that one side or

the other must perish due to limitations of supplies

(Malthusian technological constraints)

in the context of

two populations that "naturally" attempt to expand.

Darwin equates the technological level of
with its evolutionary level.

It

a

society

is the development of

machine technology which lifts humans above the other
species and distinguishes civilization from "savages" or
other Natives.

It

is the human technique of imitation

which allows for the reproduction of machine culture.

Thus

social skills are reduced to technological concerns, and
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the reproduction of social skills
itself is reified into

a

technique for survival. 90
Now, if some one man in a tribe,
more sagacious
than the others, invented a new snare
or
weapon... the plainest self-interest ..
.would
prompt the other members to imitate him...
The
habitual practice of each new art must
likewise
in some slight degree strengthen the
intellect.

Thus an invention, through use by
individuals of the group,
increases the evolutionary advantage of each individual
and

their evolutionary ranking.

The issue of ranking of the

group is left vague here, for even those of the group
who
did not adopt the technology, such as women
who do not use
the new weapons,

for example, would benefit.

application of

variation on Lamarck's thesis

a

By the
(i.e.

he

allowed for acquired characteristics to be biologically
encoded and passed on in his theory of "Pangenesis")

,

the

acquired behavior engenders an inheritable trait, and thus
in this case advances the ranking of descendents and

possibly even the group.

Darwin therefore feels entitled

to claim that important inventions, for instance gunpowder,

not only give an edge to the European colonizers, it

defines and codes

a

superiority that allows, explains,

and ultimately justifies colonization.
If the new invention were an important one, the
tribe would increase in number, spread, and
supplant other tribes.
In a tribe thus rendered
more numerous there would always be a greater
chance of the birth of other superior and
inventive members. [91]

Technology, intelligence, progress.

Where early

evolutionists following the Jacobin implications of change
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:

based on individual cooperation and
empowerment find

m

materialism 92 Darwin's Malthusian version
sees
progress through struggle and elimination of
the "less
progress

fit

2.

,

"
.

Natives and the ranking of species

In the paragraph immediately following the one in

which Darwin tells us that the Europeans are everywhere

supplanting the barbarous nations, he describes the savages
as ranked close,

in level,

to apes:

"Apes are much given to

imitation, as are the lowest savages..." 92

This

juxtaposition is not accidental, for in reducing the
colonial wars to the mechanical progression of Natural
Selection, Darwin is able to place the savage securely on
the level

animal.

(or as close as

possible to that level) of the

This placement has many results, one of which is

preventing an invocation of the moral sentiment of
sympathy.

This allows the ideology of colonization to

escape unanalyzed, and furthermore explains and justifies

European domination.

In his private notebooks,

view that colonialism is

a

Darwin's

form of evolutionary struggle is

clear 94
i

When two races of men meet, they act precisely
like two species of anima Is --they fight, eat
each other, bring diseases to each other etc, but
then comes the more deadly struggle, namely which
have the best fitted organization, or instinct
.
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(i.e. intellect in man) to
gain the day. ..The
peciaiiar skulls of the men on the
plains of
Bolivia ... they have been exterminated
on
principles strictly applicable to the universe—

The ideological aspect of this
argument is exposed

when two things are recognized: Darwin
often emphasizes the
"gulf" between savage and civilized Englishman,
but

he also

offers first-hand testimony that this divide
may be closed
through a few years' education:
In contradiction to what has often
been stated, 3
years has been sufficient to change savages into
as far as habits go, complete & voluntary
Europeans. [95]

On the face of it, the evolutionary imperative
to

exterminate Natives becomes suspect when
will vault them into the English culture.

a

little education
Of course the

unstated rejoinder is that in Malthusian terms this ability
of the Native to rise through the tiers of civilization is

irrelevant to the problem of shortages.

But this is

insufficient too, for one could argue that the best Natives
would rise higher than most ordinary Englishmen if given
the chance.

Thus the most competitive society might be

comprised of

a

mixture of races.

The suppressed argument for the necessity of

extermination is not merely an oversight.

The very

discussion of this topic would invite overtly political

dimensions to surge forward.

Other thinkers of the time

were already voicing alternatives to practices of

annihilation.

As the devious Westermack pointed out:
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I
am convinced that in our dealings
with
non-European races some sociological knowledge,
well applied, would generally be a
more
satisfactory weapon than gunpowder.
It would be
more humane and cheaper too. [96]

The power of this objection is more keenly
felt when
one realizes that Darwin's ideas on the
inher itabi 1 ity of

traits

(pangenesis)

included the notion that learned

behavior is incorporated physically and thus makes
ready
for transmission an increased learning capacity for

descendents.

The possibility of altering characteristics

through education contains many progressive alternatives
that should complicate Darwin's views on the transmission
of culture.

He argued in the "M" notebook that childhood

education was desirable because knowledge would then be
more readily available for inheritance by later

generations.

Education that occurred after the procreative

stage would be wasteful, and so would be irrational and

counter to sound evolutionary doctrine.
Given Darwin's materialism any form of human thought
or activity is reducible to a material base which must obey

the laws of nature.

Thus politics--on all levels

manifestation of the laws of Natural Selection.
fact,

— is

a

Given this

in order for Darwin to substantiate his claim that

race war is unavoidable,

(given evolutionary laws), he must

be able to establish the biological base which mandates

struggle unto death.

If

a

there are adequate biological

resources, of if an alternative political solution is

possible, the biological imperative goes away or at least
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lessens and the extermination becomes
senseless as far as
scientific theory is concerned.
(This point will become
more pointed when considered in terms
of birth control.)

There is another wrinkle in Darwin's idea
of necessary
and lethal competition, namely that
many systems gain

stability through

a

failure to eradicate opposing forces.

Darwin may have sensed this in his discussion
of the

rationale for destruction of the lower classes, and

a

contemporary example might be the hegemony of the
Republican and Democratic parties in the United States.
Also,

if

the poor were eliminated, and replaced by the
more

fit upper classes

would the wealthy want to work in the

factories ?

Clearly

a

struggle between opposing political systems

or beliefs does not demand the death of the opponent.
is doubly true,

for

a

change in beliefs

(as

This

brought on by

education, rational argument, agreement to disagree, or

a

political solut ion--f or instance by democratic process)

accomplishes change without bloodshed.

Thus we see that

political struggle can look very unlike Natural Selection,
and might best be compared to it only metaphorically.

Of

course Darwin's controversial theory of pangenesis further

complicates but does not settle this issue.
Oddly enough, Darwin endorses such "re-education" in
his notebooks:

Animals do attack the weak & sickly as we do the
wicked. --we ought to pity & assist & educate by
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putting contingencies in the way to
aid motive
power.
[98]

—

Furthermore, in order to be scientifically
credible,
the exercise of political power must be
evaluated in terms
of survival value if Darwin is to have
it his way.

It

wouldn't be enough to point to colonial expansion
as proof
of superior survival value.
Such a gesture would violate
his principle of progress, for success is but
related to

current conditions.

Colonial policies might lead to over

extension and collapse of the empire in question.
Isolationism might produce

better survival strategy.

a

The

ideological nature of the scientific application of

biological laws to human geopolitical activity becomes
apparent when these issues remain on

a

level of politics

and the theorist does not require biological evidence or

explicit and extended arguments.

Darwin's racism provides

the biological evidence necessitated by his claims for the

scientific justification of empire.

This will be spelled

out shortly.
So let us re-examine Gasman's claim

(from above)

:

Haeckel... decisively contributed scientific
authority to the cause of racism. By bringing
biology and anthropology to its support, in works
that were widely read and credited, he succeeded
in investing the ideas of racial nationalism with
academic respectability and scientific assurance.
We have witnessed Darwin's use of biology to support racial

domination.

Furthermore,

a

more detailed examination of

Darwin's work reveals that he, like Haeckel, thought that

nationalism was an evolutionary artifact.
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Darwin reveals

his view that evolution moves
man from the levels of tribe
to community to nation when he
describes the function of

sympathy.

While Darwin attempts to relate this
"advance"

in loyalty to an individual's sense
of rationality,

germ of

a

the

group entity is inevitably present.
As man advances in civilization, and
small tribes
are united into communities, the simplest
reason
would tell each individual that he ought to
extend his social instincts and sympathies to
all
members of the same nation. [99]

Darwin goes on to claim that the movement from
nationalism
to pan-nationalism is prevented only by "an
artificial

barrier

,

i.e.

the "great differences in appearance or

habits" between nations

.

Thus for Darwin the domination of inferior races is

scientific matter (i.e. under the constraints of

a

a

radical

materialist evolutionary theory) which functions,
potentially, at
to the

a

more brutal level than is "necessary" due

"artificial" barrier of strangeness between

cultures.

Darwin's complex array of ideas allows him to

simultaneously endorse

a

noble moral conceit via sympathy,

while Malthusian evolutionary forces demand the destruction
of foreign cultures.

Darwin's ambivalence to "savages"

takes the form of an articulated wish to treat them as
part of

a

universal humanity (thus deserving sympathy)

alongside this desire is

a

a

,

but

scientifically-validated

justification of more overt and violent domination.
Furthermore, the abuses to which the latter is capable are

claimed to be unavoidable, though of course "unfortunate,"
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side effects of the difficulties
that plague the path to
higher civilization.
Darwin created Social Darwinism even
if he held the doctrine ambivalently.

C.

Progress, Craniometries and Race

The scientific racism Darwin creates is based
on his

concept of progress, the craniometric evidence available
to
him, and ultimately on

Malthusian reductive materialism.

a

These seemingly disparate elements are not independent of
each other, but rather form an interconnected complex.
The Darwinian idea of progress is complex.

Initially,

critics attacked Natural Selection as manifestly false

because not all organisms had evolved to "higher" forms.
But it is often noted that one of the major advances of

Darwinian theory was that it dispensed with the view that

evolution is equivalent to progress
Let us review the situation.

evolutionary theory vis

a

^*"*1
.

One problem for

vis creationist thought during

Darwin's period was the continued existence of simple or
"unevolved" organisms, such as infusoria (roughly

equivalent to ciliated protozoans) or rhizopods (protozoans

with-root like pseudopods).

These organisms bucked the

assumed evolutionary trend of "progress" or change towards
"increased complexity."

Their simple morphology stood out

as a challenge to the idea that Natural Se lect ion--as
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a

force demanding change— could be
the uniform law of nature
it claimed to be.

Darwin had an adequate response to this
challenge:
On our theory the continued existence
of lowly
organisms offers no difficulty; for natural
selection, or the survival of the fittest,
does
not necessarily include progressive
development
.And it may be asked what
advantage ... wou Id it be to an infusorian
animalcule. .to be highly organized. [102]
.

.

.

Quite simply, according to Darwin the process
of

Natural Selection allows particular organisms which
possess
survival advantages over other organisms competing
for the
same niche to leave

a

higher proportion of progeny.

Since

selection pressure is neutral, it has no agenda and
therefore unless increased specialization of parts, or
complexity, yields

a

particular advantage vis

a

vis the

other competing organisms it will confer no survival

differentia 1 and complexity will not be selected.

Darwin

thought that the specialization of parts to particular

functions need not be an advantage and this would be

especially obvious in the case of tiny organisms.

To

create an example, what use would an amoeba have for
nerve cell or

a

a

liver cell added to itself?

Indeed, Darwin noted to himself that "in my theory

there is no absolute tendency to progression." 10 ^

While

explaining that progress and history is opaque to himself,
however, he points to the deeper structure which demands
and powers an all but inevitable progress.
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f various checks... do
not prevent the reckless,
the vicious and otherwise inferior
members of
society from increasing at a quicker
rate than
the better class of men, the nation
will
retrograde, as has too often occurred in the
history of the world. w e must remember that
progress is no invariable rule.
it is very
difficult to say why one civilized nation rises,
becomes more powerful, and spreads more quickly
at one time than another; or why the same
nation
progresses more quickly at one time than another.
We can only say that it depends on an increase
in
the actual number of the population, on the
number of men endowed with high intellectual and
moral faculties, as well as on their standard
of
excellence. Corporeal structure appears to have
little influence, except as far as vigour of body
leads to vigour of mind. [104]

Despite initial claims that progress is no rule, and its

development opaque, selective advantage is expressed in
terms of intelligence/morals which pan out in terms of

technology, brain size and social organization.

This

factor is adjusted according to the ratio of smart/dumb
or upper class/lower class.

increase in population

— which

The second factor is an
in the animal world is the

sine qua non of success.
Of special interest here is the Victorian

and Darwinian)

criminals

(Malthusian

perception that the poor (reckless),

(vicious), and the sick

(inferior)

were swamping

out the intelligent, responsible and virtuous

(entrepreneuria 1 /noble classes)

.

In Darwinian terms there

is a conflict between increasing population as an indicator

of success and the ratio of poor to managerial classes.

There is also
sympathy.

a

related conflict between fitness and

In the end it is intelligence/brain size that

powers progress.

Thus racist craniometries provides

a

reliable indicator of success as long as
sympathy is held
check.
In this sense progress is more

m

or less

inevitable and ultimately based upon intellectual
power.
A
is

conceptual problem for Darwin on this topic

that in the case of more complex organisms,
such as

mammals, most species have evolved analogous
specialized

organs and this specialization ultimately arose
from

ancestors who were simpler in organization.
concept of change becomes entangled with

increased specialization of parts.

a

Thus the very

movement to

While Darwin recognized

that this trend was independent of change in itself, and
he

recognized that change is accidental
contingent and non-teleological

,

— i.e.

historically

he at times succumbed to

the idea that evolution is inevitably driven to increasing

complexity.

This drive is encoded in "noblest" as applied

to sympathy and "excellence" as applied to intelligence and

class.

Furthermore, he implies that some force (most

likely government), through "various checks," should

prevent the poor/criminal/sick

— insane

population from

increasing "too quickly."
Despite the lack of an invariable rule, and an

incomplete knowledge of causes, Darwin promulgates
agenda in the name of progress.

a

social

This is so despite his

decoupling of change and progress for species other than
"man."

Within his argument there is

a

tension between

evolutionary success in terms of sheer numbers--and success
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.

m

terms of

.

a

preconceived notion of fitness (large brains,

higher ratio of upper to lower class)

Within the social context Darwin's attempt at

decoupling change and progress was quite revolutionary.
Change, or evolution in the general sense, had
been linked
by radical materialists of the 1830's to social
revolution
in their attacks on the Poor Laws, Malthus,

of

the privileges

"Oxbridge," the clergy, royalty and the establishment as

artificial impediments to "natural" advances available
through democracy and the legitimation of social position

through fair competition. 105
of these would-be reformers,

Darwin personally knew some
such as Grant, with whom he

went to medical school in Scotland.
of politics,

Spencer presented

And on the right wing

conservative version of

a

progressive evolution.
But Darwin's conservative Whig politics were

incompatible with ideas of social revolution, 106 and the

addition of Malthusian competition to radical materialism
altered the simpler idea of progress in terms of the

breakdown of class privileges and

a

promulgation of fair

competition
Darwin does talk of evolution leading to, or

progressing to "man."

And when Haeckel was introducing

Darwinism the battle was described as between "evolution
and progress

[on the one side]

,

and on the other the

10 7
creation and immutability of the species."

Most

biological terminology continues to code the preference for
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.

progress"— despite the connotation
merely

lineage.

a

to idea of "descent" as

For instance, most evolutionary trees

Place the present at the top, coding

a

preference for the

elevated," rather than descending to the
present at the
bottom.
Recent, more differentiated organisms are
referred
to as "higher" or "more complex" by Darwin
and even our

contemporaries.
less simple

?

Why not "lower"

(as

in "descended")

or

A subtle bias for a positive view of

progress underlies Darwinian and Victorian vocabulary

despite
Ma 1 thus

a

,

negative view of the world situation (e.g.
and Darwin's claims for Victorian "nobility" being

the source of degeneration)
As we saw above, Darwin held the view that

civilization results from evolution's press for larger
brains and greater complexity (specialization)

.

Such

a

view

is coded by both his and Haeckel's normative vocabulary

even when they ostensibly refer to survival power; he
refers to the "superiority" and "advanced" state of

civilized man. Haeckel follows Darwin's lead, for Darwin
quite clearly enunciates the view that progress and

evolution are synonymous:
...here we enter on a very intricate subject, for
naturalists have not defined to each other's
satisfaction what is meant by an advance in
organization. Amongst the vertebrata the degree
of intellect and an approach in structure to man
clearly comes into play... Von Baer's standard
seems the most widely applicable and the best,
namely, the amount of differentiation of the
parts of the same organic being... and their
specialization for different functions... [108]

77

Darwin continues:
If we

take the standard of high organization,
the
amount of differentiation of the several
organs
each being when adult (and this will
include
the advancement of the brain for intellectual
purposes)
natural selection clearly leads
towards this standard... [109]

m

,

First,

it

should be noted, even Victorian biologists

were aware that insects were by far more successful
than
any imitator of humans.

On

a

deeper level,

a

teleological

view exists side by side with Darwin's theoretical

decoupling of progress and evolution.

This result is

if one thinks of Darwin's work as a consistent

whole.

On the other hand, if one accepts the

inconsistencies as surface distortions as opposed to
mistakes, one can start to think about what deeper issues

prevent the homogenization of articulated theory.
In this particular case Darwin is inventing a

secular/scientific reason for recreating what might be
called

a

universe.

"religious view" of "man" as the center of the

Remember his quip about "noblest."

In the

context of Victorian ideas about "man's" place in nature we
see Darwin above resuscitating

Chain Of Being" theory.
Great Chain of Being

.

variant of the "Great

(See A. Lovejoy's classic: The

Whereas the old classification of

)

organisms was based on

a

a

hierarchy leading to God, Darwin's

is based on a hierarchy leading the specialization of parts

(and its correlates in capitalist industrialism), man,
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.

greater intellect

(the entrepreneur)

and

(Victorian)

mora 1 ity

Darwin was quite aware of the deficiencies
of this
hierarchical view, and the passages quoted are
hemmed in
with qualifications and observations about
the various

intricacies" of the topic.

He knows that it makes little

sense to compare species that occupy separate
niches:
...if we look to the different grades of
organization within the same great group; for
instance, in the vertebra ta ... [we find] the
co-existence of mammals and fish... But mammals
and fish hardly come into competition with each
other; the advancement of the whole class of
mammals, or of certain members in this class, to
the highest grade would not lead to their taking
the place of fishes. [110]

But the lumping of all mammals together as

species attempting to become human is odd.

a

group of

Why human

attributes would aid animals that occupy different niches
than humans do is unclear, unless one assumes that there is
a

special value to human attr ibutes regardles s of niche, in

which case the "human" aspect of the qualitie s is
secondary, and the "inevitabi lity" of progres s based on
those attribute s reasserts it self

Another way to make the Darwinian structure visible
is to observe how he uses the

language of the Great Chain

to code the view of a hierarchy of development in terms of

evolution to greater complexity:
Although organization, on the whole, may have
advanced and be still advancing throughout the
world, yet the scale will always present many
degrees of perfection... [Ill]
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Darwin makes perfection

a

telos and links it to an

increasing complexity of morphology.

The inadequacy of

this view is obvious, and Darwin recognized
this for
lower

species.

Environmental parameters can sometimes be

better met through increased specialization,
and sometimes
not.

The use of the word "perfection" is notable
because

it allows Darwin to traffic in a normative
element without

explicitly having to defend "superiority" with biological
facts or confront his own opposing theoretical insight
that

superiority is

a

particular local and historical fact of

the most radically contingent and reversible sort.
In his use of the word "perfection" Darwin takes on a

vocabulary of earlier radicals such as Lamarck and Geoffroy
who use it as "tricolor banners" demanding social and

political reform'*'^ and reconfigures it for more

conservative ends.

The hierarchical view implied in

"perfection" contributes to the scientizat ion of capitalism
and racism.

Darwin will echo the claim of some of his

contemporaries in anthropology that civilization
specialized than primitive existence.

is more

He will argue that

the success of Europeans against Natives shows superiority

based on differentiation, technology and mental powers.
This approach to the topic deflects attention from the

conceptual possibility that domination of Natives is based
on political will backed up by

a

lucky accumulation of

technological power, in favor of an analysis in terms of
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racial characteristics linked to the
"higher evolution" of
larger brains and the resulting more lethal
weapons.
On the one hand Darwin wants to rate
organisms on

their 'perfection"

(degree of differentiation, or

hierarchical status) and on the other he wants to
dispense
with the scale altogether and claim that any organism
(or

species)

is fit or

"perfect" insofar as it evolves

a

successful strategy for its niche.
A bias

toward the view that adaptation is always

enhanced by complexity of organization need not be

blatantly ideological as it might be accounted for by
Darwin's assumption that environmental change is always
slow.

Catastrophism on the other hand might favor more

basic systems, for those animals that specialize too finely

would not be able to change rapidly enough to cope with

radically altered environment.

a

In this way the assumption

of the ubiquitous value of complexity can be seen as both

"neutral" and "loaded."

Insofar as the appeal is to

geological assumptions of slow change (although even this
can be construed as politically tainted--as
of revolution)

the assumption looks neutral.

same time assumptions of the advantages of
labor and

a

a

a

devaluation
But at the

division of

non-cooperative (i.e. anti-welfare state)

political economy look loaded.

Here overdetermination

makes distinctions such as Longino's questionable.
In terms of the fitness of Natives,

in order to be

consistent Darwin would have to rate "savages" as "perfect"
81

in regards to their niche as
it existed before Europeans

changed the niche through their presence.
see,

he does not take this approach.

But as we shall

The application of

this consideration about perfection to the
problem of

colonialism within Darwin's evolutionary theory
yields
interesting results. On the one hand, he argues

that due

to less "severe" competition 113

(although no argument is

advanced as to why this is true; this could refer
to the
lack competition from the more advanced Europeans)

the

indigenous peoples of America and Africa have evolved
less

than Europeans.

(But

in other places he argues for

the degeneration of civilization due to an artificial
end
of natural competition through the implementation of laws

helping the poor, and late marriage of the elite who also
have fewer children.)

Thus, Darwin concludes, these

peoples must be displaced by the "more advanced" Europeans.
"Progress" in this context is decoupled from Darwin's other

claims for moral supersession of nature.
Also, the Malthusian imperative for expanding

territorial holdings was highly questionable even at the
time Darwin was writing.
Four.)

(Much more on this in Chapter

Even so, the necessity of the destruction of

Natives is not the only conclusion to erupt from Darwin's

conflicted theory.

Sympathy as the "noblest" virtue of

civilization could preclude extermination and suggest
more benign form of colonization.
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a

And the possibility of

^

education engendering

a

Lamarckian change of

characteristics suggests another wrinkle.
The deep structure which causes
Darwin to waffle on
progress and the role of civilization resides
in an

ambivalent attitude to change, especially in
how it applies
to humans in terms of perfection, morality,
degeneration
and whether the human will puts humans
to one side or

within evolution.
One disturbing piece of paleontological evidence
in
this regard was the fact that the skulls of the

Neanderthals proved "capacious
contemporary average.

l

in comparison to the

This judgement was based on the idea

that brain size correlates with intelligence.

Darwin

endorsed the use of this correlation:
The belief that there exists in man some close
relation between the size of the brain and the
development of the intellectual faculties is
supported by the comparison of the skulls of
savage and civilized races, of ancient and modern
people, and by analogy of the whole vertebrate
series.
Dr. J. Bernard Davis has proved, by many
careful measurements, that the mean internal
capacity of the skull in Europeans of 92.3 cubic
inches; in Americans 87.5; in Asiatics 87.1; and
in Australians only 81.9 cubic inches. [115]

That Darwin was uneasy about what he claims to be

"proved" is clearly shown in his treatment of the evidence
at hand.

Initially he notes that Prof. Broca claims that

the skulls of medieval Frenchmen were smaller than modern

French skulls "in the proportion of 1484 to 1426

.

(Broca's data is reproduced from Vogt's table of

craniometric evidence, which Darwin cites (in
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a

footnote)

)

in Figure 2.

Darwin also cites Broca's work at this

location. 117

Directly after this passage Darwin points
out that the
Neanderthal skulls indicate just the opposite
trend, and

the fact that these remains are many
times older than

Broca's data from the 12th century.
1426 represents

a

4% difference.

this would comprise of
(19th)

European, or

a

a

The ratio of 1484 to

In terms of cubic inches,

change of 3.7 for the "modern"

difference commensurable with the

jump down from the "modern" European to the "modern"

American.

As Stephen Jay Gould has pointed out, these

measurements were the results of racist preconceptions,
poor manipulations of the data, and data which sometimes
had

a

margin of error in excess of 4%. 118
Also, despite the certainty previously expressed,

Darwin comes to doubt that craniometry can accurately gauge

intelligence. 119

While Darwin might be thought to be

pushing the point that craniometry gives general evidence,
rather than specific details, such
more questions than it answers.

a

For,

point of view raises
the specific

if

evidence was not fine-grained enough to capture
intelligence, and the acknowledged margin of error was high

enough to swamp out trends between races, the whole project
collapses.

Gould points out that "with

a

3.5 percent mean

difference between smallest and largest sample, it is
likely that no statistically significant differences exist
at all" 120

(i.e. between Broca's data on twelfth.
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,

.

eighteenth and nineteenth century
Parisians— the very data
Darwin cites from Carl Vogt)
In terms of the Parisian skull
evidence, Gould points

out that while the shift from 1426 to
1484 seems to
indicate an increase in average cranial
size from the 12th
to the 19th centuries (for upper-class
individua Is— note
that this data assumes the private vaults
contain upper

class individuals, otherwise the class spread
between

commoners and the aristocracy of the 19th century:
81 cc,
would swamp out the 59 cc difference between the

12th and

19th centuries

and this is circular reasoning on Broca's

part), Broca's average for the 12th to 18th centuries was
1,409 cc

(lower class) .1^1

The average for common grave

skulls for the 19th century was 1403 cc.

This data

indicates degeneration for lower class individuals since
the 12th century.
In order to utilize the data for proving

that skull size reflects intelligence,

brain size increases over time, and
a

(3)

(2)

(1)

the claim

the claim that

the legitimacy of

hierarchy of intelligence isomorphic to class status,

Broca classified the skull samples according to these
views, and then cited the evidence as proving his points.

Gould puts it nicely:
Broca claimed that if differences in social class
do not explain why calculated values fail to meet
expectations, then the data are unintelligible.
Intelligible, to Broca, meant steadily increasing
through time— the proposition that the data were
meant to prove, not rest upon. [122]
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However, this blend of modern and
contextual criticism
is not needed to throw the endeavor
into question, for the
theoretical basis of racist craniometries
founders on

deficiencies that it itself recognized during
Darwin's own
time.
Thus Darwin's use of craniometries is
another

manifestation of an ambivalence held in place by

a

blend of

scientific and ideological needs.
Darwin's ambivalence about the value of craniometries,
shown by his qualifications and asides, is
overpowered by
the utility the new discipline offers.

First, he benefits

from an emerging science that boasts quantitative
data.
It

is

worthwhile at this point to interrupt the

narrative to go back to Longino's distinction between

constitutive and contextual values.

Darwin's clear

interest in the quantitative aspect of craniometries could

easily be seen as following
is
a

a

constitutive dictate.

impossible to separate the desire to put

a

Yet it

discipline on

quantitative basis from the particular problems and

deficiencies of the theory and data being adopted.

On one

level one cannot fault Darwin for such oversight because

every theory and its data has its own problems.

One could

point to the switch in craniometries from using millet seed
to measure the volume of skulls to using metal shot as

proof of the new discipline's drive to improve methodology
and technique.
in bad data.

The compressibility of millet seed resulted

Such error was especially racist because the

experimenters tended to push less (unconsciously, we can
86

assume for the sake of argument and
probably to some degree
truthfully) on the millet in Native
skulls as opposed to
harder on the seed in white skulls.
(See Gould's The
M ismeasure of Man, particularly
chapter 2, as well as his
article in Science 200, pp. 503-9.)
,

Even the more global constitutive value:
to seek to
understand human behavior in terms of biological
evolution
is itself chock full of what should be
called contextual
values.

There are "good scientific" reasons to see

Darwin's use of craniometries as in "good faith" and
in

accordance with "purely" constitutive values.

perspective is incomplete.

Yet such

a

As will be shown by the

following argument, Darwin's use of craniometries was

over-determined and problematic.

Specific problems within

the field of craniometry lead inevitably to the conclusion

that this discipline was racist and incomplete, if not

incompetent.

Longino's distinction fails to give any

leverage for prying the problem apart.

Let us turn back to

Darwin's ambivalence towards craniometries.

Another plus for the new discipline was that the
results of craniometries fit the race and class prejudices
of many of his peers:

group of biologists.

the newly emerged professional

Also, Darwin required

a

link between

contemporary man and earlier pre-human forms, which Broca's
data helped forge.

Given the lack of fossil evidence

Darwin attempted to adopt the strategy of the

anthropologists and look to "savages" as not just
87

representatives of the past, but as living
fossils.
Craniometries helped support this project.
Vogt's craniometries were invaluable to
Darwin because
(1) Vogt's conclusions about racial
hierarchy fit Darwin's
and others' ideas, (2) Vogt's work tied
Natural Selection
to geopolitics--thus claiming a new territory

(that others

would attribute to culture or politics) for
biology,

craniometries lent the scientific status of

a

(3)

quantitative

field to Natural Selection, which was at the time
primarily

qualitative, and

(4)

the missing link

Vogt's work turned the "savage" into

filling an undesirable gap in the

geological record.
Given all these benefits the role ideology plays in
science is shown to be complicated indeed.

Ideological

concerns related to class and personal bias, questions of

scientific status for

a

internal requirements of

novel and controversial theory, and
a

new theory for missing data

combine to form an over-determined impetus to shape

nineteenth century biological science.
However Darwin's use of Broca and Vogt, useful as it
was, was fraught with difficulties.

Craniometries

presented an example of the worst sort of ideologically
driven scientific work.
was

a

Quite simply, Vogt's new science

technical failure in its own terms despite its

increasingly widespread acceptance within mainstream
science

.
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Fig. 68.

Fig. 69.

Fig. 72.

Negro

skull, side view.

Idiot skull, side view.

Chimpanzee

skull, side view.

Illustration 4: Three skulls by Carl Vogt. This depiction
of human skulls was intended to show a gradient of
development from the chimpanzee to the negro. [124]
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1.

Negroes, women and sympathy

At this point let us turn to the
details of Darwin's

use of Dr. Carl Vogt's work. Lectures on
Man

.

set of data for our discussion is given
by Vogt

died 1895)
Two)

,

One relevant
(born 1817,

and derives ultimately from Aitken (see Figure

Aitken claims that an average cranial capacity
for
Negroes in general" is 1347.66 cc and for "Caucasians
.

in

general" is 1427 cc.
For

a

radical reductive materialist this data suggests

an argument for the ranking of intelligence

accepts

a

— as

long as one

correlation of cranial size with intelligence.

Vogt's now-infamous position on the ranking of races and
sexes is outrageously clear:
The grown up Negro partakes, as regards his
intellectual faculties, of the nature of the
child, the female, and the senile White.
He
manifests a propensity to pleasure, music,
dancing, physical enjoyments, and imitation,
while his inconstancy of impressions and all
other feelings are those of a child... The Negro
resembles the female in his love of children, his
family, his cabin; he resembles the old man in
his indolence, apathy, and his obst inacy
He
knows not steady work, cares little for the
future; but his great imitative instinct enables
him to become a skillful workman and artistic
imitator. [125]
.

Furthermore the "discovery" of

a

.

.

human race fitting

into the evolutionary gap between "civilized man" and

animal was an important find for him:
The existing materials for bridging over the gulf
between man and ape I have placed before you.
I
three
anthropoid
have shown in what points the
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apes establish the similarity; in what
respects
the races of mankind, and especially the
Negro,
approach the ape-type, without, however,
completely reaching it. [126]
Vogt, and as we shall see--Darwin, thinks
of the Negro
as a more instinctual,

Caucasian.

less reasoning animal than the

Vogt and Darwin also share

a

view of women as

a

step in the direction of the animal, and who, along
with

"savages," are bridges linking "man"
Europeans) to his ape forebears.
that the female of

a

(i.e. white male

(By the way,

the idea

species could be less developed

in terms of evolution than the male,

and inhabits

a

state

of development already passed through by the male is rather

odd.

It

would be interesting to know if Darwin allowed

this condition for any other species.)

Many evolutionists had attempted this bridge between
"man" and ape before and met opposition.

Remember that

Owen had successfully beaten back Geoffroy, Bory and

Lamarck by debunking their appreciation of the proto-human

characteristics of chimps.
create

a

Lyell too despised attempts to

scale of beings proved by "apes with foreheads

villainous low," and even evolutionists such as Tiedemann

dismissed claims of Black inferiority as mere prejudice
attempting to justify slavery (1835). 12 7
Darwin's concept of women mirrors, develops and

complicates his concept of Natives.

Darwin on women:

Man differs from woman in size, bodily strength,
hairiness, &c., as well as in mind, in the same
manner as do the two sexes of many mammals. So
the correspondence in general struct ure ... between
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.

man and the higher animals, especially
the
anthropomorphous apes, is extremely close.

And

[128]

:

Woman seems to differ from man in mental
disposition, chiefly in her greater tenderness
and less selfishness; and this holds good
even
with savages ... Man is the rival of other men;
he
delights
competition, and this leads to
ambition which passes too easily into
selfishness.
These latter qualities seem to be
his natural and unfortunate birthright.
It is
generally admitted that with woman the powers of
intuition, of rapid perception, and perhaps of
imagination, are more strongly marked than in
man, but some, at least, of these faculties are
characteristic of the lower races, and therefore
of a past and lower state of civilization.

m

The chief distinction in the intellectual powers
of the two sexes is shewn by man's attain ing to a
higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than
can woman... If two lists were made of the most
eminent men and women in poetry, painting
sculpture, music
science
the two list s would
not bear comparison. [129]
r

The above passages allow Darwin's ambivalence over the

status of moral qualities such as sympathy and altruism to

surface.

Earlier it was shown that Darwin considered

sympathy the "noblest" aspect of civilization.

One would

assume he thought of morals as the province of cerebral
males, and this elevation derives in part from the long

intellectual traditions of higher education, which excluded
women
Yet in the quotes above women are derided for

possessing sympa thy--accused of being more negroid and
animalistic, and selflessness is made out to be

a

nicety

that is all very well and good, but hardly the kind of

thing that drives civilization to greater heights.
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Darwin

.

declares female selflessness to be an
attribute of "lower
civilization" and he expresses sadness that
men cannot
share that mode of being: the male's
"unfortunate

birthright

"
.

Darwin

s

dilemma arises from the desire to retain

mainstream Victorian morality (in itself
thing)

a

complicated

in its broadest outlines and yet adopt a
radically

competitive and a-moral view of human nature.

Neither one

satisfies him, yet he retains both by constantly juggling
his perspective as circumstances of the argument for

Natural Selection require.
Vogt shares an interest in several problems that

plagued Darwin.

Vogt notes that the Neanderthal skull's

measurements do not fit the pattern expected

Cast

Length*

Neander Skull
Australian
Apostle
*

100
100
100

Width of
anterior lobes
64.7
60.9
61.1

Greatest
Width
Height
78.6
76.2
70.5

Length taken as 100%, all other figures are
proportional
Figure

1

Vogt's Neanderthal Data
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38.9
46
35

:

.

Quite simply the Neanderthal skull

's

proportions seem

"too high," for he "knows" that it was
the housing of an

inferior mind:
know not whether these measurements can
be
considered as measures of the cerebral
deN/elopment
for if this be the case, the Neander
skull would in every respect stand above
those of
the Australian and the Apostle skull...
[131]
I

Luckily for Vogt, the relief on the inside Neanderthal
skull wall provided "evidence" that could be
used to

invalidate the quantitative data which proved so

incorrigible
The characters of cerebral development, still
recognizable, thus indicate a very degraded human
race, approaching the simian type. [132]

Vogt expands on the importance of this mitigating

evidence
But whom did this primitive race of Europe
resemble most?--the Australian, the most
disgusting type of living savages! Poor Adam!
Poor Eve! [133]

While Vogt's gymnastics with "bad" data is ad hoc and,
shall we say, rather creative, it has its rationale.

But

his problems do not end with large-brained Neanderthals.

The very basis of hierarchy based on brain size was

hopelessly flawed.

While this seems obvious from

a

late

twentieth century vantage point it might be claimed that
would be anachronistic to criticize Vogt in this way.
we need not rely on twentieth century assumptions about

cerebral organization, for on the contrary, even Vogt
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it

But

.

understood that the theory of craniometries was
seriously

compromised

Illustration 5: Portrait of Carl Vogt. Reproduction
of the frontispiece of Vie d un Homme / Carl Vogt by
1

William Vogt.
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The remarkable thing is that Vogt,
Broca, Darwin and

others knew the limitations of craniometries
and yet they
plowed ahead. While it is now known
through the sociology
of science that it is not uncommon or
"unscientific"
for

scientists to adopt ideas which are problematic
or argue
for ideas which are unsupported but for which
they

hope to

get evidence, this practice of "floating" an
idea requires
an admission of the state of things in order
to be honest.

Both Vogt and Darwin express worries about the
value of

craniometries, but because the theory and its data were so
useful they end up using craniometries as if it was beyond

dispute
Vogt presents

a

large mass of empirical evidence, but

this data is compromised by the fact that Vogt himself

admits his theory requires further evidence which in most
cases is unavailable.

It would be one thing if these

inadequacies were dealt with when possible, but Vogt never
tries to fill in the gaps.

He makes no attempt to rectify

his data, and neither does he offer an explanation, or even
an excuse, for this failure.

First, Vogt notes that cranial size, in and of itself,

can't be the absolute measure of intelligence:
Formerly, the opinion prevailed that man
possessed a brain absolutely heavier than that of
any other animal.
This is true as regards most
animals; but intelligent colossals--such as the
elephant, and we may also add, the whale--soon
If, it was then
proved the axiom unfounded.
said, it be not the absolute, it is the relative
weight. [134]
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But the concept of relative weight
proved inadequate.

Whilst in the former case it was the giants,
it
was now the dwarves of creation that
upset the
axiom.
The host of small song birds vary as
regards this proportion, within limits which far
exceed the normal proportion in the human race.
The small American monkeys, too, exhibit a
proportionally heavier brain than that of the
lord of creation. [135]

Vogt's final solution involved calculating the ratio
of brain size to vertebral column length as the
solution to

this relational problem.

But this idea proved troublesome

for while it might solve the inter-species comparison

difficulties it wreaks havoc with intra-species relations.
While these considerations are important and deserve more

attention, given below, the astonishing thing is that

nowhere in his book does Vogt use this ratio!

He relies on

skull measurement data exclusively.
It

is not as

if Vogt was devoid of all desire to be

consistent and thorough for he is sensitive to other
technical and methodological problems of craniometry.

He

realizes that the weighing of brains--despite its

quantitative aspect--is plagued by

a

high margin of

experimental error:
difference of fifty grammes or more may easily
be caused by the way in which the brain is
prepared ...
136
A

[

Although in the end he claims that brain weight data
"should on no account be neglected," he acknowledges that

...privileged individuals may sometimes possess
lighter brains than others who are noways
distinguished from the common horde... [137]
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This admission is important, for
with it he undercuts the
value of his weight data and shows why
he switches to the
cubic capacity of skulls as a better
measurement.

Going back to his chart (Figure

2)

we note that the

difference between common and private grave
skulls is on
average 81 cc and this swamps the 59 cc difference
between
the 12th and 19th centuries for upper class
skulls.

This

information throws credibility for "progress" of skull size
into doubt when taken in the context of the doubts
about

whether graves going back six hundred years could be

accurately classified by class.
More disturbing however, is Vogt's attempt to find

a

theoretical justification for the ranking of intelligence
in terms of skull size through adjusting the volumetric

data by relativizing it to body size.

There also exists a certain proportion between
the size of the skull and that of the body...
Thus though giants have generally a larger skull
than dwarfs, it is proportionally smaller in the
former than in latter. [138]
So it looks as if dwarfs are on the whole more intelligent

than giants, and presumably "normal" people.

Vogt even

applies this principle to the "Negro problem":
From long skulls of considerable size we may,
therefore, generally infer that their possessors
were tall, muscular men, and it is known that
among Negroes, who are characteristically
long-headed, we frequently meet with strikingly
athletic forms. [139]
The potential for abuse of this qualitative

observation is now obvious.

Finding Negro skulls that are
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too big

can be rendered

less problematic event because

a

their big skulls indicate big bodies,

crania 1 /height ratio and hence
than first suggested.

a

a

lower

relatively lower intellect

And abuse does result.

In passages

that follow the one above on Negroes Vogt
claims that the

smallness of female skulls demonstrates the inferiority
of
women.
It is simply remarkable that he does
not
look to

a

proportional measure that would factor out the obvious bias
built in by neglecting the fact that women are
generally
smaller than

men— a

fact noted by most Victorians

(including Darwin, as above)

.

Given this major

inconsistency, it is not surprising that he neglects to
correct for relative size in his comparison between races
or over time.

entire chart

The problem of time is acute and throws the
(Fig

2)

into chaos.

If,

for instance,

medieval people were smaller than 19th century people, the

difference in skull size is meaningless until is is

corrected for this factor.
Even worse, Vogt acknowledges that diet and

environment influence physical health--and so influence the
chances of fulfilling one's physical potential:
There can be no doubt that the prosperous and
wealthy classes of human society are, on the
whole, physically finer and stronger than the
lower classes, who are much exposed to misery and
want. [140]

However it never occurs to him to question the validity of
his data due to the problem that the wealthy are

"physically finer" because they have access to better food,
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shelter and the amenities of life,
rather than finer
because they have greater somatic potential.
Let us turn to Vogt's table of measurement s:^!

CRANIAL CAPACITY IN VARIOUS RACES
No

.

People

No. of skulls

measured
1
2
3
4
b

Australians
Polynesians
Hottentots

8

II

3

Peruvians

.

152

6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Oceanic Negroes.
Mexicans
Americans in General
Negroes born in
America
Malays
Mexicans
Greenlander
Chinese
Negroes in general.

2

Volume
1228 27
1230
1230
1233.78
1233.78
1246
1253.45
1296
.

341

1315.71

12

1323 .90

1328
25
1

76

Observers

Remarks

(cc)

1338.65
1340
1345
1347.66
1361
1361
1371.42
1376.71
1403.14

Aitken Meigs.
Morton
II

Aitken Meigs.
II

Morton
Aitken Meigs.
Morton
Aitken Meigs.
II

Morton
Aitken Meigs.
Welcker
Morton
Aitken Meigs.
Morton

Ancient Peruvians.
Negroes born in Africa 64
Aitken Meigs.
Wild Indians.
164
Parisians, from a
35
Broca.
Skulls of
common grave.
the 19th century.
Parisians from the
117
1409.31
Broca.
Skulls of
Cimetiere des Innocents.
12th to 18th century
Esquimaux
1410
Morton
Parisians of the 12th 115 1425.98
Broca. From a vault
Caucasians in General
1
1427
Aitken Meigs.
Malays
1
1430
Welcker
Germans
30
1448
Parisians of the 19th 125 1461.53
Broca
Anglo-Americans
7
1474 65
Aitken Meigs.
Parisians from private 90 1484.23
Broca.
Skulls of
graves
the 19th century.
Parisians from La
17
1517
Broca.
The same.
Morgue
Germans in general.
38
1534.127 Aitken Meigs.
Brachycepha le from
Broca.
1
1540
From a
Meudon
Dolmen
Aitken Meigs.
English
1572.95
5
*
EDITOR.]
[With artificially compressed skulls
II

II

II

.

,

—

Figure

2:

Vogt's Craniometric Data
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As we have seen, Vogt attempts
to solve the relational

problem by proposing that
would correct the data.

a

ratio of brain size to height

Such

a

ratio would eliminate the

bias of the measurements for races or
nationalities that
on average possess a larger stature.
If we take some of

Vogt's own figures on the difference in height
between

Caucasians and Negroes, and then correct the
information of
the table with this ratio, we obtain surprising
results.
But first,

let’s look at the details of Vogt's explanation

of the height issue:

The Negro is on the average shorter than the
German... Six negro skeletons yielded as their
mean length 160 centimeters; whilst as many
European skeletons gave above 172 centimeters.
There are no doubt athletic forms occurring among
Negroes, and some tribes among the blacks, just
as among the whites, are distinguished by a high
stature; but even these exceptional ly tall
Negroes never reach the length of the tall tribes
among the Germans or Anglo-Saxon races... [142]
If we

take the ratio to be 160/172

(Negro height/

European height) and put it to work on the data of Aitken
(Figure

for the average Caucasian: 1427 cm 3

2)

,

we get the

projected average of 1327.4 cm 3 for Negroes who would have
an equal brain ratio ranking.

value for

a

We now have the expected

race of equal braininess to Caucasians, given

the fact that the former is on the average shorter than

Caucasians.
1347.66.

Aitken finds the average for Negroes to be

Thus Vogt's table, when corrected in the manner

demanded by his own theoretical understanding of
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.

craniometries, yields the result that Negroes are
on the
average brainier than Caucasians.

Illustration
Homme / Carl Vogt

Drawing of Carl Vogt.
facing page 176.

6:
,

From Vie d un
1

It's true that Vogt questions the use of height, rather

than backbone length, because in his opinion the main

variable in human stature is leg length 143
On adopting the whole length of the body, that of
the legs is included, and it is just the length
of the legs which exhibits the greatest
The trunk of man varies much less,
variations.
and this offers a much more accurate standard.
102

While it would be better for my purposes
to show that

Vogt's data fails his prejudices when corrected
for

backbone length, such
own lack of data

essential.

a

demonstration founders on Vogt's

— information

which he claims to be

The next best thing is to correct for body

length, which Vogt provides but fails to utilize.

Although Darwin might be excused for not checking Vogt
in this way, he cannot be held faultless in his lack of

attention to the theoretical problems Vogt faced,

articulated clearly, and failed to meet.

Clearly the need

fill 9 a P s in the theory of Natural Selection overpowered

concerns for consistency and thoroughness.
citation of this table (Figure

2)

Darwin's

as proof of a correlation

of skull size and intelligence must be understood as an

overdetermined scientific/ideological move.
The sources of Darwin's ambivalence are suppressed in
the Descent but the fact of his uneasiness is not:

...on the other hand, no one supposes that the
intellect of any two animals or of any two men
can be accurately gauged by the cubic contents of
their skulls. [144]

Worse yet, the "on the other hand" refers to his view that:
I presume, doubts that the large
proportion which the size of man's brain bears to
his body, compared to the same proportion in the
gorilla or orang, is closely connected with his
higher mental powers. [145]

No one,

Darwin shows that he is on some level aware of the problem
that sent Vogt off in search of

a

relativizing criteria.

But Darwin fails to produce as sophisticated
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a

failure as

does Vogt.

On the other hand, Darwin excels at

consideration of the "degeneration" problem.
some sort of degeneration thesis along side

That he held

theory of

a

progress is clear from the passages cited earlier in which
he notes that the development of sympathy

(a

good thing)

results in the degeneration of civilized human stock

through tolerance of the continued survival of the poor,
criminals, and the sick.
It

is a curious thing that the passage on

craniometries ends with Darwin giving evidence for the

degeneration of the cranial size of domesticated rabbits as
a

contradiction to the thesis advanced by Lartet that the

brains of mammals have enlarged over time 146
.

Darwin's

evidence on rabbits could be taken as an analogy for

civilized (domesticated)

"man," though Darwin does not

overtly articulate it that way.
Furthermore, this curious and ad hoc passage about
rabbits points to another inconsistency in Darwin's

position towards "savages."

That is, he attributes greater

selective forces to "natural life" as opposed to domestic
or "civilized" life, both in the case of rabbits, and in

"man."

Thus one would think that non-Europeans, being

"closer to nature" and so under greater selective pressure,

would evolve more quickly than their European counterparts.
Thus his claim, cited earlier, that savages must have been

under less selective pressure, is complicated or perhaps
even compromised by other positions he holds.
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In particular,

by suggesting

(as we have seen)

that

sympathy goes beyond the domain of reason, Darwin opens up
the possibility of there being other spiritual or moral

qualities that would supersede biological considerations.
While such

a

move would be welcomed by Darwin's critics,

such as Wallace and George Eliot, and could accord with

various conservative or left-wing religious scruples of the
times, it simply doesn't fit with the major themes of

Darwin's theory.
Darwin admits it is hard to make any kind of argument
about the mental life of animals:
It would be very difficult for any one with even
much more knowledge than I possess, to determine
how far animals exhibit any traces of these high
mental powers.
This difficulty arises from the
impossibility of judging what passes through the
mind of an animal... [147]

Yet he is willing to create

a

chasm between animals and

"man" on the basis of the unique quality of

self-consciousness: "It may be freely admitted that no
animal is self-conscious..."
"man" from beast:
is,

I/O

Language too, separates

"The habitual use of articulate language

14 9
however, peculiar to man..."

There are two main considerations here.

First,

Darwin's materialism forces all aspects of human behavior
into the domain of inheritable characteristics and,

therefore. Natural Selection.

He did not have the concept

of recessive or linked traits available to him.

Thus his

pains to show that morality, like tool use, is not an
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accidental quality, or one that would distinguish
animal
from human, but rather ethical activity is

a

device which confers selective advantage.

It

behavioral
is suggested

that the advantage is for the group although Darwin in

other places attempts to keep all descriptions of
advantage

located at the individual level.

However he is ambivalent about the value of sympathy.
Part of the problem with the theory of Natural Selection is
that it robbed glory from "man's" best achievements.

Somehow value needed to be pumped back into human activity.
Paxton writes:
...the old problem was exactly reversed.
No
longer was man attempting to explain his
bestiality in the face of his divine nature; he
had to define and assert his humanness in the
fact of his demonstrated participation in the
bestial nature. [150]

Darwin speaks to values: sympathy is what makes humans
"noble."

Yet we noted how he suggests that moral values

are primarily female, negroid and uncivilized.

Nor was

this conflict unique to Darwin, Spencer shared it:
...by recognizing the social benefits of the
sympathy nurtured in the family, Spencer came
perilously close to identifying women rather than
men with the forces of "moral"--as opposed to
material progress.
For a moment then, in his
analysis of the forces shaping human evolution,
Spencer seemed to confirm Eliot's view that women
have "an art which does mend nature" and so
contribute more to the moral evolution of the
race than men do. [151]

—

Notice how Spencer can be understood to suffer from the

supercession of morality too: "mend" nature, to put it in
Eliot's vocabulary.

Darwin's attempt to undercut the value
106

of morality can be seen as damage
control for the problem

that women were getting too much credit for human

evolution.

Spencer was stuck with this too.
By this concession

[that women contribute to
moral evolution]
Spencer undermined all his
arguments that sought to confine women to the
domestic sphere, for their liberation from it
would clearly help to advance the moral progress
of society as a whole. [152]
,

Both Darwin and Spencer use

a

claim for the

craniometric and competitive superiority of men to try to
contain the argument from unfolding. 153
Spencer could only defend the traditional
separation of men's and women's spheres, then, by
an appeal to the authority of natural law, which
ensured that men were intellectually superior to
women.
He concludes by begging the question:
"The human race, though a gregarious race, has
ever been," and "still is a predatory race."
For Darwin ambivalence enters not just because "noblest"

status is stolen from men by

a

wrinkle in Victorian morals,

but also because sympathy--a 1 though perhaps devalued by

being mechanically biologica l--by removing vast segments of
the human population from the rigors of Natural Selection

brings up the artificial nature of human social

arrangements.

Whereas animal strategies based on sympathy

are easily seen as selected, human ability to alter and

discuss strategies raises issues about continuity.
On the one hand Darwin assumes there is

a

selective

advantage for sympathy and it overpowers suggestions for

extermination of the poor.

But he does not want to allow

morals, noble though they be, to define the change of
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society as progress despite the fact that in
other contexts
he does so define it.

From this perspective Darwin speaks

of the degeneration that results from
sympathetic treatment
of the poor and refrains from speaking of Natives in

similar contexts.

Another aspect of Darwin's ambivalence over morals
results from his attempts to avoid new, or emergent,

qualities and to shun consideration of Natural Selection at
the level of groups.

His materialism pushes thought and

consciousness towards the atomic level, despite his
reservations. Analogously he waffles over similarity
between sexual selection in savages and animals:
When... it is said that the lower animals have a
sense of beauty, it must not be supposed that
such sense is comparable with that of a
cultivated man, with his multiform and complex
associated ideas. A more just comparison would
be between the taste for the beautiful in
animals, and the lowest savages, who admire and
deck themselves with any brilliant, glittering,
or curious object. [154]
On the one hand Victorian aesthetics are seen as

a

from which all other appreciations of beauty pale.

pinnacle
On the

other, human and animal senses must be different in terms
of quantity only.

Therefore savages provide

a

useful cusp,

linking the animal to the human.
There are points at which he interrupts the continuity
of reason,

instincts.

for instance by separating reason from

Desmond writes:
A second point emerges from Richards' work:
Brougham's Dissertations convinced Darwin that
some instincts (like that of a wasp sealing a
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grub into its egg cell as future food for the
l^tva) could not possibly have developed from an
intelligent habit.
In other words Brougham moved
Darwin away from older sensationalist notions.
Darwin was forced to use natural selection to
explain instinctive acts to search for evidence
that instincts (like organs) vary slightly,
giving selection something to work on. So Darwin
appears in an ultra-Broughamite tradition, rather
than a radical ideologue one. [155]

—

If this chasm between higher reasoning animals and

lower instinctual ones is emphasized, the opening is made
for more sympathy- 1 ike events: the emergence of

qualitatively new characteristics which interrupt Natural
Selection.
it

This split in qualities is materialist because

depends upon

a

material base and organization of that

base, but it strains Darwin's continuity thesis and raises

problems for craniometries and the necessity of race war.
Another source of ambivalence over the status of
morals resides in the problem of where to locate selection:
at the

level of individuals or groups.

societies, A and B.

If A eliminates the the poor,

to preserve genetic fitness,

from

a

Consider two

it will

in order

look quite different

society, B, which because of sympathy, allows the

poor to propagate.

These two alternatives can be

schematized as follows:
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Figure

3

_fitness or
survival line

Sympathy Schema

This figure emphasizes that the term "fit" is relative
to

level of selective pressure, and to

a

society A the wealthy
poor

(0)

(*)

are fit, as well.

a

niche.

Thus in

are fit, while in B some of the
We can view A and B as

different strategies: in modern terms perhaps something
like pure-trait vs mixed-trait strategies.
If we give

priority to Darwin's non-teleologica 1 view

of Natural Selection over his teleological version,

not necessary that strategy A turns out to be

a

it

is

priori

better, unless Darwin can prove that nature selects A over
B.

In fact,

the very "problem" of the high reproductive

rate among the poor and corresponding low rate among the

wealthy classes would point out that the "natural" strategy
is B,

whether it be "degenerate" in terms of human

evaluations or not.
The key to understanding Darwin's problem here is that
by definition "unnatural" should be an oxymoron if natural

selection is ubiquitous.

If

sympathy is thought of as

a

characteristic selected by evolutionary forces, it remains
110
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subject to selective pressure.
"highest" have little meaning

In this case

— other

"noblest" and

than some sort of

extraneous approval that evolution has selected

particular characteristic.

a

Thus synthetic or civilized

life is just as "natural" as nature,

in that what has

survival value remains and what does not tends to

disappear
But Darwin wants to say that just because nature has

selected society

B

does not mean that this is best.

He

wants to say that A would be better--on evolutionary terms,
he implies that man can decide to change the way things are by

(political)

the better.

will and so alter the course of evolution for
In this sense society B is unnatural or

removed from nature, and "degenerate," even though it is

human will that changes what is to what ought to be.
The appraisal of society A as better, however, in one

sense cannot be said as it is the unsayable in Darwinian

terms--it is merely the urging of "hard reason."

Muteness

results because the claim for the greater value of A rests
on a normative claim for which Natural Selection has no

use--as proven by the presence of "degeneration" itself.
Darwin is caught within the competing demands of two lines
of thought, mutually exclusive, each of which contains

elements he does not wish to surrender.

Thus his

ambivalence towards nature, man's place in nature, and the
power of understanding to shape the world, manifests

itself
Ill

.

:

His "hard reason" is not as decisive as
he would wish,

for unless future biological constraints place
A at

a

competitive advantage over B for the same niche, there
is
no reason to refer to B as less fit than A, or

form of A.

a

degenerate

In fact, he rules out the case that A is more

fit than B, by asserting the survival advantages of

sympathy (morality)
...none of the differences between the races of
man are of any direct or special service to him.
The intellectual and moral or social faculties
must of course be excepted from this remark. [156]

Here we have seen

case in which social and race bias

a

comes into conflict with moral scruples.

He attempts

synthesis of these views, but ends up with

a

a

confused

doctrine
Furthermore, since the poor reproduce at

a

greater

rate, according to Darwin, fitness, as defined by the

ability to leave reproducing progeny, seems to reside with
the poor, rather than the rich.

If this

idea is pushed to

its conclusion, Darwin should be arguing that the

"degeneration" of the upper classes is an evolutionary
shift to

a

more optimal composition.

Darwin wants to make

claims for the advantages of intelligence and ethical

behavior (of the managerial class) over sheer reproductive
force
it

(of the poor)

,

but this is

a

involves social factors such as

tricky business because
a

low birth rate driven

by conscious choice and the use of birth control--topics he

was loathe to discuss

(as we shall
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see later).

Spencer ran into similar problems.

He resorted to

a

doctrine that races tend to advance and decline in an
analogous way to the birth, youth, maturity and decline of
an individual,

in order to explain degeneration.

But he

also wanted to claim that the human mind and nature fit

together in such

a

way that over time progress and harmony

are produced.

...there is a gradual harmony between man's
mental nature and the conditions of his
existence.
After finding that from it are
deducible the various characteristics of
evolution, we finally draw from it a warrant for
the belief, that evolution can end only in the
establishment of the greatest perfection and the
most complete happiness. [158]

While Darwin does not see evolution ending and is ambivalent
about progress

(noblest but degenerate)

,

he does share

the concept of harmony of mind--or reason, and nature.

For

example, intelligence is equal to evolutionary power.

when he considers degeneration

But

and the status of women

Darwin finds disharmony between reason and reality.
To make matters more complicated, the main thrust of

the Descent

:

sexual selection, can be understood as

a

third

element in the ambivalence between nature and the

artificial.

Consider the fact that in sexual selection,

the competitor is not killed, but is deprived of progeny:
[Sexual selection] depends, not on a struggle for
existence, but on a struggle between the males
for possession of the females; the result is not
death to the unsuccessful competitor, but few or
no offspring. [159]

The advantages of this idea are obvious;

113

it

allows for the

selection of traits inconsequential or even harmful
to
survival

(e.g.

bright plumage), which the theory of Natural

Selection up to this conceptual point prohibits.
there has been

a

Recently

surge of studies documenting the

mechanisms and strategies various species adopt in sexual
selection.

Darwin

s

However sexual politics finds ready access to

formulation, especially when applied to humans, as

we shall see in the next chapter.

Hints of what is to come

can be seen in his nervousness over the lack of selective

advantage for sexually selected traits.

In this vein he

reintroduces fitness, and tilts the agency of choice back
to the male.

There can also be no doubt that the most
vigorous, best nourished and earliest breeders
would on average succeed in rearing the largest
number of of f spring .. .But in very many cases the
males which conquer their rivals, do not obtain
possession of the females, independently of the
choice of the latter... it is obviously probable
that they [females] would at the same time prefer
the most vigorous and lively males. [160]

While male power is discounted initially
obtain possession"
for vigor.

— it

— "do

not

is reintroduced through preference

Recent studies tend to disconnect vigor from

female choice in favor of

which females select.

a

maximization of the trait for

In a recent study of swordtail fish

by Alexandra Basolo females selected

species which had

a

a

males of

a

different

tail surgically implanted--indicat ing

"females were basing their choice on sword preference and
161
not on other traits."

While Darwin must be credited for
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bringing female choice to the fore, his version is
imbued
with the social context.
In relation to colonialism,

the doctrine of sympathy

undercuts his view that genocidal colonization is an
inevitable result of survival of the fittest.

That is, by

allowing Natural Selection to include, or even be
superseded, by culture or morality, Darwin allows the

possibility that any cultural aspect
religion

— may

— be

it treaties or

interrupt colonial expansion.

Once political decisions allow for the maintenance of

disadvantageous traits, the choice as to which traits are
allowed to survive is removed from the biological realm and
placed in the political arena

selective advantage for
occur here.

a

(assuming equal social

group of options)

.

Two problems

The first is practical and methodological.

There was no method for determining selective advantage of

anything so complex as human society.

No one was in

a

position to claim they had sufficient understanding of
nature or society to predict survival power of various

contemporary social and political arrangements and
possibilities.

Appeal to the "degeneration" of stock in

terms of cranial capacity means little if the nation is

successful or the group characteristics overwhelm
individual traits.
Furthermore, on

a

practical level, no one could claim

to be able to convince a political system,

such as the

government of Great Britain (remember Darwin's quip about
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consanguineous marriages)
control of social policy.

,

that biologists should be given

Darwin's ambivalence depends

upon the clash of reductive materialism and Victorian

morals

Farrington senses the conflict in Darwin:
This is sad stuff.
Patriots do not necessarily
beget patriots.
There is no gene for virtue.
Moral progress is not achieved in this mindless
way.
Nor did Darwin really think so. But he had
no philosophy which could provide him with any
other reasonable account of the true nature of
the mental world.
After all, he had been
satisfied, and more than satisfied, with his bold
speculation that "thought is a secretion of the
brain." [162]

Darwin's radical reductive materialism demanded

a

causal chain from atoms to culture. This made culture--in

toto— an adaptation subject

to Natural Selection.

He was

therefore encouraged to think of race warfare and the
colonial process as an inevitable result of biology.

Craniometries plus cultural chauvinism and an equation of
complexity and progress, and an anthropology proclaiming
Natives as simpler and "living fossils" all depended upon

reductive materialism which allowed and encouraged Darwin
to embrace a scientific racism.

D.

Scientific Origins of Scientific Racism

Clearly Darwin embraced

a

racist ideology and he

justified this point of view with contemporary racist
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a

science, such as Vogt's and Broca's
craniometries, as well
creating it anew in his own work. Although
Darwin was a
racist to begin with as his Journal shows,
and may have
used the work of the craniometers or other
scientists to

—

justify his prejudice, his views were also
in part

generated by his metaphysical assumptions and required by
his biological theory, due to its gaps.

We turn now to

a

consideration of the biggest lacuna his theory faced.
The main problem confronting the early evolutionists

was to show that not only was transmutation possible, but
that it had occurred.

One possible strategy would be to

show that there was no fundamental distinction between one

species and the next, so that
(descent, or change)

a

ladder of development

could be established.

The traditional

"Great Chain of Being" theory aimed at providing

a

different kind of structure, for it needed to explain

a

hierarchy of organisms from the simplest to the most
complex: God.

ordering of

a

Thus it provided

a

perfectly "dense"

non-deve lopmenta 1 ladder--for the chain had

to express God's maximization of creativity and so it

assumed
orders.

a

static hierarchy of fundamentally different
But scientific discoveries in biology such as

comparative anatomy (see Desmond on Grant) were reducing
the distinctness of each species and the next.

Indeed Haeckel made important contributions to filling
the interstices of the biological catalogue.

Haeckel knew

the value of this data for convincing others that Natural
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,

Selection was possible.

Thus Haeckel sought

a

bridge

between differentiated unicellular organisms and dead
matter.
a

He found this transitional entity in the "monera,"

unicellular organism that had no nucleus or organs. 163
To his utter joy, Haeckel could point to the

radiolaria (his area of undisputed expertise) as an example
of transitional organisms.

Even more fortuitous was the

fact that these organisms build

a

silicon shell.

This,

according to Haeckel, showed them to be on the edge of the
organic world, just one step away from the inorganic. 164

Although it was merely insufficient technology that

prevented Haeckel from noticing the nuclei of radiolar ians
the concept that Haeckel and Darwin wanted instantiated is

now fleshed out by the virus.

Darwin lacked expertise in this area and took another
route that was to have serious implications for social and

political aspects of his theory.

He adopted the more

direct and perhaps controversial strategy of producing

evidence of an evolutionary link between man and some
"lower" creature or previous form.

The fossil record was,

for all practical purposes, of no use in this regard.

The

Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon discoveries were baffling: they
seemingly presented creatures with greater-sized brains
than some nineteenth-century peoples, and in the case of
the Neanderthals,

large jaw)

"non-human" attributes

as well.

(heavy brow ridge,

Thus it was easy for others to argue

that the Neanderthals were diseased or not human at all,
118
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and that the Cro-Magnons, who were
very similar in terms of

bone structure to contemporary people

evolution didn't happen at all.

'

s— were

proof that

Also, the age of these

remains was grossly misunderstood:
Even the best practicing archeologists
were
lumping strata belonging to fifty thousand
years
into single "ages" without any real awareness
of
the immense amounts of time involved.
166
[

]

Most scientists of Darwin's era thought in
terms of

Biblical time, attributing the fossil finds to the
diluvial

period: the Great Flood.

The more accurate

placement of these fossils in time, in terms of the two
year span of their existence did not occur "until

well into the twentieth century.

Given the lack of fossil evidence, Darwin had little
choice but to turn to anthropology.

Here he could point to

"savages" as living representatives of prehistoric man.

However his problems were only beginning for he found
himself caught between two divergent needs

— within

the

"savage paradox," as it were.
On the one hand, he needed to place as much distance
as possible between civilized man and the "savage."

The

mainstream views of "man's" place in nature and religious
views on the God-given nature of the human soul carved out
a

unique order for humans, one that tended to unify

humanity and make it distinct from all other organisms.
Here Darwin's talk of morality as the "highest" result of
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,

evolution

man's" noblest quality, served to
create

distance
On the other hand, in order to forge

a

link between man

and beast, the lowest man must be clearly
beast.

For as

long as the "savage" was clearly human,
the old hierarchy
of creationism stood steady and evolution
discredited at

this crucial intersection.
But Darwin could not go too far, for success
in

showing the savage to be animal could be problematic too.

Darwin needed to show continuity with "savages" so they
did
not get written off as beasts but were clearly understood
to be

men."

This problem had already happened in the case

of the Neanderthals.

Brace and Montague write:

...the Neanderthal remains, while of unknown
date, were clearly different from modern man and
the differences had been declared to be due to
pathology by the greatest living pathologist and
one of the founders of German anthropology...
[The] Neanderthal ... [was] not regarded as a
representative of a former stage of evolution and
[was]... not regarded as a precursor of modern
man. [168]

Thus Darwin's scientific construction demanded an

understanding of humans that is racist at its core: he
required the savage races to be something on the cusp of
humanity.

No allowance for limiting the differences

between cultures to differences of culture could be
considered.

This also accords with the materialist thesis.

But it does contradict, as has been pointed out above, the

Darwinian positions that culture can be post-evolutionary
and that survival of the fittest is not
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a

doctrine of

.

.

progress which entails increased
differentiation (assuming,
as he did, that the "savages" are
less dif f erent iated-i
.

e

less developed in culture, and so
also more primitive in

brain physiology)

Although Darwin does not address these
issues head-on,
he does display an ambivalent doctrine
concerning
the

status of the "savage."

It

is this ambivalence that betrays

his conflicted ideological and scientific concerns.

Darwin writes: 169
The Fuegians rank amongst the lowest barbarians;
but I was continually struck with surprise how
closely the three natives on board H.M.S.
"Beagle," who had lived some years in England,
and could talk a little English, resembled us in
disposition and in most of our mental faculties.

Furthermore, we should note that Darwin was sincere in his

empathy for "savages":
The remembrance of screams
[he] heard in
Brazil, when he was powerless to interfere with
what he believed to be the torture of a slave,
haunted him for years, especially at night. [170]
In his journal of the Beagle's travels he says:

While staying at his estate [in Rio de Janeiro],
I was very nearly being an eye-witness to one of
those atrocious acts which can only take place in
a slave country.
Owing to a quarrel and a
law-suit, the owner was on the point of taking
all the women and children from the male slaves,
and selling them separately ... I do not believe
the inhumanity of separating thirty
families .. .even occurred to the owner. [171]
He also offers the hope that slavery be abolished.

But in

the same book he betrays his hope with another comment on
the nature of common men:
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Yet

I
will pledge myself, that in humanity
and
good feeling he [the slave owner] was
superior
to
the common run of men. [172]

Yet his scientific need for

a

close resemblance

between the human and the animal is clear
to himself:
If no organic being excepting man
had possessed
any mental power, or if his powers had
been of
wholly different nature from those of the lower a
animals, then we should never have been able
to
convince ourselves that our high faculties had
been gradually developed. [173]
It

is the

"savage" who provides crucial evidence for

evolutionary theory.

Darwin requires small jumps between

every level of species,

Chain— but

a

density like that of the Great

for different reasons.

The jump from ape to man

is of course the most important.

We must also admit that there is a much wider
interval in mental power between one of the
lowest fishes, as a lamprey or lancelet, and one
of the higher apes, than between an ape and man;
yet this interval is filled up by numberless

gradations.

[174]

Here the homogenization of thought processes implies

difference only of degree.

a

This idea is made more specific

in relation to race relations:

Differences between the highest men of the
highest races and the lowest savages, are
connected by the finest gradations. Therefore it
is possible that they might pass and be developed
into each other. [175]
Yet here the theme of difference is stressed, even in

the same breath uttering sameness.
.

The concepts of

"passing into" or "development" are ambiguous as to whether
the gradations lead to change of degree only or of kind.
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It

is clear from the context that
the overt claim is for

degree only.
But however much continuity the
savage provides,

Darwin also wants to emphasize the gap
between savage and
civilized man:
Nor is the difference slight in moral
disposition
between a barbarian, such as the man described by
the old navigator Byron, who dashed his
child on
the rocks for dropping a basket of sea-urchins,
and a Howard or a Clarkson; and in intellect,
between a savage who uses hardly any abstract
terms, and a Newton or Shakespeare. [176]

Here the use of abstract terms is all but
kind.

difference in

a

The implication of the savage/Newton comparison is

that the gap is real, insurmountable, and has

a

moral

dimension as well as an intellectual basis.
The moral difference proves to be an important one for
it separates the human distinctively from the animal
A moral being is one who is capable of reflecting

on his past actions and mot ives
and the fact
that man is the one being who certainly deserves
this designation is the greatest of all
distinctions between him and the lower animals.
.

.

.

Darwin is in trouble here of making humans unique, but one
must remember that consciousness goes right down to the
level of atoms.

gradations,"

One moment he speaks of "the finest

the next he talks in terms of vast divides.

Again
The variability or diversity of the mental
faculties in men of the same race, not to mention
the greater differences between men of distinct
races, is so notorious that not a word need here
be said. [178]
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His racial ideas were not new
with the Origin or the

Descent, but are recycled from his earliest
work, such as
the Journal
"savages" are
;

...like wild beasts .. .We can hardly put
ourselves
in the position of these savages, and
understand

their actions.

[179]

Also
One s mind hurries back over past centuries,
and
then asks, could our progenitors have been men
like these?-- men, whose very signs and
expressions are less intelligible to us than
those of the domesticated animals; men, who do
not possess the instinct of those animals, nor
yet appear to boast of human reason, or at least
of arts consequent on that reason.
I do not
believe it is possible to describe or paint the
difference between savage and civilized man.
It
is the difference between a wild and a tame
animal
[180]
.

Darwin gets
his point.

animals

.

a

.

little carried away in order to prove

"Less inte 1 1 igible ... than ... domest ica ted

is certainly aimed at placing the savage in the

animal kingdom by assigning the Native to

animalistic than animals themselves.

a

place even more

Note also the

distinction between the "wild" and the "tame," which
further isolates the savage as animal
to the human

(natural)

as opposed

(artificial).

When he is not overstating his case Darwin uses the
standard examples of tool use and language to separate man
from the animals:
Man in the rudest state in which he now exists is
the most dominant animal that has ever appeared
on this earth... He manifestly owes this immense
superiority to his intellectual faculties...
social habits... and corporeal structure...
Through his powers of intellect, articulate
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language has been evolved; and on this his
wonderful advancement has mainly depended ... He
has invented and is able to use various
weapons,
tools
[181]

Darwin's ambiguous feelings towards savages surface
again
and again.

The savage invents humanity, yet cannot be too

human lest he or she command too much respect.

One way to

keep the savage at arm's length is to treat the

contemporary indigenous people as relics of the past, or
living fossils.
In the Journa

he refers to some of the Indians'

languages as "scarcely ... [deserving] to be called

articulate." 18 2

Also, he saw many of their abilities in

terms of animal instincts versus human reason: "Their skill
in some respects may be compared to the instincts of

animals, for it is not improved by experience."'*'^
The concept of

a

species or in this case

a

variation

of a species as a relict or living fossil carries useful

overtones of validation for domination.
Darwin pointed out a consistency about relic
species of the sort we call living fossils: They
generally have a very limited geographical
distributions. Relict species are generally
thought to be at a competitive disadvantage with
respect to more advanced forms and manage to
survive only by retreating to some isolated
environment where some special circumstance
allows them to hang on. Therefore, in principle
one would not expect a "relic" species like
Lat imeria cha lumnae to have a broad geographical
(In this case, for an oceanic
distribution.
fish, what do you call broad--hundreds of miles,
or thousands?) [184]
As Keith S.

the concept of

a

Thomson makes clear in the above quote,
living fossil combines
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a

lack of

.

.

evolutionary change (stability of form)
combined with
competitive disadvantage (or more specialized
niche)

vis "more evolved" forms.

a

vis

a

Darwin is developing the idea

that Natives are only living during his
time because they
have been isolated from Europeans up to that
point.
The
fact that Natives possessed

a

huge geographical

distribution is seen not in terms of evolutionary
success
but rather as
t

happy accident for the Native up to this

a

ime

What is missing from Thomson's interpretation is that
the Coe lacant h

(

let imer ia cha luninae

highly developed animal

— even

)

is a complicated,

if it is unchanged,

most part, over the last seventy million years
we can tell)

can equal.

The Coelacanth has

a

for the

(as

far as

longevity few creatures

Perhaps restriction of range may present

a

good

strategy for long term survival.
This desire to place present savages far above and yet

cheek to cheek with advanced apes creates
tension within Darwin's work.

a

disturbing

Racist ideology, reductive

materialism, hierarchical development, and lack of fossil

evidence created

a

need for savages to be as low as

possible on the developmental and competitive scale, while
the facts of human activities and the bias of human

chauvinism pushed in the other direction.

Critics of

Darwin wanted to emphasize the discontinuity of man with
the "lower" primates.

For instance, the continuity thesis

received criticism from Darwin's contemporaries, especially
127

St.

George Mivart:
Thirdly, in addition to the argument that
brutes
have not intellect because their actions can
be
accounted for without the exercise of that
faculty, we have other and positive arguments
in
opposition to Mr. Darwin's view of their mental
powers.
185
[

It

]

is easy to see that Darwin,

even if already already

predisposed to radical materialism, was forced for
strategic reasons to embrace it absolutely in this context.

Continuity in Natural Selection has several
components.

First, there is density: change is said to

proceed by small incremental changes to what already
exists.

Related to density is pace: change proceeds at

more or less even and slow speed.

a

Lastly, there is no

emergence of unique qualities, so that any particular

quality can be traced back in terms of quantity.
The legitimacy of Darwin's dependence upon the

continuity thesis has been taken for granted up to recent
times due to

changed.

a

lack of alternatives, but this situation has

While standard Darwinian and Neo-Darwinian

evolutionary theory has retained the view that change
occurs slowly and evenly, at least from

a

geologic

perspective, Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould have

proposed the theory of "Punctuated Equilibria."

On this

new and controversial view change concentrated during

periods of speciation and then slows to
species could be said to be stable

— and

Darwinian evolution occurs.

a

Such
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a

point where the

the slow and more

view harmonizes

.

with gaps in the fossil record 186 but
flies in the face of
the historical battle with catast
rophisni
Density, pace and emergence are enmeshed.

Darwin

sensed this in that he pioneered the idea
that much of

evolution is accidental in that sense that attributes
developed for one need may switch functions and
take the

organism in another direction of development.

Emergence

might be construed as the rapid or instantaneous
coming
into being of an entirely new trait.

switch

in function,

constitute emergence.

In other words the

if rapid and extensive enough,

The key is

may

lack of

a

causal chain

from the old to the new when the new is not

a

guantitative

change but

a

qualitative one.

a

Gould makes this argument

for the emergence of human language 187
:

I can't prove that
language was not the selected
basis of increasing brain size, but the
universals of language are so different from
anything else in nature, so quirky in structure,
that origin as a side consequence of the brain's
enhanced capacity, rather than as simple advance
in continuity from ancestral grunts and gestures,
seems indicated. (I lay no claim to originality
for this argument about language.
The reasoning
follows directly as an evolutionary reading for
Noam Chomsky's theory of universal grammar.)

Darwin denies emergence but his insight into function

switching is perilously close to emergence, saved perhaps
only by strict adherence to the principles of slow and

quantitative change.
Given the new view of the fossil record even if one
rejects emergence Darwin's position stands out in relief as
only one strategy among many.
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Wallace's view of

discontinuity may boil down to disagreement
over how to
interpret the accidental in evolution, and his

appeal to

other-worldly forces an attempt to motivate

a

view more in

harmony with religious metaphysical views.

Another way to motivate Wallace's view of the
uniqueness of humans would be to emphasize the magnitude
of
change made possible by relatively small somatic
alterations.

Such changes during

a

period of rapid

speciation (Punctuated Equilibria) could be interpreted as
emergent.

In terms of the geologic record one could then

say some gaps demonstrate

a

"break."

But to return to the

Victorian context, T.H. Huxley also made an absolute
distinction between "man" and beast.

He even argued that

there was no living "missing link" between the two:
...in present creation. .no intermediate link
bridges over the gap between Homo and
Troglodytes
[188]
.

.

Huxley speaks of the "chasm" separating the two, even if he
agrees that it is some, perhaps small, structural

difference that generates this split:
The argument, that because there is an immense
difference between a Man's intelligence and an
Apes's, therefore, there must be an equally
immense difference between their brains, appears
to me to be as well based as the reasoning by
which one should endeavour to prove that, because
there is a "great gulf" between a watch that
keeps accurate time and another that will not go
at all, there is therefore a great structural
hiatus between the two... A hair in the balancewheel, a little rust on the pinion, a bend in a
tooth of the escapement, a little something so
slight that only the practiced eye of the
watchmaker can discover it, may be the source of
all the difference. [189]
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These comments are especially interesting
as they come in
the context of

a

discussion of craniometries.

While

rehearsing the arguments Darwin will use concerning
the
wide differences of cubic capacity in "man," Huxley
sticks
to the point of "man's" uniqueness.

He finds

...the minds of men being everywhere similar,
^iff^ting in quality and quantity but not in kind
of faculty ...
190
[

In this context,

given Huxley's emphasis on speech as one

of the distinguishing characteristics of "man" it is in

direct opposition to Darwin's claims for "barely

articulate" savages that he writes:
But, even admitting the that differences may
obtain among the various races of men, to this
extent, I do not think that there is any good
ground for the supposition that an infant of any
race would be unable to learn, and use with ease,
the language of any other race of men among whom
it might be brought up. [191]

This difference between Darwin on the one hand and Huxley
and Wallace on the other is an important distinction, for
it shows that Victorian biology was not monolithic.

Darwin's ambivalence to the continuity thesis is
evident in his passages purporting to show the closeness of
ape to savage:
...as soon as the progenitors of man became
social (and this probably occurred at a very
early period)
the principle of imitation, and
reason, and experience would have increased, and
much modified the intellectual powers in a way,
of which we see only traces in the lower animals.
Apes are much given to imitation, as are the
lowest savages; and the simple fact... that after
a time no animal can be caught in the same place
by the same sort of trap, shows that animals
,
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learn by experience, and imitate
the caution
others. Now, if some one man in a tribe... of
[192]
We see Darwin starting out with
the premise that

socialization sets humans apart from the beasts.

However,

he quickly shifts modes and attempts
to retract the

separateness by an eliding movement between apes and
savages who hold the 'same

1

(similar?)

and utilization of experience.

powers of imitation

Next he suggests, through

direct juxtaposition, that the invention of snares
and

weapons by "some one man in
of

a

tribe" is on the same order

intellectual activity as the ape's imitation mode.

positioning of the "savage" relies on

a

This

suppression of the

great differences between Native cultures and the

activities of other primates.
Despite the claim that the scale of human development
leads to an apex which the English owning-classes inhabit,

Darwin is aware that the accidental or historical nature of

evolution (see Gould) detracts from the inevitability of
any one historical construct.

Thus while Darwin affirms

that the English morality is the "noblest" development of

evolution to date, he also realizes that given his

definition of fitness in terms of survival power--progress
and evolution become decoupled--with the result that

English morality need not be the only evolutionary
successful variant:
I do not wish to maintain that any strictly
social animal, if its intellectual faculties were
to become as active and highly developed as in
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man, would acquire exactly the same
moral sense
as ours. [193]

This view harmonizes with his idea that
greater

differentiation is not

a

uniform result of evolution, and

that many different social strategies could
be considered

rational or advantageous from

a

selective standpoint.

However, for Darwin there is the troublesome
specter of

cultural relativism or diversity lurking in this doctrine.

Darwin did not appear to fret over such relativism, but
once the relativist thesis asserts itself, more pressure is
put on racist anthropology.

This would also point

questions at craniometries and even the reductive
materialist thesis.
The doctrine of accidental history also impacts on

Darwin's ambivalent feelings for the place of rationality

within science.

Darwin's discomfort with his radical

reductive-materialism is evident by his desire to place the
moral faculty of sympathy both inside and outside Natural

Selection
By now it is obvious that Darwin used racist ideas to

further his theory of Natural Selection and he used

evolution to explain domination of Natives.
first to note Darwin's racism.

I

am not the

Gould and Oldroyd make note

of it; Oldroyd;

Darwin, we may suppose, would have utterly
repudiated the racism of Hitler, yet even Darwin
occasionally put forth a remark that gives some
indication of racist tendencies... [194]
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Gould downplays Darwi n's racism and sexism
by arguing,
(1)

Virtually no white male of that era

superiority of his race," and
individuals in
boat entirely

a

(2)

decent way. 195

— for

...

doubted the

Darwin treated
Most commentators miss the

example, Farrington says:

nothing could be less in keeping with Darwin's
personal character than racial antipathy, racial
enslavement of weaker peoples, or extermination
of those judged by butchers to be less fit. [196]
John Greene goes further than most in exposing

Darwin's prejudices and like Gould dismisses the idea that
Darwin can be held responsible because these biases were
shared with his contemporaries who wrote on social matters
and science.

The passage from Greene found in Darwin's

letters to William Graham in 1881 used at the beginning of
this chapter deserves restating.
I could show fight on natural
selection having
done and doing more for the progress of
civilization than you seem inclined to admit.
Remember what risk the nations of Europe ran, not
so many centuries ago, of being overwhelmed by
the Turks, and how ridiculous such an idea now
is!
The more civilized so-called Caucasian races
have beaten the Turkish hollow in the struggle
for existence.
Looking to the world at no very
distant date, what an endless number of lower
races will have to be eliminated by higher
civilized races throughout the world. [197]

Following this quote Greene comments in the following
way
This view of history would find few supporters
today, but we should not therefore rush to brand
Darwin a "racist" or dismiss him as a bourgeois
If, as it seems
exponent of British imperialism.
of this
of
most
belief
the
clear, he shared
racial
of
existence
in
the
contemporaries
differences in intellectual ability and moral
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disposition, he did so because he thought
the
evidence seemed to require it, and he qualified
1S etatements in cases where the
evidence
contradictory, as in the case of the moral seemed
differences "believed to exist" between human
races... [198]

Greene believes that Darwin presents

good-faith imperialism/racism.

a

case of

However "good intentions"

do not separate Darwin from other Social
Darwinists.

Also,

Greene fails to note that Darwin's reliance on racist
science, such as Craniometries, was flawed.

Furthermore

Darwin was especially prone to accept racist sciences
because they mesh with his metaphysics and Malthusian
assumptions, as well as fill gulfs in theory and evidence.

Apologists for Darwin miss the point that many of
Darwin's contemporaries despised racism.

in the next

chapter Wallace's views will contradict Darwin's in these
matters.

Within the culture at large others, such as

George Eliot, disputed notions of class and race

superiority
...in noting the oppression suffered by the Jews
in gentile culture, Eliot both questions
Spencer's hierarchy of "race" and demonstrates
how racial discrimination multiplies the problems
of obedience and resistance. [199]

Virtually all commentators fail to notice that
Darwin's racism is not merely

a

non-scient if ic bias which

seeps into his "pure" science but is an integral aspect of
his evolutionary theory.

Later biological theorists could

in time dispense with Darwin's racist doctrines only

because they changed his work in scope and detail.
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1

,

Furthermore, the uncomfortable result that
science
sometimes moves through morally repulsive phases
needs to
be acknowledged and dealt with.

Greene's suggestion that Darwin was especially

conscientious because he was willing to admit to
gaps of
data and theory deserves further comment.
Darwin's

hints

of ignorance concern central aspects of
evolutionary

theory

,

cause")

such as how variations arise

("from whatever

and how tightly selection functions

("tend to"): 200

Owing to this struggle [for existence]
variations, however slight and from whatever
cause proceeding, if they be prof itable wil
tend to the preservation of such individuals...
.

.

.

.

And Darwin freely admits that the physical basis of

variation is unknown to himself.

His theory of pangenesis

had no evidence of any kind to recommend it and was

disputed by even his most ardent followers.

This is of

crucial importance to those who would attempt to engineer
the genetics of society.

Until one knew the principles and

mechanisms of descent with change, one could not in good

conscience embark on eugenics programs even if general
trends were recognized.

E.

Conclusion to Chapter Two

The claim that Haeckel perverted and de-scient ized

Darwin

'

evolutionary theory with racism and nationalism
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cannot be supported.

Rather, the origin of Social

Darwinism must be traced to Darwin himself.

Darwin

supported eugenics in theory, though he tempered
calls to
implement activist policies in England out of moral

considerations.

It

is unclear whether it was out of a

temporary lack of understanding of evolutionary mechanisms
as or on the other hand it was purely moral
scruples which

held Darwin back from actively seeking the extermination of
the poor.

In any case,

Darwin was

a

Social Darwinist.

While several critics have noted Darwin's Social
Darwinism, the actual details: structure of the theory of

Natural Selection, metaphysical, epistemological and

methodological assumptions, as well as imperialist and
racist biases, have been neglected and left invisible.

One

of the transparent aspects of Darwin's thought that needs

to be rendered visible is that he embraced several

interna 1 ly-inconsistent doctrines, which rendered his work

ambivalent in regards to central themes of evolutionary
theory

Darwin was ambivalent about the place of "man" in
nature, and this showed in his handling of the relation of

Natives to apes and in his discussion of the role of moral
values for human evolution and of his understanding of
sexual selection and the level at which selection operates.

Darwin was also ambivalent about the notion of progress,
and this showed in his inconsistent handling of ideas about

perfection, degeneration, hierarchy, telos, social programs
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and the new science of craniometry.

that

These results show

proper historical understanding invalidates any
neat
distinction between science and ideology, at
a

least in the

case of nineteenth century biological theory.
Thus, for example, Longino's neat distinction
between

constitutive and contextual values fails. "Pure science"
and bias are not mutually exclusive, and inattention
to

this problem has led to

a

dangerous distortion of our

understanding and evaluation of science, and therefore our
relation to it.
This chapter draws to its close with

a

newly directed

attention to the very last words of the Descent of Man
where Darwin tries to shift attention away from human

history and focus instead on the "less shameful"

predecessors of man:
The main conclusion arrived at in this work,
namely, that man is descended from some lowly
organized form, will, I regret to think, be
highly distasteful to many. But there can hardly
be a doubt that we are descended from barbarians.
The astonishment which I felt on first seeing a
party of Fuegians on a wild and broken shore will
never be forgotten by me, for the reflection at
once rushed into my mind such were our
ancestors.
These men were absolutely naked and
bedaubed with paint, their long hair was tangled,
their mouths frothed with excitement, and their
expression was wild, startled, and distrustful.
They possessed hardly any arts, and like wild
animals lived on what they could catch; they had
no government, and were merciless to every one
He who has seen a
not in their own small tribe.
savage in his native land will not feel much
shame, if forced to acknowledge that the blood of
some more humble creature flows in his veins.
For my own part _I would as soon be descended from
that heroic little monkey who braved his dreaded
enemy in order to save the life of his keeper, or

—

,
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from the old baboon, who descending
from the
mountains, carried away in triumph his young
comrade from a crowd of astonished dogs
as from
the s avage who delights to torture his
enemi iiT"
of fers _up bloody sacr if ices
practices
j.nf ant icide without remorse
treat s his wives as
slaves knows no decency and is haunted by
the
grossest superstitions
[201]

—

,

,

,

,

.

That almost all critics have denied, disputed
and

suppressed the racist characteristics of Darwin's theory
of
Natural Selection is interesting but the question
remains:
why all the anxiety over

a

point that by now should be

merely an historical fact?
Shapin and Barnes' work presents the most insightful
and entertaining analysis of the cognitive disturbance that

charges of racism and Social Darwinism in Darwin's work
bring to scientists and academics.

Playfully tackling the

problem as one to be investigated by anthropologists like
themselves in terms of "phenomena" encountered in the
"tribal setting" of the academic world, 202 these two

conclude that real understanding of the situation cannot be

obtained until one realizes that
Darwin is a sacred totem by virtue of his
" f oundership"
of modern biology; science is
sacred, so must Darwin and his book be sacred,
both must be protected from contamination from
the profane.
As the author of the Origin he must
himself be pure; his thought must be unmingled
with worldly pollutions and incapable of
satisfactorily blending or combining with the
suspect formulations of social Darwinism. Thus,
"influences" from the "profane" Malthus can only
be the spiritual emanations of mathematics and
genuine science, or nonessential stimuli or
manners of speech.
And implications for social
Darwinism can only be misunderstandings. [203]
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Shapin and Barnes note that when discussions
of
Darwin's work which is unrelated to Malthus and
Social

Darwinism occurs, the language of critics
changes— no
longer are '"blame,'

'responsibility,' and internal

purity” 204 the key phrases.

This shift allows us to see

that the fuss over Darwin's purity is based on an

unarticulated desire to control the visible shape Darwin
and science presents to scientists, historians and the

public
ri
other words, the display of Darwin's purity of
internal state is nothing but a way of making him
out as the ideal-type of a modern scient ist
205

I

.

[

The purification process also attempts to give
...the Origin status as proper science, and thus
align it for study by the methods of the history
of science proper, rather than as (say) "popular
culture" or "ideology." [206]
In order to understand science and its relation to

culture, Shapin and Barnes continue, the cultural inputs
into science must not be seen as evil, but rather as "what

happens." 207

Their best insight, which this dissertation

hopes to instantiate, is that cul ture— inc luding science

itself— is never homogeneous, and

in order to understand

,

science no "a priori conceptions of how science must be"

?

f)

can drive an understanding of science, but rather the task
of the investigator is to go and look at the details of

what occurred in history in order to develop knowledge of

science
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The issue remains as to how we are
to evaluate

Darwin’s work.

The understanding we have reached on the

interplay of science and social bias precludes
simply

attacking Darwin as an unscientific racist, for

(1)

scientific facts could be used (even if ideologically)
to
support racism at that time, and (2) Darwin's bias was
not
unique, but rather shared by some of his peers, even
if

disputed by others.
The political ramifications of Social Darwinism,

particularly as witnessed in this century, point to the
grave potential for evil inherent in Darwin's particular

version of the theory of evolution.

But within the

framework of his theory there is also an emancipatory
potential: first, the de-hierarchizat ion implied by the

undermining of the concept of progress in biology, and
second, the anti-radical-reductive-materialist evidence
that allows culture to supersede Natural Selection in such
a

way that it is possible that humans may make meaningful

attempts to control the path of evolutionary or cultural

change

Clearly Darwin's work presents
consider.

a

complicated case to

A more elaborate critique might even suggest

that even Darwin's cautious

(but naive)

approach to

biologically-mandated social action, which demanded
knowledge of the biological mechanisms of social change
before proceeding to active measures--is another escape
from moral responsibility through invocation of scientific
141

expertise and results as the final arbiters
of social
policy.

This misuse of the classic is/ought distinction

and of science will be made more clear in
the chapters to

come in which Darwin's relation to Wallace, Malthus and

legislative reform of the Poor Laws are revealed and

Darwin's work is placed in

a

wider historical and

philosophical perspective.
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connection of kind of thought with form of
brain. --Like
f attract lon with nature of the
element..." see page
S ruber.
Kantian scruples aside, an obvious result of
this radical-reductive materialism is the
elimination of
free will.
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Charles Darwin, The Or ig in of the Spec ies by Means of
Natural Selection or the Preservation of favored Races in~
t
S t rugg le for Life (New York: Modern Library,
?) pps.
94-5.
For more information on the bibliographic status of
this book see the bibliography or footnote 73 above.
In
Notebook "B" Darwin says: "It is absurd to talk of one
animal being higher than another." He goes on to say: "We
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CHAPTER

III

ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE: CRITIC OF SOCIAL DARWINISM

A.

Wallace's Work in the Darwinian Context

Illustration

8:

Portrait of Alfred Russel Wallace
155

1

1

.

Wallace's life

Although the co discoverer of the theory of Natural
Selection, Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) remains an

obscure figure outside the domain of biology.
travails of the

Despite the

Darwin Industry," little has been written

about Wallace and his relation to Darwin remains virtually

unexplored.

2

This gap in scholarship has contributed to

a

lack of understanding of the ideological context of

nineteenth century biology in general and of Darwin's work
in particular.

Due to Wallace's almost invisible status

biographical sketch is called for here.

a

general

Besides being the

second to discover the mechanism of the transmutation of
species, his other recognized and major contribution was
the discovery of the "Wallace Line,"

a

geographical

division of fauna species between Asia and Australia
falling in the Malay Archipelago.

During his own time he

was renowned for both theoretical and applied biology by

those within the field and without and published

extensively within the scientific and political domains.
Known to Victorians as

a

scientist, social reformer and

critic of contemporary values, he was valued for his many

contributions to science and society.
His origins were unlike those of most professional

biologists of his time and therefore

156

it

is

interesting to

review his early history.

The scientific societies were

dominated by people with backrounds similar to Darwin.
While Darwin went to the best schools and graduated
with

top-notch references and trust funds waiting, Wallace was

self-educated and earned his daily living through the labor
of his own hands.

Such self-reliance resulted in part from

his father's financial failures.

Early in his life his

father squandered most of the modest family inheritance on
a

publishing venture, and litigation took the rest.'

5

at fourteen Alfred

as

a

left home in order to earn his on living

land surveyor with his brother.

he was
A

Thus

4

His father died when

21.

turning point in his life came when he met Henry

Walter Bates

(1825-1892)

,

and the two, having read W. H.

Edwards' book on the insects of the Amazon, decided to

become insect collectors in the jungles of the "New World."
They managed to scrape together boat fare and left in 1848.
The idea was to capture and then send specimens back to

London in order to raise funds to continue collecting and
perhaps even save something for their return.
ill

Bates fell

soon after arriving in Brazil, which was not an

uncommon fate during these dangerous times when allopathic
medicine had little grip on health in the tropics.

Wallace

went off on his own, and soon fell in love with collecting.
He was enthusiastic about the Natives he met, and accounts
of interactions with the local people fill his diaries and

books.

Because the "best" insects, the ones unknown to
157

European collectors, were to be found at the furthest
reaches of "civilization," he spent much of his time
in
'remote" and even "unexplored" territory.

During these

years his life was often in the hands of Native guides and
the local inhabitants

(see Illustration 8).

After years of collecting insects and pelts he began
in 1852 to get ready for his trip back to England.

Upon

arriving dockside he found that most the the crates he had
sent from the forest to be shipped to London while he

continued his work in the wilds had been seized by
bureaucrats who figured he was up to no good, for they
could not fathom why anyone wanted dead bugs.
After what seemed like endless bureaucratic

maneuvering and bribe-taking he finally convinced the
authorities to let him load his cargo.

disaster struck: his boat, the Helen
He was

,

Soon, however,

caught fire and sunk.

lucky to escape with his life, having survived days

adrift on the open seas in

a

lifeboat, but his collections

and notebooks were lost to the fire and ocean.

him his agent: Samuel Stevens

Luckily for

(who had done the job of

selling the insects that had made it back to England)
had insured the cargo so Wallace did not return penniless.

Once in London Wallace wrote and self-publ ished his
first book. Palm Trees of the Amazon

,

(1853)

,

while

initiating contact with people in the scientific community.

Because he needed to establish himself, economically and
scientifically, and because he loved travel, he set out two
158

The Amazon Basin showing areas explored by de la
1.
Gondamine 1735-1745, Humboldt 1799-1804 and Wallace

Fig.

1848-1852.

Illustration 9: Maps of Wallace's route through the
Also see Wilma George. [5]
Amazon.
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years later for the Malay Archipelago with the
intention of

redeeming his fortunes.

Like most biologists of the time,

he was always considering how what he saw might
help

provide an insight into the mechanism of evolution.
During his travels in the South Pacific, reeling from
what was probably

a

bout of malaria, he recalled Malthus'

work and emerged with
a

a

new idea.

In February 1858 he sent

letter to the Royal Society, care of the committee on

biology, announcing the discovery of the principle of

speciation through descent with modification and survival
of the fittest,

or what would become known as "The Theory

of Evolution" or "Natural Selection."

Darwin chaired that committee, and was urged by his
friends to publish before Wallace could return to England.
Darwin arranged to have two papers read before the Linnean
Society, his and Wallace's.

(True to his usual form,

circumstances "prevented" Darwin from attending the
meeting.)
it

Thus the theory of evolution was born, although

caused little commotion at this point, probably due to

a

failure of most listeners to grasp the enormity of what was
being proposed.

Wallace,

a

shy and generally unknown

figure at this point, did not challenge Darwin's claim for

priority of discovery.

He was happy to share Darwin's

glory and vowed to help Darwin establish evolutionary

biology as an accepted scientific discipline.

£

Catching insects and the discovery and elucidation of
the theory of speciation were not the only matters that
160

held Wallace's attention.

During his eight years in

Malaysia, Wallace came to the conclusion that indigenous

peoples were being exploited by Europeans.

The hypocrisy

of Empire became a major theme in his writings and

political work.

Wallace returned to London in 1862 to establish his

scientific career as author and entomologist.

Although

reticent by nature and an outsider to the aristocratic

scientific circles of London in which Darwin moved freely,
he quickly made friends and was allowed to join the major

groups.

His publication record grew to copious

proportions, as he contributed to journals and published
many books.

His most famous book, The Malay Archipelago

(1869), went through more than

dozen editions,

a

translated into many foreign languages.

7

and was

Having earned the

Victorian credentials to marry, he sought out

a

mate and

married 18 year old Miss Annie Mitten, settling down to the
life of an orchid-growing gentleman-scientist.
He was of course

a

recognized and principal expert in

theoretical biology, as well as
entomology.

a

respected authority in

His insects found their way into major

collections within the scientific community.

Following

general research practice, he saved the best specimens
for himself, so that his own "cabinet" was famous within

collecting circles.

He was responsible for cataloging

thousands of new species, and helped further Bates' ideas
on defensive mimicry in insects.
161

Wallace's scientific

8

circle in London included: T.H. Huxley,
Tyndall, Sir John
Lubbock, Dr. W.B. Carpenter, Sir William Crookes,
Sir

Joseph Hooker, Mr. Francis Galton, Prof. Alfred
Newton, Dr.
P.L. Slater, Mr. St George Mivart, Sir William
Flower, Sir

Norman Lockyer and Prof.

R.

Meldola.

8

He frequented the

meetings of the scientific societies and was President of
the Biological Section of the British Association.

9

Although he had done well by insect collecting and
publishing, he eventually lost much of his money through
bad business dealings
on his savings).

(a

failed lead mine took quite

a

toll

His friends at the societies, who had

contacts in government, tried unsuccessfully to obtain
various positions for him.

Finally Darwin and

used their influence to secure

a

a

few others

government pension that

made his later years more comfortable.

Wallace outlived

most of his contemporaries, and continued publishing right
up to the time of his death in 1913.

His successful publishing career included popular

books on biology, travel and politics, technical writings,
and articles.

Even though at times outspoken, he was

regarded as one of the inner circle of mainstream
scientists.

For example, Wallace wrote for the

Encyclopedia Britannica, and was approached by the
publisher of Darwin's work to edit the new edition of the
Origin

1
.

He was sought out by Darwin's friend Sir Charles

Lyell for summaries of the theory of evolution because
11
Lyell thought Wallace more readable than Darwin.
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In 1889

1

the University of Oxford awarded him the
D.C.L., an

honorary Doctor of Civil Law degree.

Towards the end of

his life he joked that he did not want any more
medals, as

any addition to his collection would require remodeling his

crowded display case.

All in all, he was

a

major presence

within the intellectual community of London and the world.
was also recognition gained for his unorthodox

politics and views on "non-scient if ic" matters, some of
which will be explored in this chapter.

Wallace tells us:

In 1865, when Spencer was, I believe, one of the
editors of The Reader he asked me to write an
article on the treatment of savage races, with
special reference to some cases of the barbarity
of settlers in Australia that had recently been
published. [12]
,

John Stuart Mill recruited Wallace to head up the Land

Nationalization Society, which was fighting the enclosure
of

commons.^

In 1882 Wallace published Land

Nationalization

,

a

lower classes. 14

political book aimed at helping the
This work was followed by others which

delved into social issues such as imperialism, capitalism,
and public health,

Studies

Century
Life

in such books as:

Scientific and Socia

,

(

1898)

,

Vaccination

a

Bad Times

(1900),

(1885),

The Wonderful

Delusion (1901)

,

The World of

(1910), Social Environment and Mora 1 Progress

and The Revolt of Democracy

(1913)

.

(1913)

He wrote over two

hundred articles, reviews and letters which were published
in leading scientific and literary journals.
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Not only did individuals and groups seek
him out, the

government summoned his expertise for one of the

controversial topics of the day: vaccination.

As

a

well

known scientist and social activist, he was asked to
join
the commission, but he refused.
the hearings

He did offer testimony at

.

Even when some of his interests took

a

turn at odds

with those of most scientists of the biological community,

Wallace found support in other circles.

For instance, his

interest in spiritualism was shared by F.W.H. Meyers, 16 who

wrote Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death
as well as Miss Wood,

Mr. Gurney,

,

Miss Fairlamb, Professor Sidgwick,

and Mr. Balfour.

Explorer, entomologist, evolutionary biologist, social

reformer, spiritualist and phrenologist, these descriptions
point to the extensive interests and accomplishments of

a

major figure of the middle and late nineteenth century.
Let us turn now to an analysis of the work of this

scientist and critic of Victorian culture.

2.

The politics of Victorian evolutionary science

By now it should be clear that Darwin was the the

first Social Darwinist.

As the co-discoverer and

(then)

well-known critic of the social aspects of the theory of
Natural Selection, Wallace should be considered one of the
164

foremost scientific critics of Social Darwinism.

In the

sections that follow, his views on Natives, capitalism,
imperialism, eugenics and "man's" place in the universe

provide

a

foil to the idea that Victorian science was

monolithic in its assumption of racist and sexist

evolutionary theory.

Wallace's attack on Darwin's

materia list continuity thesis provides the basis for

rejecting the scientific justification of what was claimed
to be "value free" scientific policy.

One of Wallace's

important contributions to the field of evolutionary

biology was his attempt to open up

a

discussion of the

scope, application, and justice of this science.

What little response Darwin mustered for Wallace

centered on two restricted, but key points.
Darwin claimed that biology was

a

In the main,

"purely scientific"

enterprise, and so politics lay outside his domains of

expertise and concern.

Secondly, he emphatically rejected

Wallace's suggestion that there are emergent qualities
which separate humans from the rest of the biological
world.

Darwin,

like Haeckel, held firmly to the belief

that an absolute continuity between humans and primates was

essential to the theory of evolution and its success.

But

Wallace was equally sure about this point: evolutionary
theory need not be Social Darwinist.

As a member of the

loyal opposition, Wallace attempted to keep the theory of

transmutation true to itself by restricting science to the
physiological and behavioral development of animals and
165

1

humans up to the penultimate moment of
the emergence of
human culture.
The class bias of the evolutionary biologists
needs to
be addressed.

After all, most of them were rather wealthy,

with the exception of Wallace and Hux ley--which
more or
less substantiates this point--since they were, or
ended up
in,

opposition to Darwin's position on "man."

Huxley's

status as an "outsider" is compromised by the fact that his

career was launched through the intercession of powerful
friends.

As Huxley matured,

shifted from

a

however, his emphasis

radical materialism to the non-biologica

status of "man."
It

is well worth bearing

in mind that at the same time

evolutionary biology was carving out its domain the
credentials for becoming

a

member of this scientific

community underwent particular changes.

Whereas the

academic world and the overlapping universe of the

scientific societies were dominated by religious

conformists 1 8 and the wealthy, two new elements were
,

entering the picture.

On the one hand, nouveau riche

entrepreneurs and their professional technicians, were
making inroads into the scientific domain.

On the other,

the practical advantages to systematic advances in

technology appealed to the interests of politicians.
Government funding for scientific research was
reaching new plateaus.

Both Darwin's and Huxley's voyages

were underwritten by the Royal Navy, much in the same way
166

.

that various scientific experiments are
currently allowed

limited access to NASA shuttle shots--which tend
to focus
on military and large-scale commercial
research.

Later the

Challenger, that is the HMS Challenger, not the space
shuttle, undertook the exploration and mapping of the
seas
that would provide an obvious payoff to British security

and business interests.

The middle class of entrepreneurs

was being serviced by government spending as its economic

power was translating into political clout.

Thus upwardly

mobile middle class technicians and scientists worked to
find entry into the conservative societies and clubs of

science and government.

If

the professionalization of the

medical field can be taken as
is not

a

model

(see chapter 4),

surprising that biology was headed in

a

it

conservative

direction
Even Wallace benefited from governmental largesse by

accepting free government passage to Asia.

In

later life

he began to see problems with government-driven science,

and campaigned against its presence.

He feared that the

effect of such funding would erode the independence of

scientists, and silently tailor biological research to

government's concerns--when public money would be better
spent in eradicating poverty. 19
By 1864, he was already committed to the position that

there was

a

radical split between man and beast.

20

By

1869, disillusioned with empire, he was extolling the

virtues of savage life and attacking the failures of
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laissez faire imperialism.

We now turn to the details of

his critique of Social Darwinism.

B.

Natives and the Continuity Question

Like Darwin, Wallace spent

a

considerable time

exploring the geological, biological and sociological
facets of the "New World" and beyond

— before

mechanism for the evolutionary hypothesis.

conceiving

a

Despite this

initial overlap, the two came to remarkably different views

concerning the status of Natives.

explained

This can perhaps be

by the fact that Wallace, unlike Darwin or

Huxley, spent

a

good deal of his travel time living and

working with local inhabitants.

Whereas both Darwin and

Huxley enjoyed the advantage of having fewer

responsibilities for taking care of themselves and no
concern for generating income as they went, Wallace had no
choice but to become intimate with Native cultures.
The most obvious difference lies, perhaps, in the
fact that Darwin was free from the thought of
having to "pay his way" by the immediate result
of his efforts, and likewise from all care and
anxiety regarding domestic concerns; the latter
being provided for him when on board the Beagle
or arranged by those who accompanied him on his
travels over land and by river. The elimination
of these minor cares tended to leave his mind
free and open to absorb and speculate at
comparative leisure upon all the strange
phenomena which presented themselves throughout
the long voyage.
A further point of interest in determining
the ultimate gain or loss lies in the fact that
,
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Darwin's private excursions had to be somewhat
subservient to the movements of the Beagle ...

[211

Wallace was free to roam where he pleased, when
he
pleased.

See Illustrations 7,

travel inland, however, was

8,

9

and 10.

limited.

Darwin's

Wallace's main

restriction was the presence of collectible insects or
other specimens.

Since he made his living through the sale

of his insect collections, he was forced to abandon any

area that held scanty reserves of salable insects, plants
or animals.

When collectible species were abundant he

could stay for extended periods of time--which encouraged
him to learn more about the local inhabitants.
In Brazil and elsewhere Natives guided Wallace,

and

helped provide transport, food and labor for his daily

existence.

He learned their languages, out of abstract

interest and outright necessity.

For

a

goodly part of his

years abroad he lived with people who had little, and in
some cases no, experience with Europeans.

He began with

remarkably enthusiastic openness to their practices, and

eventually developed

a

respect for ways of life utterly

foreign to his own.
In his travelogues he often gives the benefit of the

doubt to the strange and sometimes repulsive ways of the
Native.

When he found their practices odd or seemingly

irrational he would usually inform the reader that the

problem probably lay in his understanding, rather than in
Native practices.

169

a

)

Illustration 10: Map of Wallace's routes through the
(See Wilma George for his
Malay Archipelago. [22]
itinerary
.

170

The

Voyage

of
the

Beagle

23
Illustration 11: Map of Darwin's voyage

171

Illustration 12: Map of Darwin's inland travel from
August to December 1833. [24]
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Illustration 13 Map of Darwin's inland travel
125
March to July 1835
:

.

]
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front

His stance contrasts markedly with the plethora
of

anecdotes and attitudes alluded to by Darwin in reference
to savage and inarticulate brutes at the end of the

Descent

,

or by Huxley as expressed in his writings on the

mental capacities of negroes.

Darwin was consistent: the

final passage of the Descent is taken directly from his

travel notebooks, which were written at
time

a

much earlier

2 ^
.

Wallace develops

theoretical basis for this view of

a

human emergence through

a

multi-faceted approach.

He

exposes the political nature of human social and

geopolitical activity, the failure of technology to yield
true progress, the evils of capitalism, and the ideology of

eugenics, in order to generate the claim that human

activities fall outside the domain of biology.
One can sense Darwin's discomfort and almost feel the

onset of debilitating symptoms 2 7 as he surveyed Wallace's
attack.

Wallace even had the poor judgement to refer to

angels in one explanation of emergence.

The sad part of

this saga is that Darwin ignored the many substantial

arguments Wallace made.

The following section sets forth

Wallace's development of

a

of Natives.

critique of European domination

In this venture he offers what amounts to a

"proof" against Darwin's continuity thesis.
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:

1.

Interaction with Natives

Wallace spent the years of 1848 to 1852 travelling in
South America.

villages

He lived, for the most part,

in Native

hiring the locals to help him canoe up and down

the waterways and enter the jungle where he could collect

specimens.

While Darwin painted pictures of barely

articulate paint bedaubed blood-thirsty beasts,

^

an(^

Huxley avoided contact with the Natives by remaining on
board the Ra t t lesnake or within major European outposts
such as Sydney, Australia,

culture.

Wallace plunged into Native

He was intrigued by the complexity and beauty of

the "savages' way of life."

His first reaction to the

people so new to him was one of "surprise and delight."
His openness to the situation is marked by his enthusiasm
at

"living with man in

a

state of nature--with absolute

uncontaminated savages!" 8 n
This enthusiasm deepened throughout his career, and
his travel journals are full of accounts of Native

practices.
f estiva

Here follows an account of an "Indian"

1

The Indians had a fiesta while I was here. [Tomo
They made abundance of
on the Rio Negro.]
"shirac," and kept up their dancing for thirty
hours.
The principle peculiarity of it was that
they mixed up their civilized dress and their
Indian decorations in a most extraordinary
They all wore clean trousers and white
manner.
or striped shirts; but they had also feather
plumes, bead necklaces, and painted faces, which
They
made altogether a rather queer mixture.
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also carried their hammocks like scarves
over
their shoulders, and had generally hollow
cylinders in their hands, used to beat upon the
ground in time to the dancing. Others had
lances, bows, and wands, ornamented with
feathers, producing as they danced in the
moonlight a singular and wild appearance. [31]

From this rather neutral description, one can easily
sense the attempt to be "objective," yet also sympathetic,
in his description.

offer

a

But he also betrays

a

willingness to

glimpse of his enthusiasm.
We prepared our supper rather early, and about
sunset... a messenger came to notify us that the
dance had begun [at Jauarite, along the Rio
Negro]... The paint with which they [the women]
decorate their whole bodies has a very neat
effect, and gives them almost the appearance of
being dressed, and as such they seem to regard
it; and however much those who have not witnessed
this strange scene may be disposed to differ from
me, I must record my opinion that there is far
more immodesty in the transparent and flesh
coloured garments of our stage-dancers, than in
the perfect nudity of these daughters of the
forest. [32]

Not only did the nubile ladies move him, but he often

compliments the men, for example, as "peaceful," 3 ^ or "fine
active fellows."^ 4
and generous.

3 S

He finds them hard working, personable

When he runs afoul of the Natives— some of

them steal his gifts or abandon him to

a

potentially lethal

river ride-- he does impugn their situation or race rather
he looks for circumstantial and local ly-particular

explanations based upon the foibles human personality

is so

liable to exhibit.
I had now only one man and one boy in each
to pass rapids which required six or eight
paddlers to shoot with safety; but staying
was useless, so we went on --drift ing down
,
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canoe,
good
here
the

.

stream after Senhor Jesuine, who, no doubt,
rejoiced in the idea that I should probably lose
my canoes, if not my life, in the caxoeiras
rapids
and thought himself well revenged on
the stranger who had dared to buy the canoe he
had wanted to purchase. [36]
[

]

,

What needs to be borne in mind at this point is that

although Wallace had fully articulated his theory of
evolution five years after the first edition of Travels
the second edition (1895)

,

includes no revisions that would

suggest that this theory would cause him to abandon, or

even modify his views concerning the Natives of the Amazon.
In fact,

his point of view becomes more radical as he gets

older
several years after Darwin is painting

In 1883,

savages as inarticulate beasts in the Descent

,

and Huxley

deprecates the status of "our prognathous relative,"^ 7
Wallace is still willing to make claims, however naive, for
idyllic life within pockets of savage existence.

At

Pitcairn Island, near Easter Island, according to Wallace,
"They all lived as one united family, and crime, or even

dissension, was unknown." 3 R
Unlike Darwin, who is locked into
holes various cultures within

a

a

view that pigeon

vertical hierarchy, Wallace

discusses each Native group within two contexts which he
usually treats as distinct: biological and cultural.
results is

a

What

complex and multifaceted gauge of

civilizations.

The cultural superiority of one group over

another was not an absolute biological judgement concerning
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survival power, as Darwin would have it.

That is to say

that even on Wallace's early view, so called
"civilization"

was not better in every respect to the Native's
situation,

though he certainly preferred to live with the comforts and

culture of Europe.

To develop this point we shall look at

his views on slavery, cannialism, social development and

technology

2.

Slaves, cannibals, society and technology

Wallace's views on slavery could be said to be more
consistent than Darwin's, but none the less they are not
any less complicated.

While Darwin's Victorian scruples

pushed him to condemn slavery on moral grounds
sympathy)

,

(via

his hierarchical view of the innate biological

worth of human races pulled him in an opposite direction.
That is, if one race is destined

(i.e.

due to biological

superiority given the environment) to displace another,
there is no reason why slavery or race-war should be

rationally opposed, however distasteful the process might
be.

One wouldn't want to make arguments for liberating

aphids from ants.

Darwin saw no essential difference

between ant and human social life, as we shall see in more
detail later, in an analysis of sexual selection in humans.
For Wallace, however, things were different.

Given

relatively non-hierarchical view of the biological and
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a

.

]

cultural worth of the social and racial
groupings of
humans, he adopts

moral stance towards slavery,

a

independent of racial survival power.

focused on abuses, Wallace goes for

a

Whereas Darwin
more encompassing

argument which goes to the core conception of racial

domination
For instance, Wallace first relates stories about

Senhor Calistro,"

a

slave owner.

The owner provides good

working conditions and recreation for the slaves, is

attentive to their health and takes good care of them in
their old age.

According to Wallace, the best analogy

would be that Calistro treats the slaves as if they were
his own "large family of children.
At this point Wallace attacks.

He points out that

without freedom, the slaves can never lead

a

full life--no

matter how "nice" the working conditions:
But looking at it in this, its most favorable
light, can we say that slavery is good or
justifiable? Can it be right to keep a number of
our fellow-creatures in a state of adult infancy,
--of unthinking childhood? It is the
responsibility and self-dependence of manhood
that calls forth the highest powers and energies
of our race ...
40
[

Furthermore, he points out that the worst thing that could

happen would be to provide educational opportunity for the
slave and yet withhold freedom, for it would "assuredly

embitter his life." 41

While Wallace was surely insensitive

to the complexities of slave life

— its

complicated duties

and struggles hidden from the view of this white male slave
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owner and himself, the advance over
Darwin's argument based
on what amounts to pity is noteworthy.

Wallace recognized that the issue of slavery
could be
further complicated by histor ica 1 /cul tura 1
circumstances.
In other passages he observes that some
Native tribes have
a

long-standing tradition of practicing slavery, which

became entangled with European exploits.

immediately labeling the enterprise

a

Rather than

degrading spectacle

as he does in the case of solely-European-run slavery,

here he takes time to develop

a

more non- judgemental

and context-dependent stance:

There was hardly a male in the village, Messrs.
Jesuino and Chagas having taken all with them up
the river, to assist in an attack on an Indian
tribe, the "Cara-panas " where they hoped to get
a lot of women, boys, and children, to take as
presents to Barra.
There was scarcely anything
to be had to eat... [43]
,

In fact,

it

seems incredible that he can wedge this account

between complaints at not obtaining enough specimens and
the lack of food!

Barra is the town which is the

administrative headquarters for the region.

The European-

run government, he notes, encourages slavery by placing

orders for boys, girls and women with the Chiefs under
their jurisdiction.

A

complicating factor, however, is

that

There is something to said too in its favor, for
the Indians make war on each other, -principally the natives of the margin of the
river on those on the more distant igar ipes --f or
the sake of their weapons and ornaments, and for
revenge of any injury, real or imaginary, and
then kill all they can, reserving some young
,
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r
f r
helr wives
Th e hope of selling them
?i
!
o iK
the 2traders,
however, induces them to spare
many who would otherwise be murdered.
-

[44]

Furthermore, he notes that although the
captured people
would be happier if left alone, due to
the bizarre nature
of the local social practice of slavery
the captives become

free to leave their masters whenever they
like, which,

however, they seldom do when taken very young.
What is intriguing in this account of complexities
is
that Wallace doesn't resort to gasps of horror, as Darwin
does, but is willing to consider the various cultural

practices as intricate puzzles.

Where Darwin sees evidence

of a depraved dead-end of evolution, Wallace sees
cultural

difference which must be evaluated within
hence political and historical context.

a

social, and

In order to

develop this aspect more fully, we shall turn to Wallace's
views on technology and social development.

Unlike Darwin, who explicitly ranks cultures according
to European standards of technological power, Wallace is

reticent to rank societies and sees no essential connection

between technology, survival or progress.

As we saw above,

he tells us that the "civilized" government at Barra

provided the guns and ammunition for the slave trade, which
only made things worse.

Furthermore, given the choice

between Native life in the forest and life in

a

Europeanized town, Wallace recognizes the value of
"savage" existence:

"I

much doubt if they
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a

[the captured

.

——

!

natives] are better or happier than in
their native

forests

"

4 ^

.

His enthusiasm takes several forms.

He pokes holes in

the view that Europeans bring an uplifting
influence, by

debunking the value of firearms or centralized
government
while embracing an appreciation of the beauty and joy that
sometimes accompanies life in the jungle.

This latter

view, although rather unigue among the evolutionary

biologists of Darwin's resonates with

a

longstanding

tradition in English literature, the "Noble Savage."
Examples of the first point, that European culture
is not necessarily uplifting,

may be gleaned from his jibes

at the priests who tried to bring European culture to the

savage
Padre... Frei Jose dos Santos Innocentos was a
tall, thin, prematurely old man, thoroughly worn
out be every kind of debauchery ... and was
celebrated as the most original and amusing story
teller in the province of Para.
Don Juan was an
innocent compared to Frei Jose; but he told us he
had a great respect for the cloth, and never did
anything disreputable-- during the day
There
are seven or eight distinct processes in the
Roman Catholic baptism, well calculated to
attract attention of the Indians: there is water
and holy oil, --and spittle rubbed on the eyes,
and crosses on the eyes, nose, mouth, and body,
and kneeling and prayers in between, which all
bear sufficient resemblance to the complicated
to
operations of their own "pages" (conjurers)
make them think they got something very good, in
return for the shilling they pay for the
ceremony
The next day there were a few weddings...
After it [one of the weddings] was over, Frei
Joze gave the newly married people a very good
and practical homily on the duties of the married
state, which might have done some good, had the
parties to whom it was addressed understood it;
.

.

.

,
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which, as it
at all times
get married,
his pocket.

was in Portuguese, they did not.
He
strenuously exhorted the Indians to
and thus save their souls, --and fill
[47]

While he was amused by the vulgar priests,
he takes special

delight in exposing the indiscretions of corrupt
European

officials
Senhor Antonio Dias was rather notorious, even
in this country of loose morals, for his
Patriarchal propensities, his harem consisting of
a mother and daughter and two Indian girls, all
of whom he keeps employed at feather work. [48]

Although at times he qualifies his enthusiasm, his
subsequent publications continue to show appreciation for

Native ways of life over that of typical English existence.
Some of my dull and dreary evenings I occupied in
writing a description of the village and its
inhabitants, in what may probably be very dreary
blank verse; but it shows my ideas and thoughts
at the time, I may as well give it the reader in
place of the more sober and matter-of-fact view
of the matter I should probably take now.
I give
it as I wrote it, in a state of excited
indignation against civilized life in general,
and not altogether as my views when writing in
London in 1853.

A

DESCRIPTION OF JAVt TA

'Tis where the streams divide, to swell the floods...
There is an Indian village...
Here I dwelt awhile the one white man
Among perhaps two hundred living souls.
They pass a peaceful and contented life.
These black-hair d red shin'd, handsome, half-wild men.
How they look's, save in their dusty skin.
To a fair group of English village maids!
Yet far superior in their graceful forms?
For their free growth no straps or bands impede,
But simple food, free air, and daily baths
And exercise, give all that Nature asks
To mould a beautiful and healthy frame.
'

,
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...The young girls carry water on their
heads...
And sport like mermaids in the sparkling
wave.
...And thus these people pass their simple
lives.
They are a peaceful race; few serious crimes
Are known among them; they cannot rob or
murder,
And all the complicated villainies
Of man called civilized are here unknown.
[49]
It

is interesting that from the vantage point
of London,

even in 1853, Wallace doesn't want to claim that
he prefers
life in the rough;

"Yet think not that

I

would place, as

some would do. The civilized below the savage man," for
in
his opinion the European culture of books and art are worth

knowing.

But the fact that he felt torn in terms of

allegiance to both Native life and civilized life is
important for developing an understanding of his

perspect ive--which is vastly different from that of Darwin
or Huxley.

Wallace's reticence in allowing his appreciation for
Native life to overpower his praises of civilization must
also be interpreted in the context of Wallace's need to

establish his reputation within the conservative scientific
societies at this early date.

Later, when he has gained

entry and recognition, his tendency to be flagrantly

outspoken can be understood in part as

a

public

manifestation of personality no longer suppressed.
In any case,

at this early date

(1853),

in addition to

seeing some advantages to the Native way of life, he also

stresses the Native ability to adopt European culture, for

better or worse.

This represents

a

serious departure from

Darwin's view that Natives are incapable of rising above
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their low status in any meaningful
sense.
is

(Although Darwin

inconsistent on this point, as has been shown
earlier.)
They are ingenious and skillful workmen,
and
readily adopt any customs of civilized life that
may be introduced among them; and they
seem
capable of being formed, by education and good
government, into a peaceable and civilized
community. [51]
In one

remarkable passage, Wallace attributes much

misunderstanding between Europeans and Natives to

a

European ignorance of the Native's language and social
conventions.

In the instance of the hunt for the Amazons

he blames European confusion on

differences between

European standards of sexual demarcation in dress and the
conventions of the Natives.

The Europeans think that

because this tribe's warriors wear beads, have no beards
and sport long hair, they must be women. 52

Other

contributing factors, such as the use of shields covering
the Native's breasts, and the secretive nature of some

tribes mislead the Europeans.
The Natives, when asked about

a

tribe of Amazon

warrior women, pretend to know what the Europeans are
talking about, and provide invented information to please
them.

Wallace notes that the Natives do not "lie," but

rather are speaking in good faith to the foreigners.

Native practices include
formal communications.

a

prohibition of disagreement in

Thus to behave in

a

civil manner,

they honor the intelligence of the Europeans by giving them

assurance that the Amazons of which they speak exist.
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Of this tradition [of the Native's
assertion of
the existence of a female Amazon warrior
tribe],
however, I was myself unable to obtain any trace,
and I can easily imagine it entirely to have
arisen from the suggestions and inquiries of
Europeans themselves. When the story of the
Amazons was first made known, it became of course
a point with all future travellers to
verify it,
or if possible get a glimpse of these warlike
ladies.
The Indians must no doubt have been

overwhelmed with questions and suggestions about
them, and they, thinking that the white man must
know best, would transmit to their descendants
and families the idea that such a nation did
exist in some distant part of the country.
Succeeding travellers, finding traces of this
idea among the Indians, would take it as proof of
the existence of the Amazons...

Furthermore, he concludes 53
,

In my communications and inquiries among the

Indians on various matters, I have always found
the greatest caution necessary, to prevent one's
arriving at wrong conclusions. They are always
apt to affirm that which they see you wish to
believe, and when they do not at all comprehend
your question, will unhesitantly answer "Yes."

Cannibalism presents an exotic practice of especial
interest.

The very concept of consumption of human flesh

provoked intense reactions and raised moral questions for

Victorian scientists.

Slavery, although much more widely

practiced, was not as stirring an issue because both

Natives and Englishmen shared in the practice.

Cannibalism, however, elicited
response unimpeded by guilt.

a

visceral and moral

Thus the attribution of

cannibalism carried baggage which could be put to use in
demonstrating

(without explicit argumentation)

that the

anthropophagous Natives were beyond the pale of human
dignity
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In The Man-Eating Myth

(1979)
is

W.

Anthropology

/

Anthropophagy

Arens makes the astounding claim that cannibalism

so poorly documented that it is probable it
never

existed.

He claims that even if the practice had or has

adherents certainly there is

a

profound lack of evidence

that any credible person has ever witnessed such an event

other than in

a

rare case of starvation.

I have been unable to uncover adequate
documentation of cannibalism as a custom in any
form of society.
Rumors, suspicions, fears and
accusations abound, but no satisfactory
first-hand accounts. [54]

While Arens' thesis has been met with opposition, few
examples of cannibalism have been offered up in refutation.
A quick

look at Wallace's references to anthropophagy

reveal additional grist for Arens' mill.

The Malay

Archipelago contains no references to the practice in its
index.

Australasia has eight citations, but at these

locations ten references are made of which half contain no

evidence whatsoever: "undoubted cannibals" is one such
C.

reference.

C

Other cases send one to other works, thus the

book presents no first-hand evidence.
On the other hand, Wallace does refer to J.E.

Erskine's Journa 1 of

a

Cruise Among the Islands of the

Western Pacific in which claims of cannibalism are made.
However, again Arens' thesis rears its head.

instances none are witnessed by the author.

Of eleven

Most give

other sources, some vaguely pointing at unidentified

witnesses.

However to Erskine's credit there are least
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several references to particular
individuals who claim to
have witnessed cannibalism.
Of the evidence provided by
Erskine,

compelling is provided in "Appendix A."

the most
At this point he

introduces John Jackson, an Englishman who
spent two years
in the Feejeean Islands amongst the
Natives just prior
to

1850.

Erskine reproduces

a

portion of Jackson's diary, in

which lurid and first-hand accounts of ritual
consumption
of human flesh are given.

The dead bodies [of enemies killed in battle]
were set up in a row on their hinder parts, with
a pole rove through their legs, just
under their
knees, to keep them in a sitting posture on the
bows of the canoe.
We then pushed off, our
natives singing out, "Satiko, satiko" (Good bye,
good bye); and telling the enemy that they should
call again on them shortly, as their place was
conveniently s i t uated
and take a few more...
that they should take them just in the same way a
man kills his pigs... so as to have the honor of
being eaten by the chief himself... as I had seen
so much of their dark ways, and knew my presence
would not affect their proceedings, I thought I
would witness all I could...
At last they hauled them up to a place used
purposely for the dressing, cooking, and eating
of human flesh ..
The king being very impatient to begin, and
not choosing to wait till it was properly
prepared, told the butcher just to slice off the
end of their noses, and he would roast them while
he was getting the other parts ready... the first
he hardly let warm through, but while he was
eating it, the second got a little better done,
which he quickly demolished. While he had the
third in his hand, his eye caught mine looking at
him with surprise, which he misinterpreted into
another meaning, thinking that I was longing for
a taste... he offered me the last nose... He was
very much surprised that I would not accept what
to him seemed the best food imaginable... [56]
.

.
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.

,

Jackson tries to convince the chief that
God did not
approve of cannibalism, but the chief responded:
"different
countries, different fashions, and like manner,
different
gods." 57

Shortly thereafter, the feast began in earnest.
The flesh was then put into this "lovo" (oven)
and when cooked, which was not until the next
morning, shared out according to rank,
distinction &c... Several invited me to partake
of their small allowance, and all were egually
surprised with Tui Mativata [his Native
appelation] at my refusal. [58]
,

Jackson goes on to describe several occasions of

cannibalism in detail.

Thus Erskine and ultimately Wallace

could be said to possess some credible evidence of this
taboo social practice, regardless of our final appraisal of

Jackson's narrative.

It

is also worth keeping in mind that

of all of Wallace's works, Australasia should, of course,
be taken with a grain of salt, as he based the book on

Hellwald's work--which does not necessarily represent

Wallace's views.

Thus the silence of the Ma lay on the

topic speaks loudly of Wallace's lack of experience with

anthropophagy along with

a

lack of credulity and/or

interest given to others' claims.
Unlike many other writers of the time Wallace treats

cannibalism neutrally, as if he were describing an unusual
hand-shaking practice.

It is useful to consider the

ramifications of this attitude.

Arens understands the

attribution of anthropophagy as part of the technology of
imperialism.

By calling

a

tribe cannibals, the

(imperial)

anthropologist places the particular "natives" into
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a

.

special category

"early man," since the assumption is
that

the civilization process includes leaving
such culinary

practices behind.

Particularly interesting from our point

of view, Arens places cannibalism in a
context of

a

racist

Victorian science which ultimately leads to
contemporary
anthropology
Cannibals abound as western science pushes back
the frontiers of time.
There are at least two
reasons for this.
First, all the academic
branches which today are classed under the
heading of modern anthropology emerged as
organized inquiries at the same time, facing one
overriding question. The formative period
extended from the mid-nineteenth century to the
turn of the twentieth century, and the
intellectual puzzle, which remains unsolved and
is still debated, was the original human
condition.
The industrializing western societies
were bringing the remainder of the globe under
European colonial domination in an almost
effortless, unchecked process of expansion. At
the apex of their power, intellectuals in an
institutionalized setting and systematic fashion
first began to ponder the historical path to this
assumed inevitable conclusion .. .an equation was
made between nineteenth-century primitives and
prehistoric man. Both creatures were assumed to
be almost devoid of culture as conceived by the
European mind of the last century; and in this
savage state, the worst could be expected. [59]
While Wallace participated in the practice of equating

cannibalism with primitivity, he attempted to decouple
moral condemnation from the effort of reconstructing

history.

In this process Wallace both mirrored and went

beyond more recent efforts to re-evaluate the meaning of

cannibalism.

Arens points out that while contemporary

attempts to understand anthropophagy in terms of dietary

strictures is an advance over treating the practice purely
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as

cultural monstrosity, it none the
less serves to
preserve the anthropologically-created
gulf between
"primitive man" and "normal" cultures.
a

One of the few bright spots, if it can be
called
such, in the history of the cannibal
complex
mythology has been the willingness of
intellectuals of the eras to rush forward to
defend and absolve the man-eaters of their deeds.
In our age, instead of learned friars
with their
mastery of cannon law and Aristotelian logic, we
encounter learned professors referring to caloric
tables and Levi Strauss's structuralism to
explain away cannibalism. [60]

Thus Wallace's attempt to treat Native cultures in

terms of his version of

a

non-imperial science demanded

a

decoupling of European morals and European standards of

behavior from the description of what seemed to be
outrageous practices.

His "scientific" stance can be

understood in terms of an attempt to promote understanding
without domination.

Darwin, on the other hand, had been

quick to utilize "savage" practices in order to code and
promote domination.
In describing Natives who participate in a

cannibalistic funeral rite, Wallace notes that they are
polygamous

— but

without passing judgement as he did in the

case describing the Portuguese polygamist given above
(Antonio Dias).

He then details a rite that comes close to

canniba 1 ism
The Tarianas and Tucanos, and some other tribes,
about a month after the funeral, disinter the
corpse, which is then much decomposed, and put it
into a great pan, or oven, over the fire, till
all the volatile parts are driven off with a most
horrible odour, leaving only a black carbonaceous
191

mass, which is pounded into a
fine powder, and
nnxed in several large couches
(vats made
hollowed trees) of caxiri: this is drunk of
by the
assembled company till all is finished;
they
believe that thus the virtues of the
deceased
will be transmitted to the drinkers.
61
[

]

He tells us that the above example
is not exactly
a

case of cannibalism, and he goes on to
provide what he

considers to be a more true example.
The Cobeus alone, in the Uaupes, are real
cannibals: they eat those of other tribes whom
they kill in battle, and even make war for the
express purpose of procuring human flesh for
food.
When they have more than they can consume
at once, they smoke-dry the flesh over the
fire,
and preserve it for food a long time.
They burn
their dead, and drink the ashes in caxiri in the
same manner as described above.
62
[

]

At another point he describes a tribe's cannibalism in

an aside when discussing their eating habits.

The Catauixis, though in the immediate
neighbourhood of the last, are very different...
They eat principally forest game, tapirs,
monkeys, and large birds; they are, however,
cannibals, killing and eating any Indians or
other tribes they can procure, and they preserve
the meat, smoked and dried.
Senhor Domingos, a
Portuguese trader up the river Purus, informed me
that he once met a party of them, who felt his
belly and ribs, as a butcher would handle a
sheep, and talked much to each other, apparently
intimating that he was fat, and would be
excellent eating.
63
[

]

The phrase "apparently intimating" only adds fuel to
Arens' argument, which simmers through the above quotes as

Wallace does not precisely state that he witnessed these
events of cannibalism.

Furthermore, the implication of

"apparently intimating" is that Mr. Domingos did not speak
the language and that he guessed about the Native's

conversation or got it second hand from
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a

trans lator--who

might have misunderstood
of his own.

a

joke, or perhaps was playing one

Wallace's following passage:

Of the Jamamar is we have no
authentic

information, but that they much resemble the
the
last [Catauixis] in their manners
and customs,
and in their appearance... [64]

only adds to the suspicion that the
attribution of

anthropophagy was based upon hearsay.

Again, it is

difficult to evaluate his assertions and descriptions
of
the Catauixis, despite the fact we know Wallace
actually

visited them, as his words do not precisely state
that he
himself witnessed what he relates.
In any case,

the difference between Darwin and

Wallace could not be more clear, for where Darwin recoils
in a horror which results in

a

technology of domination

(through professional anthropology and assumptions of

superior morality) Wallace provides

a

a

description that is

both detailed and contextual as well as humorous and

determinedly non- j udgementa 1
head-hunting.

.

A

related case is that of

In the Malay Archipelago Wallace relates an

incident in which the house he sleeps in sports

a

bevy of

shrunken heads.

When entering Borneo he asked to witness the local
dancing rituals.

The Borneonians obliged him, but clearly

he was not in any mood to appreciate the volume of the

proceedings at that particular time.

publication

— 1869,

(The later date of

as compared to the Amazon

be kept in mind for its evidence of
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,

should also

continuity in

:

Wallace's unusual anthropological attitude.)

His

description follows.
These [dances] were, like most savage
performances, very dull and ungraceful affairsthe men dressing themselves absurdly
like women,
and the girls making themselves stiff and
ridiculous as possible. All the time six or
eight large Chinese gongs were being beaten by
the vigorous arms of as many young men,
producing
such a deafening discord that I was glad to
escape to the round house, where I slept very
comfortable with a half dozen smokedried human
skulls over my head. [65]

Despite the bad humor and the perspective from London
(which perhaps contributes to the account's negative

overlay:

dull,

and "ungraceful")

,

he lets us know that

this strange and presumably threatening environment was to
his way of thinking rather unremarkable.

Rather than

a

written outburst on savage blood-thirstiness or moral
depravity, we get

a

"neutral" anthropological-insider's

account
A young Dyak could not marry,

nor a parent or
widower leave off mourning, till a head was
obtained. These heads were carefully dried and
preserved in their houses.
It was a custom, and
as a custom was observed, but it did not imply
any extraordinary barbarism or moral
delinquency. [66]
In the end,

he concludes of these head-hunters:

Crimes of violence (other than head-hunting) are
almost unknown... In several other matters of
morality they rank above the most civilized, and
even above many civilized nations... [67]
By discussing culture without linking it to

biologically determined behavior, he allows for an
emergentist conception of human cultural activity.
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This

gives him the conceptual room to
criticize, independently,
both European and Native cultures in
terms of their various
practices, without being forced at the
same time to rank
one culture over the other in terms of
an absolute scale of
morality or survival power.

3.

"Necessary" extinction and progress

In Wallace's opinion Native cultures had
their merits

and thus the conflict between Natives and Europeans had
to
be considered problematic.

This can be best shown by the

issues raised by the fact that Natives were being

exterminated.

Alfred Crosby has greatly enlarged our

information about the decline of indigenous ecology caused
by contact with European germs, seeds and animals.

Using

a

model of "virgin soil" which corresponds with

aspects of Punctuated Equilibria theory Crosby points out
that long ago the overland migration to the Americas

cleansed humans and animals of many European diseases.

Due

to the small density of groups and the culling effect of

severe conditions, migrating animals shed pests and so lost

built up immunities.

In addition,

the higher population

and specie densities of the "Old World" resulted in

multiplication and increasing vigor of pests during the
time the Americas were being first colonized by humans.

Thus when European
195

-

smallpox, measles, chicken pox,
whooping
cough... typhus, typhoid fever,
bubonic plague,
3
SCar1
fever malaria, yellow fever,
d^nhhh
thS1
lnfluenza and undoubtedly several
more
[68]
'

^

'

'

diseases hit the Natives, their numbers
crashed. Crosby
puts the decimation as high as 90%. 69
Added to this was
not only a crash in material
culture—

inabi 1 ity to plant,

tend and harvest— but similar problems
for native plants
and animals, and insult to injury a
hiatus in the ability
to care for the sick because old and young
were struck

alike.

To this account must be added the
demoralizing

effect such hardships bring. 70

Although Victorian scientists did not possess this

understanding of the situation they were well aware of the
decline in Native numbers and reasonably enough linked
the
success of European plants, animals and germs to biological

superiority.

In the case of humans, biologists tended to

think superiority lay in vigor, culture and technology.

Given such

a

context it is small wonder that Wallace

did not at times lapse into endorsement of European

superiority despite his considered views to the contrary.
Some passages of his masterwork, The Malay Archipelago
(1869)

,

seem to stand in conflict with views one expects

from the author of savage critiques of capital's

degradation of the poor of London and Natives of the "New
World."

For example, in his early work Wallace sometimes

falls into the widely promulgated view that savages

actually appreciate, or should appreciate, white man taking
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on the "burden" of reforming them,

He writes that the

equation of Native as child
...is not merely an analogy —there is in
many
respects an identity of relation, between
master
and pupil or parent and child on the one
hand,
and an uncivilized race and its civilized
rulers
on the other.
We know (or think we know) that
the education and industry, and the common
usages
of civilized man, are superior to those of
savage
life; and, as he becomes acquainted with them,
the savage himself admits this. [71]
,

Although we see the seeds of nagging doubt in "or think we
know" and an appeal to Native approval, the overall
thrust
is to validate the idea that Europeans are superior to

Natives in

a

way which entitles them to assume

a

dominant

role

Similarly, in another passage Wallace notes that in

Celebes Natives must carry

a

pass to travel or sell goods,

and this is for their "own good."^^
is

This type of comment

intermixed with self-reflection on the problem of

domination
If we are satisfied that we are right in assuming
the government over a savage race, and occupying
their country and if we further consider it our
duty to do what we can to improve our rude
subjects and raise them up towards our own level,
we must not be too afraid of the cry "despotism"
and "slavery," but must use the authority we
possess to induce them to do work, which they may
not altogether like, but which we know to be an
indispensable step in their moral and physical
;

advancement.

[73]

The advance over Darwin here is that Wallace does not

assume Europeans have the right to dominate, but that this
must be argued on

a

case by case basis.
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Also, the terms of

.

power are described in reference to "helping" the
Natives,
and not to necessary extermination.
The Dutch have shown much good policy in the
means by which they have done this.
They have in
most cases upheld and strengthened the authority
of the native chiefs, to whom the people have
been accustomed to render a voluntary obedience;
and by acting on the intelligence and
self-interest of these chiefs, have brought about
changes in the manners and customs of the people,
which would have excited ill-feeling and perhaps
revolt had they been directly enforced by
foreigners. [74]

There is the problem of coercion here, of developing

instruments of domination that appear "kinder" but

manipulate and destroy local culture none the less.
He fails to recognize the incongruity of enforced self

interest, but his ideology represents an advance over

Darwin

'

s

That Wallace takes the Native's point of view

seriously is shown in an amusing passage of
Austra lasia

(1879).

a

middle work,

He notes approvingly that Natives who

have lived in both Native and European contexts sometimes
opt for

a

return to Native practices. 75
Campbell, who has studied the returned
labourer in his native place, gives a very
different picture. He declares that the New
Hebrideans are not in the least improved but
rather injured, by their three years' labour.
[Forced labor away from their Native area.]
Whatever goods they bring home are at once
distributed among their friends and relations;
they throw off their clothes, paint themselves,
and resume with eager delight all the savage
practices they have so long been deprived of.

Mr. F A
.

.

Wallace could not ignore the tendency of Native
populations to crash.

In pessimistic passages Wallace
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states that competition "almost
always terminates in the
destruction of one of..." 76 the competitors.
Such demise
could come not only in the form of death,
but also in terms
cultural destruction:
The only accomplishment they bring
back, and of
which they are proud, is the facility of sweari
ng
in Eng 1 ish
the Natives] have engrafted on
their originally depraved nature the vices
of
civilisation but none of its virtues ...[ 77
.

.

.

[

Once the layers of destruction caused by disease
and

unbridled (and unnecessary) competition are peeled
away

Wallace finds
he thinks,

a

core of cultural interaction.

Too often,

Europeans fail to use reliable evidence and this

contributes to the view that destruction of the Native
inevitable.

is

The best data proceeds from first hand

knowledge, and that is only good if the investigator lives
among the Natives for

a

long period, rather than taking

a

quick tour of the highlights of particular groups.
One must see the savage at home to know what he
really is... Writers on the races of mankind have
too often to trust to the information of
travellers who pass rapidly from country to
country, and thus have few opportunities of
becoming acquainted with peculiarities of
national character, or even of ascertaining what
is really the average physical conformation of
the people. [78]

Lack of good information, he thought, gave people the

wrong idea about possibilities for change.

Central to the

debate over extinction of Natives is the question of

whether Natives could be vaulted up out of "savagery."
In some passages of his early work he puts forward the

view that the Native must climb the ladder of civilization,
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as it were,

rung by rung.

This view parallels Darwin's

hierarchical model, although the "rungs" are
cultural and
not biological steps-- in some ways
similar to ideas
in

Hegel or Marx, and can be seen in reference
to

a

comment by

Wallace on the failure of Christianity to
"take" in some
Native cultures:
These peoples [of the ancient world] had already
gone through the long process of mental
development which the savage has not even begun.
The doctrines [of Christianity] grew among them,
as the do not grow among savages, because they
were adapted to the mental state on the one case,
but not in the other. [79]
Or:

There are certain stages through which society
must pass in its onward march from barbarism to
civilization ...[ Including despotism, which] we
have every reason to believe that it is not
possible for humanity to leap over this
transition epoch... [80]
Like Darwin, Wallace many times puts forward the idea
that the utter destruction of Native populations is an

unavoidable side effect of contact.
Whether he can be improved at all, except by a
process which leads to the not distant extinction
of his race, is very doubtful... [81]
Even in

a

later work of 1879, Australasia

,

he writes in

reference to the inhabitants of Celebes:
But it must be remembered that man is
pre-eminently a migrating and an aggressive
animal, the higher or more energetic races
constantly displacing the lower or less
physically powerful... [82]
Or,

in the case of Fiji:

"...the adoption of our religion

and government is leading to the extinction of the native
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race
Or

,

83

(He talks about the measles
epidemic of

1875

.)

the case of Polynesia:

how sad it is that a people with
so many
admirable qualit ies should be
exterminated
before
our eyes by the relentless march
of our too
imperfect civili sation!
84
.

.

.

[

]

sometimes seems like Wallace ha s
settled into a
pessimism on this point. However, juxt
aposed with the
above passages is a passage which
shows that Wallace is not
convinced that ext inction is necessary,
but driven by
It

political choices:
An agricultural mission established
in an island
from which miscellaneous European settlers
and
traders were strictly excluded, would be a
most
interesting experiment, and might possibly lead
us to the discovery of a method of
elevating
savage races without necessarily extermina t inq
them.
85
[

]

The problem of extinction was not just evident
in the

New Hebrides, but also in New Zealand, indeed, in all the
South Sea Islands:

Missionaries of various denominations have been
at work in New Zealand for more than sixty years,
and have now converted the whole population,
except for a few of the older chiefs, to
Christianity. Cannibalism, tribal wars,
polygamy, slavery, and most of their
superstitious practices have been abolished; they
have become to a considerable extent educated and
civilized; many of them have farms and ships, or
are successful traders.
But with this apparently
beneficial change, their old elasticity of spirit
and enjoyment of life seems to have left them.
They cannot as a body compete with Europeans,
our habits are not suited to them, our diseases
and vices decimate them... we seem to civilize and
Christianize only to destroy ... [Wa 1 lace notes the
statistics on population decreases for natives,
and is glad that recent data suggests that] the
rate of decrease has been checked, and that there
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is no
immediate danger of the extinction of this
interesting people.
The Maoris are said to be conscious of
their
approaching fate, a fate in which not only the
people themselves, but also the native fauna and
flora seem involved.
The inevitable process of
extinction is vividly described by Pesche 1
[who
states that European plants] follow the white
man
[and] soon displace the last feeble
survivors of former geological epochs. [86]
.

.

.

The above passage is especially interesting as it

shows Wallace pondering the relation between

strictly

a

biological competition between plants, and human
competition.

The juxtaposition shows him approaching the

Darwinian view of the necessity for the destruction of
Native forms of life, especially given the references to
"former geological epochs."
In yet another context he discusses the Australian

gold rush of 1851 in terms of survival of the fittest.
The influx of men of all classes from the mother
country, and of almost all the races of the
world, together with numbers of released or
escaped convicts from neighboring colonies, led
to a struggle for existence, in which the most
hardy, the most energetic, the most patient, or
the most far-seeing, could alone succeed. [87]
The end result, according to Wallace, is progress:

"...Victoria now stands at

a

prosperity and civilization."

high level of colonial
O O

Still other passages tend

to confirm this Hobbesian/Darwinian tendency:

O Q

Here we have a picture of true savage life; of
small isolated communities at war with all around
them... and no prospect of moral advancement.
But such

a

dark view fails to stay with him and

ultimately is secondary to an analysis in terms of an
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unnecessary imperialism.

An understanding of this point in

part derives from an appreciation of the
tradition of

Victorian gentleman scientists

1

writing habits.

One of the

remarkable aspects of scientific works by these
"semi
professional" enthusiasts is their informality
and

ruminating nature.

To the contemporary reader,

the

anecdotes, digressions and contradictory passages
suggest
that the writing was haphazard and therefore of
less value

than today's highly polished and uni-directional

argumentation
A point well worth

Darwin's Naturalist

'

s

considering is that works such as

Voyage Around the World and Wallace's

Australasia and The Malay Archipelago were not only

scientific works, but were also constructed to
extent in the form of diaries.

a

large

Thus digressions, false

turns, and varied minutiae of travels on the frontier are

there to inform and amuse, but also to expose the personal
and scientific passage as

passage:

a

a

directed but

accident-prone movement through time, space, and ideas.
Thus it must be seen as

a

victory, albeit quietly

presented, of emergentism over Social Darwinism when

Wallace points out that the social experiment on Savage
Island has preserved the indigenous people:

They are now wholly converted to Christianity,
and are found to be a very intelligent, mild, and
interesting race, and by no means the dangerous
savages they were long supposed to be. Their
numbers, in 1864, were over 5000, and they are
said to increase at the rate of 2 1/2 per cent
annually.
If this be true, we may probably
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When placed in the context
of his metaphysical opinions
and
his critique of Empire, it
becomes clear that he feared the
worst, but thought that it
did not have
to be so.

As his

career developed he lent more and
more of his scientific
thority to fighting imperialism
and discrediting the
value of Natural Selection in terms
of human political
struggles

Decou P 1 ing Social Darwini sm: the
emergence of politics

Another variable in the extinction equation
is that
Wallace slowly comes to the conclusion that
all colonialism
is flawed.
in Australasia he criticizes the Dutch
system
of colonial management, which he so
often championed,

for

being at bottom exploitive:
...it still remains substantially true that the
Dutch colonies are farmed for the benefit of the
mother country. The natives [still] feel the
yoke
[91]

—

He comes to see colonial mismanagement not as an

anomaly, but as an inevitable outcome of capitalism, greed,
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and the unequal distribution
of power

writes

Europeans, he

9 2

ope the «ay to greater
commercial
!\
activity, which
will lead to the gradual
alienation of the land to capitalists,
unnatural stimulus to the population, give an
and
inevitably introduce the evils of
feverish
competition, pauperism, and crime,
from which the
country has hitherto been comparatively
free.
He understands "freedom of trade"
as an ideological

construct— a smokescreen behind which one
class exploits
another.

At this point he mixes commitment
to the

patriarchal notion of "raising up" the
savage with
criticism of economic exploitation, presenting
a

complicated ideology which combines progressive
elements of
self-determination with paternalism and unreflective
Eurocentric domination.
European rulers, imbued with ideas of freedom of
labour and of commerce, will not understand that
a child-like people can only be raised
to
independence and national manhood by means of a
paternal government.
It may safely be predicted that if the Dutch
Government freely throws open Java to the world,
the result will be that many capitalists will
make fortunes, but the native inhabitants will
not be benefited. [93]
Implicit in his paternalism is

a

core dedicated to the idea

that Natives must be liberated so that they may achieve

their potential.

The task of the European is:

...raising the depressed races, the formation of
free states, and the advancement of civilisation
...to save them from oppression, misrule, and
social misery, to educate them to selfgovernment, and so enable them to grow unfettered
to whatever degree of civilisation they are
capable of attaining... [94]
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Despite his insensitive moments,
Wallace was very much
aware of this tendency in English
politics to regard

superiority as

a

ticket for genocide.

By the end of the

century, he sees the English colonists
primarily as
murderers
If the Spaniards exterminated
the natives of the
West Indies, we have done the same thing
in
Tasmania, and almost the same in temperate
Australia. [95]

As we shall see in the next section,
Wallace uses

Native practices as
But here,

a

foil to critique European society.

through coming to see that alternative colonial

policies have different outcomes, the "necessity" of

extermination falls victim to the understanding of
colonial enterprise as an evil and politically-motivated

methodology for exploiting the wealth of the world for the
benefit of

a

few owners.

Ultimately he takes an even more radical position.
claims in 1911 that not only is civilization flawed

He

— but

that the view that civilization progresses is wrong.

...there is little if any evidence of advance in
character or in intellect from the earliest times
of which we have any record. [96]

Huxley held to

a

version of this thesis, claiming that

the physical and cultural nature of savages had not changed

since prehistoric times, and so fail to provide the

"missing

1

ink"

Q7

In conclusion, I may say, that the fossil remains
of Man hitherto discovered do not seem to me to
take us appreciably nearer to that lower
pithecoid form, by the modification of which he
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has
probably become what he is. And
considering what is now known of the
most ancient
5
n e *'
^eing that they fashioned flint
lUl
axes and flint knives and bone-skewers,
of much
the same pattern as those
fabricated by the
lowest savages at the present day,
and that we
have eve ry reason to believe the
habits and modes
f living of such people
to have remained the
same from the time of the Mammoth
and the
C
ine Rhinoceros till now, I do not
know
^i ?°f!?
that
this result is other than might be
expected.
Huxley's view of progress for the civilized
,

,

'

races was

also at variance from Darwin, for he
claimed that although
there was an improvement in morals, there
was also an

increase in immoral possibility.

He asks:

•••[to] what extent modern progress in natural
knowledge ... especia 1 ly ... the ... progress in the
doctrine of evolution, is competent to help us in
the great work of helping one another ?.. .but as
immoral sentiments have no less been evolved,
there is, so far, as much natural sanction for
the one as the other. [98]

Huxley shared Wallace's view that human nature
for the British)

(at

least

had not changed for over 400 or 500

years 99
In my belief the innate qualities, physical,
intellectual, and moral, of our nation have
remained substantially the same for the last four

or five centuries.
If the struggle for existence
has affected us to any serious extent (and I
doubt it) it has been, indirectly, through our
military and industrial wars with other nations.
In order to explain European dominance, Wallace turns

to an analysis of the effects of European religion and

drugs.

For Wallace it is not biological or "natural"

conflicts, per se, that cause Native extinction, but rather

economic weapons and cultural implosion due to colonial

mismanagement
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.

:

ch ief cause, probably, of the
decreasing
number 3 of these people is the
prevalence
of
a its of intoxication
in which they indulge as
substitute for the dance, and song, and
amusements, so injudiciously forbidden varied
by the
missionaries. [100]

a

We witness Wallace's bias in this
matter when he notes

that the Native's biological equivalency
with Europeans
(which Darwin would never entertain),
does not guarantee

surviva 1
The light type is, on the other hand,
represented
by the Malays and Polynesians, who in some
places, such as Samoa and the Marquesas, are
in
no respects inferior to the average European,
either in their complexion, physical beauty, or
nobility of expression. Nevertheless, these
higher tribes are all disappearing under the
fatal contact of our much-vaunted civilization;
and nowhere is the steady process of extinction
developing on such a grand scale as amongst the
South Sea Islanders. [101]

Wallace

s

position is complex, however, for his focus

on cultural and economic conflict does not disallow a place

for Natural Selection to act at particular moments of human

history
Even these apparently trifling matters [the
Dyaks' interest in string games] may assist us to
form a truer estimate of the Dyak's character and
social condition. We learn thereby, that these
people have passed beyond that first stage of
savage life in which the struggle for existence
absorbs the whole faculties, and in which every
thought and idea is connected with war or
hunting, or the provision for their immediate
necessities.
These amusements indicate a
capability of civilization, an aptitude to enjoy
other than mere sensual pleasures which might be
taken advantage of to elevate their whole
intellectual and social life. [102]
Thus we witness the wrinkle.

He allows that

biological competition occurs at the "lowest levels" of
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human association, but that once
this level is past, the
rest is political and cultural in
nature.
Wallace rejects
the idea that social "advancement"
is powered by laws of

inheritance, in favor of transmission by learning
within
the parameters of inherited abilities.

This shift in

viewpoint allows him to think in terms of interacting
cultures rather than competing races/species.

Such

a

development also renders preconceived notions of
superiority and the necessity of domination open to
criticism.

Nowhere is Wallace's view on human evolution and
cultural development more illustrative of his development
than when he discusses the Aborigines of Australia.

He

points out one reason why many Europeans dislike these

Natives

:

The effluvium arising from the skin, in itself
peculiarly offensive to our sense of smell, is
rendered still more unendurable by the body being
greased with the oil of various large species of
fish. [103]
And he notes that these people are rapidly being

exterminated
Almost as peculiar and isolated as its flora and
fauna are the black aborigines of Australia, who
are now rapidly disappearing before the European
settler ...
104
[

Like many European commentators, he writes of the

"undeveloped" status of these Natives: their "low social
culture ... [reca 1 Is
the human race."

1

]

0 R

the earliest stages in the history of
He disparages their accomplishments in
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developing "higher faculties,"
writing that the aborigine
has a "low mental culture... no
sense of

number— that

abstract thought ...

is of

10 6

But here the similarity ends,
for Wallace, unlike many

other writers, shows sensitivity to
contradictions of
culture.
Ever interested in Native languages,
he points
out that the Aborigine language is

speech." 10 7

a

"fully developed

Like Huxley, he admires the verbal abilities

of even the "lowest" savages.

Huxley writes:

Few take duly into account the evidence
which
exists as to the ease with which unlettered
savages gain or lose a language. [108]

Wallace gets double duty from the observation that
primitive" languages are fully as complex as those of

civilized" countries.

contention that there

First, he gains ammunition for his
a

radical break between humans and

the rest of creation, therefore there is no "missing link"

between human and beast.

(Huxley takes

a

similar stand,

writing that "Man... alone possesses the marvelous endowment
of intelligible and rational speech..." 109

)

Whereas non— emergent is t Darwinians point to savages as
the hinge between humanity and its progenitors, Wallace
sees no ultimate connection.

with

a

The human race was "born"

fully developed faculty for speech, and so is unlike

any other species.

At the birth of humanity biological

evolution ended and morality too was born:
...from the epoch when he became a living soul
conscious of good and evil there was little
actual selection except to ensure health and
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vigour, and the gradual
advance towards

civilization

•

[

110

]

Nor was this train of thought
unique among the biologists.
Huxley writes that he had

endeavoured to show that, when
the ethical
process has advanced so far as
to secure every
member of the society in the
po ssession of the
means of existence, the struggl
e for existence,
as between man and man,
within that society is,
-P so f acto at an end .. .whether the struggle
for
existence with the state of nat
ure and with other
soc i e t i e s ... exert s a selective
influence. .are
questions not easy to answer...
,

.

[
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A

second important characteristic of
Wallace's
writings is that in the comparison
of cultures, there is no
absolute scale for evaluation, despite
occasional phrases,
such as: "advance to civilization."
Some things improve
with "advance," others get worse. Speaking
of the Fijians,
he says:

Their weapons are few and simple, and they
never
discovered the art of making pottery; yet, as
they are undoubtedly in a far higher state
of
civilisation, and far superior in mental capacity
to many savage races who possess that art,
it is
proof that we cannot measure the status of human
advancement merely by progress in the mechanical

arts.

[112]

He notes that others agree with his assessment
that

Aborigine

s

can display great intelligence and reasonable

behavior
Mr. Eyre found them to be frank, open, and
confiding, and easy to make friends with. He

declares that they have been greatly
misrepresented and traduced, and that much of
their assumed treachery and bloodthirstiness is
the result of cruelty and ill-treatment of the
settlers. [113]
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And at the same place he continues:
Sir Thomas Mi tche 1 1 ... found those
who accompanied
him in his journeys superior in
penetration and
judgement to the white men on the same
expedition

Wallace's "scale" of civilization allows
cultures to
be ranked in regards to many respects,
with the various
scales contradicting each other, whereas
Darwinian scales
were absolute, because technological, moral,
linguistic,
material, intellectual and physical attributes
run

parallel and are ultimately reduced to the same material
base.

Wallace split these things apart.

Thus Tasmanian

Natives could be as "low" as Aborigines in terms of
material life, but superior in others:

Although so low in all the material indications
of civilization, there is reason to believe that
they were far higher than the Australians both
intellectually and morally. [114]

Another case of differential development occurs in the case
of the Dyaks:

Again, the Malays may be divided into two great
groups the savage and the semicivi 1 ized peoples.
The Dyaks of Borneo are the best example of the
former.
They have no writing or literature, no
regular government or religion, and they wear
only the scantiest clothing of the usual savage
type.
But they are by no means a low class of
savages, for they build good houses, they
cultivate the ground, they make pottery and
canoes, they work in iron, and they even
construct roads and bridges... [115]

—

As we shall see,

this decomposition of the univocal scale

of cultural rank leads directly to questioning the very

core notion so dear to many Victorian writers: progress.
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With the fall of progress
comes the questioning of
Imperial
venture. Wallace says one 116
...is led to ponder on the strange
law of
S
Which looks so like retrogression,
and
whi^r-i^f
which in so many distant parts
of the world has
° r driVen ° Ut 3 high1
^ artistic "d
constructive
t0 make r ° 0ni for one wh ich,
far as we
wp n
can Dudge, is very far its inferior! as
By 1913 Wallace has fully
articulated his position on
'

«

the separation of technology from
social/moral standing:

The great majority of educated
persons hold the
opinion that our wonderful discoveries
and
inventions in every department of art and
prove that we are really more intellectual science
and
wiser than the men of past ages--that
our mental
faculties have increased in power. But this
idea
is totally unfounded.
We are the inheritors of
the accumulated knowledge of all the ages;
and it
is quite possible, and even probable,
that the
earliest steps taken in the accumulation of this
vast treasury required even more thought
and a
higher intellectual power than any of those taken
in our own era. [117]

Wallace even hints that the simple advances by savages
may have represented greater effort and achievement
than
the more visible and apparently complex advances
of the

nineteenth or twentieth centuries.

This point of view

comes to no surprise for one familiar with Wallace's many

remarks praising local technologies.

For instance, being

forced to use local transportation throughout his movements
over the Pacific, he comes to admire the Native boats,

constructed with techniques and materials that at first
glance seem far inferior to

a

European.

The vines, used by

the Ke Islanders instead of nails, not only work as
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fasteners
writes

but they are cheaper and easier
to replace.

He

:

vessel carefully built in this n
manner is
actually stronger and safer than one
c
fastened in
the ordinary way with nails.
[118]

a

All considered

,

he finds that he
e can heap praise on the

entire sea-faring adventure:
on the whole I was much delighted
with the trip,
and was inclined to rate the luxuries
of the
semi-barbarous prau as surpassing those of the
most magnificent screwsteamer that highest
product of civilization.
119
,

[

]

Another conceptual shift made possible by the

rejection of an absolute scale of culture is the

possibility that once culture and the biological
dissemination of
is

a

particular race are decoupled,

a

space

left open for the transmission of ideas, customs and

technology through mere social contact.

Thus the spread of

culture by means other than biological inheritance
following

a

struggle for existence is allowed.

Wallace

writes that the Malays: 120
have spread their language ... [and customs widely
throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans, in many
instances to islands where they have effected no
sort of change in the physical or moral
characteristics of the indigenous inhabitants.
]

This type of transmission presents

a

problem for

Darwin, who wants to code advance only through genetic

modification and wants to place limits on the speed with
which Natives can be turned into Englishmen, while Wallace
is under no such constraint.

In many cases Wallace

comments on how rapidly Natives pick up "civilized" habits
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who were only yesterday "savages."

For instance, when he

speaks of the Natives of Celebes, he
says they are

...easily induced to learn and adopt the
habits
°f civilized people.
They are clever mechanics,
and seem capable of acquiring a considerable
amount of intellectual education.
Up to a very
recent period these people were thorough
savages
[121]

Despite his criticism of capitalism, Wallace
says that
one of the motors of social change and anchors
of stability
is

commerce.

However economic activity is placed within

a

context of regulated commercial intercourse, and not in
terms of survival of the fittest of economic competitors.
Here we may behold in its simplest form the
genius of Commerce at the work of Civilization.
Trade is the magic that keeps all at peace...
walk daily unarmed in the jungle... I sleep in a
palm-leaf hut, which any one may enter, with as
little fear and as little danger as if I were
under the protection of the Metropolitan
police. [122]

While Wallace sometimes uses the concept as if it were

a

neutral term, in other places he indicates that he

carefully spells out that the only forms of mercantile
venture that will benefit both Natives and Europeans are
ones that are thoughtfully controlled, and not forms which

develop from hidden regulat ion--so called "free trade."
It must be remembered too that our commerce is
not a purely natural growth.
It has been ever
fostered by the legislature, and forced to an
unnatural luxuriance by the protection of our
fleets and armies.
The wisdom and the justice of
this policy have already been doubted.
So soon,
therefore, as it is seen that the further
extension of our manufactures and commerce would
be an evil, the remedy is not far to seek. [123]
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Where Darwin would see

a

biological conflict between

two races for territory, Wallace sees
cultural difference,
and ultimately politics and political
economy.
it must be
stressed that Darwin was aware of this
alternative view of
the world.
In his letters to Wallace, Darwin
pushes his
notion that the two disciplines are distinct.
I
see that you are going to write on the
most
difficult political question, the land.
Something ought to be done, but what, is the rub.
I hope that you will
(not) turn renegade to
natural history; but I suppose that politics are
very tempting. [124]

Wallace pushed back with humor, and gave Darwin

a

nudge towards seeing the political and the biological as
linked.

In a letter to Darwin

(January 20, 1869) he says:

Really, what with the Torries passing Radical
Reform Bills and the Church periodicals
advocating Darwinianism the millennium must be
at hand. [125]
,

There is no comment from Darwin.
We see Darwin's blinkers in full force in the case of
his comments upon reading The Malay Archipelago

.

Darwin's

only point about savages concerns the role of savage dress
in sexual selection. 126

Again, when on March 27, 1869

Wallace tries to make him deal with issues of imperialism
by suggesting he brush up on colonial theory, Darwin opts
to plead no opinion:

1

y7

I read all that you said about the Dutch
Government with much interest, but I do not feel
I know enough to form any opinion against yours.

In most cases Darwin acts as if he was unaware of the
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political dimension of Wallace's work.
he could wish it away.

Perhaps Darwin felt

(November 19, 1873.)

did not know that you had been writing
on
except so far as your letter on the
coal question [Wallace suggests that England
not
export cheap coal when many of the poor in
England could not afford it], which interested me
much and struck me as a capital letter... I hope
to Heaven that politics will not replace
Natural
Science. [128]
I

The las t point is very telling.

Rather than arguing about

the rol e of the scientist in society or the merits of the

part icu lar debate, Darwin worries that Wallace is being

distrac ted from scientific work.
Spencer went even further in this context, he tells

Wallace that politics is, in effect, epiphenomenal to
biology.

Spencer vocalizes what Darwin leaves unsaid,

namely, that all human suffering, including the fallout
from the Land Nationalization Act, reflects the struggle
i

for existence.

oQ

Darwin has to dodge and duck the issue, again and
again because Wallace kept bringing the topic up.
a

Finding

kindred spirit in George's book Progress and Poverty

Wallace recommends it in such

a

,

way that Darwin is forced,

out of friendship and professional solidarity, to respond.

First, Wallace's letter of July

9,

1881. 130

My dear Darwin, --I am just doing, what I rarely
if ever have done bef ore--reading a book through
a second time immediately after the first
perusal.
I do not think I have ever been so
attracted by a book, with perhaps the exception
of your "Origin of Species" and Spencer's "First
Principles" and "Social Statics." I wish
therefore to call your attention to it, in case
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:

.

you care about books on social and
political
subjects, but here there is also an elaborate
discussion of Malthus's "Principles of
Population" to which both you and I have
acknowledged ourselves indebted. The present
writer, Mr. George, while admitting the main
principle as self-evident and as actually
operating in the case of animals and plants,
denies that it ever has operated or can operate
in the case of man, still less that it has
any
bearing whatever on the vast social and political
questions which have supported reference to it.
He then goes on to praise the book's wealth
of facts and

argument
The title of the book is "Progress and
Poverty ."... It is the most startling novel and
original book of the last twenty years, and if I
mistake not will in the future rank as making an
advance in political and social science equal to
that made by Adam Smith a century ago. [131]

Darwin's answer is instructive.
is a serious issue to be addressed,

He affirms that there

but then he undercuts

the whole matter by questioning the possibility of

a

resolution

—

My dear Wallace,
I have been heartily glad to
get your note and hear some news of you.
I will
certainly order "Progress and Poverty," for the
subject is a most interesting one. But I read
many years ago some books on political economy,
and they produced a disastrous effect on my mind,
viz. utterly to distrust my own judgement on the
subject and to doubt much everyone else's
judgement!
So I feel pretty sure Mr. George's
book will only make my mind worse confounded than
it is at present. [132]

Darwin, out of fear of failing to honor Wallace's

judgement, says he will order

a

copy of the book.

Then,

unable to contain himself any longer, he attacks the
topic's validity and makes what can only be called an
insult directed at Wallace.

It
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is doubtful

that he had any

intention of reading the book.

Darwin's attempt to keep

science "pure" or separate from social
and political
matters is fraught with difficulty, as
it is faced with the
problem that his Natural Selection is saturated
with such
political topics as the Poor Laws, morals,
marriage

restrictions and Empire and race.
So much for Wallace's attempts to make
Darwin more

aware of the political dimension of his work.

Wallace

remained committed to his emergentist viewpoint and
by 1905
he articulates differences between evolution and
politics

with precision, while at the same time he overturns
his
and more positive, views about paternalistic

colonialism.

Although he is speaking to the Irish

question, the principle applied equally to the case of

indigenous peoples.
But to my mind, the question of good or bad, fit
or not fit for self-government, is not the point.
It is a question of fundamental justice, and the
just is always the expedient, as well as the
right.
It is a crime against humanity for one
nation to govern another against its will
[133]
.

C.

Capital, Imperialism and Race

Perhaps because of his working class background, or

because of

a

flowering of ideas picked up from his visits

to the Mecha nic's Institute, or because of the variety
of social pr actices he witnessed in his extensive travels
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or maybe because he took
the
Lae ideals
hie age too much
laeais of his
to

heart, Wallace became disillusioned
with conservative

m

Victorian culture in general, and
3 j
laissez faire capitalism
in particular.
t

•

r-

This is not so say that Wallace
was not proud of the

developing technology of the nineteenth
century. Great
strides had been made in mechanizing
productive forces and
prying wealth out of raw materials. He
saw before him a
"tenfold increase of real wealth"
generated
by the

harnessing of steam power, and he liked what
this implied
for the human condition

.

^4

On the other hand, he recognized, as
did the flood of

social reformers during the eighteen-seventies,
eighties
and beyond, that although technology was
progressing by

leaps and bounds, social existence for the majority
of

people in Britain was becoming worse.
Being

a

self-made man," he was constantly aware of

the difficulty of securing

a

living.

During his late

teens, he was sent to work with his brother as

surveyor.

a

land

He tramped through the countryside, primarily

engaged in doing the leg-work for the construction of the
newest high-tech innovation of the times, the railroads.

While he was impressed with the possibilities of this new
mode of transport, he also was exposed to the difficult

living conditions faced by the people of rural England.

When his work ran out, and he and his brother parted, he
was on his own.

Although Darwin's worries over financial
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security appeared real enough to
himself, he never had to
work to earn a living but rather made
do with
an ever

Illustration 14: Engraving of Robert Owen. 137

Another possible source of Wallace's sensitivity was

exposure to the utopian socialist movement through contact
with Robert Owen's ideas.

At the "Hall of Science" he

became familiar with social experiments such as Owen's New

Lanark community.

Owen bought and ran

a

spinning mill at

New Lanark, successfully incorporating child-care,
education, better working and living conditions with
of benevolently-managed capitalism.

221

He also played

a
a

form
part

in passing the Factory Act of
1819. 138

Perhaps the seeds

of Wallace's politics were sewn
at these points of contact

with utopian socialism.

Illustration 15: Engraving of New Lanark. 138

Of course immersion within Native cultures which

utilized less sophisticated technologies but yet captured
his imagination through attractive living conditions and

alternative political arrangements must have driven him to
reconsider the necessity of capitalism.
As his life progressed, Wallace became more and more

vocal on the topic of social reform through socialism.

During his trip to the United States in 1886-7 he delivered
lectures on many topics, including political economy, in
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order to bolster his sagging finances and
spread the word
about Natural Selection and social reform.
He met

President Cleveland, but found him boring. 139

Wallace's lectures were sometimes

a

bit radical for

his audiences:

The other paper

[read at a meeting of the Women's
Anthropological Society of Washington, D.C.] was
on "Social Economy versus Political Economy,"
...It was an attempt to show how and why the old
"political economy" was effete and useless, in
view of modern civilization and modern
accumulations of wealth.
Its one end, aim, and
the measure of its success, was the accumulation
of wealth, without considering who got the
wealth, or how many of the producers of the
wealth starved. [140]

He felt that the reception after this talk was chilly, but
he knew he had displayed a truth: capitalism produced

injustice.

He put the point another way by asking whether

capitalism had succeeded in providing the fundamental
necessities for society: basic physical and mental

well-being for all.
The only doctrine on this matter worthy of an
evolutionist, or of a believer in God, is that
health of body and of mind are the only natural
safeguards against disease; and that securing the
conditions for such health for every individual
is the one and only true test of a true

civilization.

[141]

His argument is double pronged.

He exhorts the scientist

and the evolutionist to consider the implications of

biology's first principle.

Evolution, applied to social

animals, Wallace seems to be saying here, demands that

group must maximize survival for its members.

a

How excess

wealth (i.e. wealth over and above that needed to assure
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the survival of individuals)

gets divided up is not

Wallace's point, but rather the focus is
on the notion that
if evolutionary success is
measured by the health of
individuals, then slums in the cities make
no sense.

Other

socialists were making this suggestion in
terms of moral
arguments, but like Kropotkin who argued that
Natural

—

Selection was driven by cooperation, Wallace
harnesses the
biological argument for his own purposes turning
Darwin on

—

his head, as it were.

Wallace also slips

a

moral prescription into an

equation which is calculated to catch materialists out: "is
the one and only true test of

a

true civilization."

Even

Darwin, the arch-materialist, wants to place British

culture above the rest of the world's.

Thus the

implications of 'true civilization" force the scientist to
allow that social justice has

a

place in the biological

equation, even if that admission is powered by sheer vanity
for empire.

Implicit in this argument is the point against

continuity: unlike other animals, humans can decide to
shape their social groups after their desires or moral

beliefs

.

On the other prong, Wallace hangs the the religious

man who may not go along with the theory of evolution.

Broad considerations of Christian morals force one to admit
that the meek ought to be provided for--or at least

given enough to eat.

Wallace turns the pride of the
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]

century against its realities, and then
asks one to
consider dividing an over-abundance according

to needs.

In order to illustrate his point,
Wallace suggested

that if the tenfold increase of real wealth
generated by
the harnessing of steam power had been
so distributed that
all were equally benefited, then every worker
would have

had ten times as much of the necessaries and
comforts of

including

a

greater amount of leisure and

enjoyment 14 9
The usual rejoinder to such thoughts on equality

typically takes the form of: it is the fault of the poor
that they are destitute

— they

do not want to work, they

drink, or they are dirty and weak with self-inflicted

disease.

Wallace responded by taking up the position dear

to Marxists and many other social critics, namely that the

poor are not poor because they are bad, but rather because
of economic forces which are beyond their control as

individua 1 s
...the horrible gulf of extreme poverty in which
more than a quarter of a million of the people of
London constantly live... [is caused by]
conditions over which the sufferers have no
control ...
143
[

During the nineteenth century statistics on morbidity

became

a

hot topic, what with the vaccination debate and

concerns over working and living conditions in the slums of

London and other manufacturing centers.

He took a

controversial stand on the vaccination issue, opposing the
new technique.

There is not space here to delve into this
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interesting debate, but

a

few comments are relevant to

developing an understanding of his point
of view.

Wallace was asked by the government to
serve on the
committee formed to study vaccination.
Although he refused
to be impanelled, he did testify,
and what is interesting

for us here is that Wallace felt it more
important to go to
the cause of the problem, than to treat
symptoms.
He

believed that the major contributing factor to the
outbreak
of disease in the slums was not the mere
presence of germs,

as germs could be found anywhere, but rather
somatic misery

resulted from the weakened condition of people placed
in an

unhealthy environment; in other words: poverty was the
culprit
...under our present social economy it
[overcrowding] is
universa 1 ly associated with
various causes of disease--impure air, bad
drainage, bad water supply .. overwork ..
[144]
.

.

.

.

Wallace worked hard for reform of working conditions-through lectures, writing and using his influence on
government.

He was scandalized by the laborers'

situation,

the more so because there was no need for conditions to be
so bad. 14 ^

He tied the lack of resources for ending

poverty to the waste of funds on the military. 14 ^
These great armies are continually being equipped
with new and more deadly weapons, at a cost which
strains the resources even of the most wealthy
nations, and by the constant increase of taxation
and of debt impoverishes the mass of the people.
He felt that the exploits of the Empire,

such as

the Crimean War in 1854-55, forced on by private
interests, with no rational object in view...
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[had] no relation whatever to
the well-being of
the communities which were engaged in
them. [147]

In looking for the culprits, Wallace
takes a

surprising turn.

He claims that science was "seized upon

by the spirit of militarism" and
dedicated itself to

furthering militaristic ends.

He sees the interests of the

owning classes directing the path of science
into socially

unproductive avenues. 148
Whil e we know Wallace was not alone in expre ssing
such

displeasu re with social conditions, and thoughts of Marx,
Mill and Dickens are sufficient, it still comes

as

a

surprise to know that others within the social-Da rwinist
camp were coming to the same conclu sion
A few years before his

much-lamented death, that
acute yet cautious thinker, the late Professor
Huxley, was forced to adopt the conclusions of
Professor Cairnes, and those here set forth, that
our modern system of landlordism and capitalistic
competition tends to increase rather than to
diminish poverty... [149]
It

must be born in mind that Wallace was not acting alone,

he felt himself part of a movement,

in the scientific,

literary and even governmental realms, towards reform.

When criticizing the Empire he appealed to

a

variety of

sources, his travel diaries, the growing literature of

dissent, and even government report s--such as those on the

problems in India. ISO
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1

.

Workers and Natives

Turning from particular abuses of capitalism
Wallace
considers the structure which allows a small
class to reap
the economic fruits of

a

society (1898)

...these Christian government s ... exist ... for the
aggrandizement and greed and lust of power of the
ruling classes. .the true vampires of our
civilization
Witness their struggle in Africa
and Asia where millions of savage or
semicivilized peoples may be enslaved and bled
for the benefit of their new rulers .. .Great
vested interests are at stake; and ever-growing
pressure is brought to bear upon the too-willing
governments in the name of the greatness or
safety of the Empire, the extension of commerce,
or the advance of civilization.
Anything to
distract attention from the starvation and
wretchedness and death-dealing trades at home,
and the thinly veiled slavery in many of our
tropical or subtropical colonies. [151]
•

,

Two themes become linked here: progress and Empire.

Wallace conceptualizes exploitation of Native and worker as

symmetrical events within the class struggle played out in
the mercantile ventures of this period.

What is explicitly

condemned in Wallace goes unremarked in and tacitly
approved by Darwin: the lower class European and the Native
must perish in the struggle for existence and it is foolish
to think one can influence this "law of nature."
In The Wonderful Century he sings praises of the age

for the first half of the book.

The second half turns to

the failures of the period, and by the time one is done

reading any attempt to utter the word "progress" becomes
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strangled with thoughts about the more sinister
elements of
the changes taking place.
Taking account of these various groups of
undoubted facts/ many of which are so gross so
terrible, that they cannot be overstated, it is
not too much to say that our whole system of
society is so rotten from top to bottom, and the
Social Environment as a whole, in relation to our
possibilities and our claims, is the worst that
the world has ever seen. [152]
,

This passage should cause the reader to recall the

structure of the Malay Archipelago
his publishing career,

.

Wallace, throughout

seems to have made

a

point of

initially catering to mainstream ideas he opposes but then
by offering alternative views he reveals criticisms of

commonly held prejudices.
Furthermore, his writings take on the quality of
critique.

In our period we have opaque buzzwords which

upon analysis turn into symbols for repression, such as:

"democracy," "national security," "free markets," and "high

technology," just as the nineteenth century had

counterparts for these in "Empire," "safety of the Empire,"
"extension of commerce," and "progress and advance of

civilization," all of which Wallace explodes.
He links the situation of Native and worker.

He

thinks that if we ask for whose benefit these Natives are
"civi 1 ized ,
...it would be found more difficult to answer
than had been imagined. The advantages, even to
the few who reap them, would be seen to be mostly
physical, while the widespread moral and
intellectual evils resulting from unceasing
labour, low wages, crowded dwellings, and

monotonous occupations, to perhaps as
large a
number as those who gain real advantage,
might be
held to show a balance of evil so
great, as to
lead the greatest admirers of our
manufactures
and commerce to doubt the advisability
of their
further development. [153]
By decoupling the "high technology"
flash of new

manufacturing techniques from nationalism and
re-coupling
it with poverty and class bias, Wallace
attempts
to call

into question the ultimate value of capitalism and
even

science itself.

He proclaims that the "advances of science

curses..." his society. 154

The evidence, he knew, was born

out by the Government's own statistics.

...accompanying our enormous increase of wealth,
there has been a corresponding increase of
poverty, of insanity, of suicide, and probably
even crime, together with other indications of
moral and physical deterioration. [155]

While Darwin might concur with this description, the
reasons and solutions to this problem that Wallace proposes
fly in the face of what Darwin stood for.
By praising Natives for this or that, he decouples

"savage" and "barbarian" from "bad" or "lower."
of the Samoans,

Speaking

he says:

...they carry their habits of cleanliness and
decency to a higher point than the most
fastidious of civilized nations. Their public
meetings are carried on with a dignity and
forbearance which Europeans never equal, while
even in the heat of war they have shown
themselves amenable to the influences of reason
and religion. [156]
He often uses this tact to elevate Native cultures in the

estimation of his readers and thus bring into question the
assumed authority of Europeans which allows them to
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dominate Natives through overpowering
technology.
In many
instances he praises local Native
political arrangements,
when appropriate, whether they be
in distinction
to

European rule, or under benevolent European
rule:
Many savage tribes, many barbarian
peoples are
really better governed today than the
majority of
the self-styled civilized nations.
[157]
Thus reality of Empire is set against the
pretensions
of the times:

And what

a horrible mockery is all this
when
viewed in the light of either Christianity or
advancing civilization! [158]

In addition to giving consciences a prick,
Wallace

explicitly develops

a

theory of morality that differs

radically from Darwin's.

Whereas Darwin would tie morality

to material existence through genetically inherited
modes

of behavior, Wallace cuts this link.

are not inherited, and are "...largely

Wallace says morals
a

convent ion ... a product of the environment

temporary."

matter of
... loca

1

and

Darwin could agree with the specifics of

this quote, but he sees morals as an evolutionary strategy

common to animals and "man."

Wallace stresses the human

capacity to adjust the world to fit moral concerns
regardless of the dictates of Malthusian materialism.

This

decoupling of morality from Natural Selection has another
result, for it takes the implicit hierarchy of culturally

specific ethical codes into the open.

Thus the question as

to the value of Native practices becomes a matter of

debate, rather than

a

settled issue.
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Wallace, as should be realized by
now, had not
abandoned the idea that evolution did apply
to aspects of
human behavior.
The break with Darwin here is not total.

Wallace allows that evolution would have
generated
faculties which held an evolutionary benefit.
The mental faculties which go to form the
character of each man or woman are very
numerous, a large proportion of them being such
as are required for the preservation of the
individual and of the race... [160]
He acknowledges the animal aspect of humans,
but he is free

to downplay the importance of these faculties for the

matters at hand by proposing
and beast.

a

radical break between human

He continues the above passage by writing that

other faculties
are pre-eminently social or ethical.
These
latter, which impel us to truth, to justice, and
to benevolence, when in due proportion to all the
other mental faculties, go to form what we
distinguish as a good or moral character ...[ 16 1

With this addition Wallace allows politics and justice to

escape

a

biological basis.

He is then free to examine

capitalism in terms of morality as well as in biological
terms when he considers the first steps towards humanity.

Darwin was horrified, as we shall see in the last section
of this chapter,

at Wallace's attempt.

Perhaps the earliest statement that Wallace made

criticizing the status of Natives under capitalism came in
I

his master work: The Malay Archipelago

.

C O

This was his

most widely read book, going through many editions and

translated into many languages, and his attack on the
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assumed superiority of civilization
was read by many
thousands. Given the harsh conclusion
he intends to draw,
he gently asks the reader to
consider what the savage has
to offer.
Soon he points out the contradiction between
what Victorian civilization stood for:
personal freedom,
equality, justice, and adequate material
existence; with
the reality of living conditions for the
British working

class and "savages:"
I
have now concluded my task ... Before
bidd ing
f a rewe 1 1
I wish to make a few
observations on a subject of yet higher interest
and deeper importance, which the contemplation of
savage life has suggested, and on which I believe
that the civilized can learn something from the
savage man.
We most of us believe that we, the higher
races, have progressed and are progressing.
If
so, there must be some state of perfection, some
ultimate goal, which we may never reach, but to
which all true progress must bring us nearer...
Our best thinkers maintain that it is a state of
individual freedom and self-government ... in such
a state every man... would require no other motive
but the free impulses of his own nature to obey
that law [i.e. a just law]. [163]
.

.

.

,

He claims to have witnessed,

first hand. Natives who

actually live in the harmony that the utopian socialists
were striving for, and the classical Marxists predicted

would occur after the revolution had moved to its

conclusion
Now it is very remarkable that among people in a
very low stage of civilization we find some
approach to such a perfect social state.
I have
lived in communities of savages in South America
and in the East, who have no laws or law courts
but the public opinion of the village freely
expressed ... In such a community, all are nearly
There are none of those wide
equal.
distinctions, of education and ignorance, wealth,
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7, master and servant, which are
the
Drodnr^nf
prcdnct ° f our civilization; there
is none of
that wide-spread division of
labour, which, while
it increases wealth, produces
also conflicting
interests; there is not that severe
and struggle for existence, or for competition
wealth, which
the dense population of civilized
countries
inevitably creates. All incitements to great
crimes are thus wanting, and petty ones
repressed, partly by the influence of public
opinion, but chiefly by that natural sense
of
justice and of his neighbor's right which seems
to be, in some degree, inherent in
every race of
1

man.

[164]

Next he tries to put technological and
cultural

achievements of Europeans in perspective with what
should
be more important, the achievement of a
just, or moral,

life
Now, although we have progressed vastly
beyond the savage state in intellectual
achievements, we have not advanced equally in
morals... But is it not too much to say, that the
mass of our populations have not advanced beyond
the savage code of morals, and have in many cases
sunk below it.
A deficient morality is the great
blot of modern civilization, and the greatest
hindrance to true progress ... Our mastery over the
forces of nature has led to a rapid growth of
population, and a vast accumulation of wealth;
but these have brought with them such an amount
of poverty and crime
that it may well be
questioned, whether the mental and moral status
of our population has not on the average been
lowered, and whether evil has not overbalanced
the good ... Compared with our wonderous progress
in physical science and its practical
applications, our system of government, of
administering justice, of national education, and
our whole social and moral organization, remains
in a state of barbarism.
And if we continue to
devote our chief energies to utilizing our
knowledge of the laws of nature with the view to
still further extending our commerce and our
wealth, the evils which necessarily accompany
these when too eagerly pursued, may increase to
such gigantic dimensions as to be beyond our
power to alleviate. [165]

—
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The final twist comes to rest with
class warfare.

Although he does not directly appeal to
Marxism, the
suggestion is obvious.
We should now clearly recognize the
fact,
that the wealth and knowledge and culture
of the
few do not constitute civilization, and
do not
of themselves advance us towards the "perfect
social state." Our vast manufacturing system,
our gigantic commerce, our crowded towns and
cities, support and continually renew a mass of
human misery and crime absolutely greater than
has ever existed before.
They create and
maintain in life-long labour an ever-increasing
army, whose lot is the more hard to bear by
contrast with the pleasures, the comforts, and
the luxury which they see everywhere around them,
but which they can never hope to enjoy; and who,
in this respect, are worse off than the savage in
the midst of his tribe. [166]
He closes with an appeal for reform.

Change was

manifesting itself during this period in the form of labor
and sanitation laws, but improvements for the worker and

savage under the Empire was partial at best, and painfully
slow
This is not a result to boast of, or the be
satisfied with; and, until there is a more
general recognition of this failure of our
civilizat ion--resul t ing mainly from our neglect
to train and develop more thoroughly the
sympathetic feelings and moral faculties of our
nature, and to allow them a larger share of
influence in our legislation, our commerce, and
our whole social organization we shall never, as
regards the whole community, attain to any real
or important superiority over the better class of
savages
This is the lesson I have been taught by my
observation of uncivilized man.
I now bid my
readers Farewel 1
[167]

—

—

!
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In his

late works he embraces socialism directly. 168

And in 1889 he met the anarchist French
geographer Elisee
Rec lus , whose radical politics fit
nicely with his own.

We agreed that almost all social evils
all
poverty, misery, crime were the creation
of
governments and of bad social sys terns ...[ it would
be best if there were] no central
governments
[except for voluntary coalitions]
[169]

—

—

.

Wallace then takes yet another step away from
hierarchy,

a

step which parallels his movement away from assumed

superiority over Natives.

He embraces cultural diversity

for its own sake, debunking the "melting pot" ideal.

There is one point. .which I do not think has
ever been much considered or discussed.
It is,
the undoubted benefit to all the members of a
society of the greatest possible diversity of
character as a means both towards the greatest
enjoyment and interest of association, and to the
highest ultimate development of the race. [170]
.

,

Such

a

claim is of course no surprise, as Wallace's

impetus tends towards breaking assumptions about cultural

hierarchy, and replacing them with core notions of social
justice based upon equality and tolerance for alternative
forms of life.

Furthermore, appeal to diversity accords

with Darwinian theory in that it is diversity that allows

Natural Evolution to go forward.

A similar argument

is

used by John Stuart Mill, in terms of the need to avoid

censorship.

Wallace's argument is subversive to Darwin's

ideas on hierarchy

— which

diversity in favor of
of society.

a

rely on

a

culling of social class

more homogeneous "superior" segment

The same applies for racial considerations, or

in Mill's case--for unpopular ideas.
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2.

Eugenics

Whereas Darwin wants to claim that
evolutionary

pressure continues to operate on humans in
every phase of
life, Wallace comes to the view that
for humans, Natural
Selection (except in minor instances) has ceased
to act.

Thus reproductive policy becomes

Wallace, and not

a

a

political matter for

biological/scientific subtopic.

By 1913

he articulates a concern over the potential
abuse Darwin's

position entails.
These misconceptions [about heredity, i.e.
whether culture is inherited biologica 1 ly
are
the more important and dangerous because their
promulgators are able to quote Herbert Spencer,
and to a less extent Darwin, as holding similar
views. [171]
]

.

.

.

Darwin and Wallace had already gone head to head on the
issue of human emergence in 1890, when Darwin read

Wallace's article in the Fortnightly Review titled "Human
Selection."

Wallace thought this article was

the most important contribution I have made to
the science of sociology and the cause of human
progress.
The article was written with two
objects in view. The first and most important
was to show that the various proposals of Grant
Allen, Mr. Francis Galton, and some American
writers, to attempt the direct improvement of the
human race by forms of artificial elimination and
selection, are both unscientific and unnecessary
I also wished to show that the great bugbear of
the opponents of social reform too rapid
increase in population is entirely imaginary,
and that the very same agencies which, under
improved social conditions, will bring about a
real and effective selection of the physically,
mentally, and morally best, will also tend

—
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towards a diminution of the rate
of increase of
the population. [172]
He suggests that eugenics is
unnatural, thus demonstrating

that the eugenicists are practicing
politics, not just
advocating "sound scientific policy." Of
critical

importance here is that others shared his view that

evolutionary pressure had ceased to work on humans,
for
example George Eliot or even Huxley.
It

is

important to our evaluation of Darwin and the

other Social Darwinists that Wallace considered himself

within the mainstream of an expanding movement, even
if
some of his colleagues within the scientific biology

community resisted these ideas through denial and silence.
The flowing tide is with us. We have great
poets, great writers, great thinkers, to cheer
and guide us, and and ever-increasing band of
earnest workers to spread the light and help in
the good time coming. [173]

Thus he had little patience with Spencer and Darwin

when they advocated letting the poor die because of their
supposed inferiority

,

or insisted on instituting eugenic

policies to limit the reproduction of the poor /Natives
In the first place, I have shown that modern
ideas as to the necessity of dealing directly
with some of our glaring social evils, such as
race degeneration and the various forms of sexual

immorality, are fundamentally wrong and are
doomed to failure so long as their fundamental
cause wide-spread poverty, destitution, and
starvat ion--are not greatly diminished and
ultimately abol ished ... reasonably just and equal
economic conditions will automatically abolish
all these evils.
In the second place, I have shown that the
dread of over-population as the result of the
abolition of poverty is wholly and utterly

—
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fallacious— a mere bugbear created by ignorance

of natural

laws and of presumption in thinking we
can cure social evils while leaving the
man-made
causes which produce them unaltered. [175]

Some of his animosity to increasing government
power

originated in an 1870 dispute between himself and John
Hampden. 176

in this

legal altercation Wallace undertook to

attack an obnoxious character who tried to promote the flat
earth theory.
In one of the bizarre but instructive chapters of

western science Wallace devised an apparatus to show that
the earth was not flat by measuring the curvature of the

planet along

canal waterway.

a

for 500 pounds

,

Even though he won the bet

and subseguently won libel suit after libel

suit against Hampden,

legal technicalities resulted in

Wallace losing hundreds of pounds in legal fees and fines.

Reflecting on the events, he felt that the
...English law which leaves the honest man in
the power of the dishonest one... is the very
antithesis of justice
[177]
,

.

In the end, Wallace saw this as an example of how

justice in England was operative in proportion to the

wealth of the individual.

1

7R

His experiences only

reinforced his opinion that progress was

a

suspect notion,

that increasing national wealth was not obviously

a

good

179
thing, and that governments were indifferent to justice.

Thus he reacts strongly to the opinions of Malthus,

Darwin and Spencer, who advocate "scientific" and
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government-run eugenics programs in one form
or another.
Malthus traced the origins of eugenics to Galton:
The total cessation of the action of
natural
selection as a cause of improvement in our race,
either physical or mental, led to the proposal
of
the late Sir F. Galton to establish a new
science, which he termed Eugenics.
180
[

Galton proposed

a

]

very mild form of direct reproductive

regulation, as he made it "limited to giving prizes" for
good efforts towards that end.

Darwin, Malthus and Spencer

wished to impose more aggressive policies.

But Darwin and

Malthus cannot have it both ways, for if evolutionary
pressure results in

a

demise of aristocrats and the wealthy

in favor of the proliferation of the poor

— on

their own

terms that is an indication of which individuals or classes
are the most fit.

On the other hand,

if selection has

ceased, then social conflict must be evaluated on some

criteria other than evolutionary confrontations based on
large craniums,

light skin color, class of birth, or sex.

Wallace was well aware of the potential abuses of
eugenics
But there is great danger in such a process of
artificial selection by experts... We have
already had proposals made for the segregation of
the feeble-minded, [while the] sterilization of
the unfit and of some classes of criminals is
already being discussed.
181
[

]

Given his ideas on social change such "experts" had to be

viewed as potential agents of oppression.
Furthermore, he felt that those pushing for eugenics
were suppressing evidence that indicated class warfare
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played

a

large role in the motivation of those seeking
to

control the reproduction of the lower classes.

Even

Spencer acknowledged that fertility decreases as
class
status increases. 182

We have already seen that Darwin

worried about this, too.

Wallace thought that the

information did not have to be taken as fuel for the
argument that the poor should be discouraged from breeding.
Rather, he thought this proved that raising the poor out of

poverty would decrease population growth and so solve the
"problem" of overpopulation.

Ending poverty would trigger an automatic restriction
of population growth because it would change the social

practices of women (more on this later)

When poverty is abolished and neither economic
nor social advantages will be gained by early
marriage, there can be no doubt it will be
generally deferred to a later age. [183]
This would have the effect of cutting the birth rate for
two reasons: shortening of the reproductive phase for

women, and altering the fertility rate.

He was not

striking out on his own with these ideas, but merely

developing things noted by the advocates of eugenics.
Galton himself noted

a

decrease of fertility with

increasing age in women. 184
In terms of imperial conflict, Wallace finds that an

examination of human reproductive practices yields another
attack on the theory that evolutionary forces alone mold
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human culture.

]

He points out that while he
agrees with

Darwin and others that war leads to
...a rather severe process of
selection [in
which] the strongest physically, the
most
ingenious in the use of weapons, and the
best
organized for war did survive... [185]
he thinks his opponents should also
take note that history

indicates that wars, because they operate on
groups and to
a lesser extent on individuals,
also ensure the survival of
slaves, prostitutes, and other so-called "less,
fit"

characters
But in the human race the conditions are
altogether different; for while... the kind of
natural selection which through all the ages had
molded the infinitely varied animal forms into
harmony with their environment ceased to act upon
man s body and only for a limited time upon his
lower mental faculties, sexual selection tended
to act, if at all prejudicially, through
polygamy, prostitution, and slavery, though it
possess the potentiality of acting in the future
so as to ensure intellectual and moral
progress .
186
.

.

[

Rather than the "most fit" sharing their genetic

heritage with each other, "inferiors" are selected by the
"higher" individuals for partners.

This contradiction

shows that humans select in ways incompatible with what one

would expect of strict Natural Selection.

While it might

be possible to wiggle around this point by invoking

formulae of selective advantage, or even disadvantage,

derived from such practices, the more direct and obvious
solution is to admit that evolution has ceased to act, and
that

a

non-biologica 1 or "cultural evolution" has begun.
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Another aspect of this concerns the
magnitude of
selective pressure on humans. Many of the
professional

biologists of the time held that Malthusian
precepts made
it a priori that Natural Selection must
eliminate a very

high percentage of offspring.

Britain was in that phase of

development of the social sciences and politics in which
statistics became important for formulation of theory
and
even legislative practice.

Yet the statistics showed that

in "civilized" countries about one-half of the
general

population died before reaching the age of twenty-five. 187
While this appalling figure makes one cringe, it was to

Wallace an indication that selection had ceased to act, and
that political action was required to reduce early

mortality even further.

He held that the figures for

survival to maturity in nature started at 20%, and went as
low as 1/10 of 1%. 188

The magnitude of selective pressure on Natives was

also an impetus for Wallace's views.
he tried to apply Malthus'

Like all biologists,

principles to local populations.

Since he lived with Native peoples for extended periods, he
was able to examine first hand the lack of selective

pressure, which should have been much higher according to

Malthus and Darwin.
During my residence among the Hill Dyaks, I was
much struck by the apparent absence of those
causes which are generally supposed to check the
increase of population [for they have plenty of
Of all the checks to population among
food].
savage nations mentioned by Ma 1 thus--s tarva t ion,
disease, war, infanticide, immorality, and
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“the last is that which
st important .. .and yet
eems to me capable of
of the population among
As we shall see shortly,

this idea that women could control

population growth, either unconsciously
through imposed
and adverse conditions or consciously
through

the power of

selecting mates and the timing of reproduction,
became an
important one for Wallace in his arguments for
sexual

equality

3.

Power to women

Wallace became

a

champion for women's rights, out of

moral concerns for equality certainly, but also out of an

appreciation of the political position of the poor/Native.
By giving women real power he thought that women could

reform society through regulating human reproduction.
The details of how he came to this view are quite

fascinating.

wrestling with

From his earliest writings we see him
conundrum: if Native women control

a

reproductive rates (in this case involuntarily through
lower fertility)

,

and Europeans help them lead

a

less

stressful life by introducing superior technology,

problematic population explosion would result.

a

Thus

European efforts aimed at

a

disastrous consequences.

He speculates that it is women's

better life would lead to
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hard working conditions that historically have kept

reproductive rates down.

modernizing the Native

If

improves living conditions, population, competition and

misery will increase.
with the sharper struggle for existence that
then occur, will the happiness of the people
whole be increased or diminished? Will not
passions be aroused by the spirit of
competition, and crimes and vices, now unknown or
dormant, be called into active existence? These
are problems that time alone can solve; but it is
to be hoped that education and a high-class
European example may obviate much of the evil
that too often arises in analogous cases, and
that we may at length be able to point to one
instance of an uncivilized people who have not
become demoralized and finally exterminated by
contact with European civilization. [190]

But,
will
as a
evil

The tragic logic of European actions demonstrates

human ability to transcend evolutionary strictures and
but paradoxically results in

a

sharpening of constraints on

the Native.

Yet Wallace finds evidence for hope.

His optimism is

generated from an intriguing reworking of Victorian ideals.
The conservative Victorian's ideas of "degeneration" and

"women as

a

source of moral values" are turned on their

heads by the proposal of giving women real power over

reproduction.

By implication there ought also be a raising

of suppressed classes and cultures through a transfer of

power from owners to workers, from colonists to Natives.
In Wallace's reasoning women's delay in marriage would

have the result of decreasing the reproductive rate,

allowing wealth to be conserved and the "bugbear" of
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overpopulation would be overcome.

He had a second reason

to think that a decrease in social
and economic pressure
for early marriage would result in
lowered reproductive

rates.

A lowering of pressure to marry
would promote a new

phenomenon

:

celibacy out of choice.

In a state of society in which all women
were
economically independent, were all fully occupied
with public duties and social or intellectual
pleasures, and had nothing to gain by marriage
as
regards material well-being or social position,
it is highly probable that the numbers
of the
unmarried from choice would increase.
It would
probably come to be considered a degradation for
any woman to marry a man whom she could not love
and esteem, and this reason would tend at least
to delay marriage until a worthy and sympathetic
partner was encountered. [191]

More unusual yet, Wallace proposed that giving women
truly free choice over mates would result in

a

a

partial

restoration of some of the positive aspects of Natural
Selection.

The humorous aspect of this claim is that it

restores Darwin's claim that sexual selection is an
important factor in human evolution by turning Darwin's

view inside out.

Wallace writes:

...under rational conditions of civilization
...the position of woman... will be far higher and
more important than any which has been claimed
for or by her in the past.
While she will be conceded full political
and social rights on an equality with man, she
will be placed in a position of responsibility
and power which will render her his superior,
since the future moral progress of the race will
so largely depend upon her free choice in
marriage. As time goes on, and she acquires more
and more economic independence, that alone will
give her an effective choice which she has never
had before. [192]
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He allows that within this reformed
society men may go

unselected because of female choice.

Thus actual

alterations in reproductive pathways could be
effected by
the conscious choices of women.

This development of sexual selection's powers
includes
a

humorous subtext.

Michael Ruse claims that Darwin created

Sexual Selection to counter Wallace's ideas about
cultural

selection and the unique status of "man."
To counter Wallace, although undoubtedly also as
a natural development of ideas which he had had
previously, Darwin included in the Descent a very
large general discussion of sexual selection and
then he argued that many of the differences
between humans, both between the sexes and
between the different races, are due to this kind
of selection: men struggle for the women they
want, women are attracted to the dominant men,
and so forth.
Thus, something like human
hairlessness can be explained as a function of
early men finding hairy mates distasteful. [193]
,

Although it is unclear why men would also become less hairy
(and apparently women prefer "somewhat" hairy men as many

prefer beards

(especially at that time)), Ruse is correct

in claiming that Darwin was absolutely opposed to Wallace's

ideas on group selection and on the unique status of "man."

Furthermore, an inventory of characteristics of Darwin's
and Wallace's view of sexual selection reveals how the

ideological and the scientific are intertwined.

Consider Darwin's version of sexual selection.

In

terms of female choice--which turns on the male's power to

drive that "choice" through vigor,
bias towards

a

a

conservative Victorian

"natural" male dominance helps validate the
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theory.

On Wallace's side

a

bias to support human sexual

equality drives the scientific view that color

characteristics in animals are equally distributed
in males
and females.
An exception proving the rule resides in the
case of female birds whose nests are "open"
or exposed.

Such females will lose their brilliant color in favor
of
more protective coloring--in cases where the female
does
the sitting on the nest

1^4

Thus on Darwin's view the more

.

beautiful coloring of the male is one more demonstration of
male superiority, while on Wallace's view the male's

coloring is not something the female lacks out of
inferiority, but rather is something given up because it is

inappropriate to the behavior of the species.
Second, Darwin's emphasis on the aesthetic nature of

animal choice in sexual selection is driven by the needs of
the continuity thesis.

By demonstrating that animals share

an appreciation of the beautiful the continuity of

psychological faculties and abilities is "confirmed."
Recent work on sexual selection has reinvigorated

a

moribund field and has resuscitated appreciation for the
.

i

.

aesthetic ability of animals:

oc;

Bateson therefore concludes ... that quail may be
following a highly abstract aesthetic rule-prefer intermediary degrees of familiarity...
The idea is that quail shun mates that are too familiar or
too strange and so avoid incest.

Similarly, the female

swordtail fish discussed earlier in the chapter on Darwin
are selecting according to

a

rule.
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The female choice is

not always benef icia 1— f or in some
environments there are

strict limits on size.

Due to accidents of the perceptual

apparatus and the particular cue utilized for size,
the
female winds up selecting sword length as opposed to

overall size and thus the "aesthetic" preference
for large
mates leads to

a

non functional adaptation: the sword. 196

Despite attempts to produce an incest aesthetic that
applies equally to animals and humans 197 the question of

whether such rules are equivalent to appreciation of the

beautiful by humans remains.

Whereas the particulars of

the perceptual apparatus can be used to elucidate

a

uniform

choice pattern within animals, any such investigation into
human behaviour seems doomed from the start.
it

Analogously

is difficult to understand how one could demonstrate the

aesthetic sense in animals--if one means more than "bigger
is better"

(as

no to strange"

in the case of the swordtails)

or "just say

(despite Bateson's terminology).

To put the

matter the other way around, what would dolphinic Cubism or
zebrine Abstract Expressionism look like?

Furthermore,

even if animals only demonstrate an ability in terms of
"early" aesthetic theory:

There is no case on record where the female of an
established pair has rejected the male because he

turned out not to be beautiful enough when the
time came for coition. [198]

Wilma George points out that Wallace explicitly argues
along these lines in his Darwinism
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:

.

The conferment of an aesthetic
sense on female
animals was to him an unjustified assumption.
Wallace maintained that is was not possible
to
prove a sense of beauty, of appreciation
of
patterns of artistic merits, in birds and
insects.
It was not even likely that insects
would see in the same way that man does,
considering the differences in structures of
their eye and brain...
"it appears to me, in
imputing to insects and birds the same love of
colour for its own sake and the same aesthetic
tastes as we ourselves possess we may be as far
from the truth as were the writers who held that
the bee was a good mathematician, and that the
honeycomb was constructed throughout to satisfy
its refined mathematical instincts." [199]

While Darwin sent biology on

a

productive research

path with sexual selection, Wallace's point about the

specifics of neural anatomy is correct.

For example,

in

the case of mating calls the utilization of two frequencies
by the Tungara frog is directly related to the particular

structure of the animal's ear

— which

is

divided into two

receptors: one maximizing at 500 Hz, the other at 2100
Hz. 200

However it is preposterous to claim that any

meaningful understanding of the sociology of popular music
genres, for example, is going to be explained by an appeal
to the structure of the human ear or the perceptual

apparatus
Third, whereas Darwin emphasizes individual choice,

Wallace emphasizes group, or emergent, behavior.
Wallace, distinctive markings helped
itself.

a

For

species identify

George points out that
To
in Darwinism he now extended his theory.
those recognition colours that he had already
defined, colours for recognition between the
sexes and of parents by the young, he added
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r ® c °9 nition and species
recognition.
Recognition marks during flight are very
important for all birds which
congregate in
flocks or which migrate together..."
[201]

Fourth, the historical record shows
the trouble the
theory had in getting off the ground.
Even as late as the

1940's there was little evidence that mate
selection could
be linked to survival-enhancing
characteristics.
In one area occupied by robins
Lack found that
in any one breeding season about one
fifth of the
cock robins failed to get mates.
Here was a

situation where sexual selection might be
thought to come into play. But, in fact, it
was
observed that a cock robin deserted by his mate
often found and kept another, and one that had
no
mate in one season had one the next season and
Vice versa
[202]
.

Yet biologists endorsed Darwin's view, despite
problems

with evidence and/or theory and the availability of an

alternative in Wallace's view.
Romanes (1892)
and with him the majority of
biologists, accepted Darwin's sexual selection
theory unconditionally, and by the end of the
century it was firmly established. [203]
,

Darwins' new view of male "adornments,"
deer)

in terms of male rivalry for mates has been

particularly successful.
component resurfaces.
function as weapons,

Yet even here the ideological

Whereas his view the antlers
a

more Wallacian or Kropotkinian

interpretation is possible.
emphasizes
male

(such as antlers in

r iva

a

Gould points to

a

view that

"peaceful" or more "cooperative" solution to

lry--based upon behavior.
But what if antlers do not function primarily as
weapons? Modern studies of animal behavior have
generated an exciting concept of great importance
251

to evolutionary biology: many
structures
previously judged as actual weapons or
devices
for display to females are actually
used for
ritualized combat among males. Their function
to prevent actual battle (with
consequent
injuries and loss of life) by establishing
hierarchies of dominance that males can easily
recognize and obey. [204]

is

An evolutionary argument lying below
the surface of Gould's

appraisal of behavior-driven sexual selection is the

suggestion that the destruction of those lower in the
mating hierarchy would be

bad thing.

a

For example, an

animal that has smaller antlers this year may have
larger
ones next year thus there is no benefit to the species in

destroying what Darwin would call the "less fit."

Given

the lack of evidence available to late nineteenth century

biologists it seems clear that acceptance of Darwin's

version was driven primarily

y a bias

for continuity and

conservative ideological/scientific values.
For Wallace any human sexual selection worth talking

about would be conscious and deliberate.

This selective

process would be ultimate proof and expression of the
radical gulf between humans and animals as reproductive

success and survival concerns need not figure in the
equation.

A

character or

woman could choose
a

a

man who had fine

clever pentameter rather than bulky biceps,

vigorous health or wealth.
During 1877 Wallace and Darwin engaged in

exchange of letters on this very matter.
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a

heated

Darwin wanted to

I

stress the subconscious nature of sexual
selection, which
betrays his desire to make such selection
more animalistic:
...I doubt whether the term voluntary
in relation
to sexual selection ought to be employed:
when a
man is fascinated by a pretty girl it can
hardly
be called voluntary, and I suppose that
female
animals are charmed or excited in nearly the
same
manner by the gaudy males.
205
[

]

Notice that Darwin wishes to equalize or even accentuate
male power in this relationship by describing the female
animal decision process in terms of

influence

a

female.

It

a

human male's power to

is the male animal's qualities that

drive the female animal to act.

Concerning the aspect of will, or rather lack of will,
in humans,

Darwin's reductive psychology demands this

construction, as he wants continuity for female choice

between humans and other animals.
present

a

Wallace can more easily

view with greater flexibility, for on his terms

choice by humans is far more complex.

On the one hand, he

can maintain his theoretical stance on emergence and still

accept that there is

a

biological basis for sexual

attraction, even for humans, while he can reject the idea
that this is the ultimate and complete explanation for

human mating behavior.

He writes:

The word "voluntary" was inserted in m^_ proofs
only in order to distinguish clearly between two
radically distinct kinds of "sexual selection."
Perhaps "conscious" would be a better word...
206
lay no stress on the word "voluntary."
,

[

]

Wallace draws the line before accepting the point of view
that humans choose their mates in ways no different than do

253

ants or peacocks, and one might add:
atoms.

While he might

allow that there are unconscious drives (and
thus his lack
of quibbles with Darwin over the
phrase "voluntary")

he may

allow that this is

a

minor and ultimately meaningless

aspect of human behavior
based.

— even

if

it might be

biologically

At the core of this issue is a metaphysical

difference between Wallace and Darwin.

It

is to this topic

that we now turn.

D.

"Man's" Place in Nature

The savage, writes Wallace,

.actually possesses. .a brain.
but very
little inferior to that of the average members of
our learned societies. [207]
.

.

.

.

.

By now it should be obvious that central to the

conflict between Darwin and Wallace is disagreement over
the position of humans with respect to evolutionary

biology.

The results of Darwin giving Natural Selection

the widest possible scope are:

(1)

universal application,

(2)

a

thoroughly reductive and materialist metaphysics, and

(3)

a

continuous and dense line of descent.

Natural

Selection is universal in the sense of application to the

activities of all living things, materialist in the sense
of postulating that the ultimate nature of reality is

resolvable into matter and motion, and continuous in terms
of allowing no breaks,

sui generis starts, or emergence
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anywhere in the system once it gets going,

The lack of

breaks requires that any quality found in any component of
the living world is found in all other components--

dif f erence is in quantity only.
a

Although Darwin strove for

systematic approach, as we have seen in Chapter Two his

ambivalences complicated and at points disrupted the neat
system he strove to manifest.

Wallace took as basic the principle that humans enjoy
a

special status amongst living things.

He saw no

contradiction in holding that the body and some aspects of
the mind were produced by evolution, but that in other

aspects the mind, even though parasitic on the body, is not

selected and functions independently of evolutionary
struggle.

He allowed for emergent qualities, and so

jettisonned universality, materialism and continuity.

His

challenge was to motivate this position, which on Darwin's
terms smacked of metaphysics and religion, when most

professional biologists eschewed discussion of these topics
in favor of

"scientific purity."

Professional resistance

may also be understood in terms of the adversarial

relationship between Natural Selection and the established

theological/scientific order. 2 0 8
In part, Wallace took an end-run around the question.

As we have seen throughout this chapter,

his analysis of

human relations and geopolitical events, particularly

within the anthropological details of his scientific work,
pointed out ways in which the world could be made more
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just

The appeal to social justice, to
the exclusion of

.

socia 1 -Darwinian arguments, was the basis
of Wallace's
attempt to shift the grounds of the
debate.

Once the focus shifts to justice, the Social
Darwinist
is put
a

in an awkward position.

Although Darwin argues for

noblest" status for moral qualities, it is unclear what

the evolutionary status of "noblest" is.

Darwin himself

acknowledges that moral constraints lead to degeneration
and irrational social constructs.

If

morals are only

valuable in terms of survival value, "noblest" seems hardly
to be the appropriate term-- "practical" would seem
more

accurate, even if the practicality is two-edged.

On the

other hand, if morality is outside the evolutionary domain,
then the Darwinian is arguing for
and hence an emergentist position

a

break in continuity,

— which

runs counter to

the Darwinian program.

Furthermore, evolutionary arguments for particular

geopolitical events would be no small undertaking;
far simpler

(and traditional)

is

it

to describe the events as if

humans affect world events through interactions of their
wills, even if such is not the case.

In the more common

view of things agents can be thought to express opinions
molded at least to some degree by arguments and social

ideals--in short, to act within

a

cultural context.

Thus

Wallace's approach puts pressure on the Darwinist to
produce particular arguments that are going to be very
difficult, indeed, to manufacture.
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Wallace did not rest with the tactic of
bringing

political argumentation to bear.

He assembled a mass of

reasoning which directly supported the emergentist
hypothesis.

One series of arguments worked off the idea of

the "imponderable."

There were fundamental questions which

evolutionary biology of the time was ill equipped to
handle

,

such as the ultimate origin of life, the details of

heredity and cellular processes, and the nature of
consciousness.

He hoped to turn these problems to account

for his point of view.

He advocated utilizing the

phrenology and spiritualism in order to demonstrate the
special nature of human existence.

This gamble did not,

ultimately, work to his advantage.
In the main he argued for emergentism on the basis of

finding practices unique to humans, ranging from

theoretical mathematics to art.

He communicated these

ideas to Darwin whose response was to say little in reply.

1.

Wallace's break with Darwin

Darwin attempted to render the idea of "man's" special
status null by chipping away, piece by piece, the bedrock

supporting human uniqueness.

He did this despite the fact

that on some level he would have rather avoided the whole
issue:

"To avoid stating how far,

Materialism..." 21 ^

It

I

believe, in

is an interesting fact that Darwin
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:

]

gathered much of his evidence for Natural Selection
from

attributes of domesticated organisms.
of the primary motors for evolution

variation

— was

—

In particular,

one

descent with

demonstrated through appeal to the domestic

breeding of pigeons and farm animals.

Many guestioned

Darwin's methodology, and asked why "nature" should
function as domesticated life does.
It has always been considered a weakness in
Darwin's work that he based his theory,
primarily, on the evidence of variation in
domesticated animals and domesticated plants.
I
[Wallace] have endeavored to secure a firm
footing for the theory in the variations of
organisms in a state of nature... [211]

In fact this job was particularly suited to Wallace,

since he ultimately wanted to maintain the split between
the natural and the human domain.

He points out that when

people select breeding animals the aim is entirely

unnatura 1
...man has considered only utility to himself...
[or] the satisfaction of his love of beauty, [or]
novelty, or merely of something strange and
amusing ...
212
[

Overt notions of beauty, novelty, strangeness and humor are

arguably purely human considerations.
Up to 1857 Darwin wished the whole issue of "Man's"

place could remain undiscussed.

In a letter to Wallace,

Darwin admits his discomfort with the inevitable topic.
You ask whether I shall discuss Man; I think I
shall avoid the whole subject, as so surrounded
with prejudices, though I fully admit that it is
the highest and most interesting for the
on which I
naturalist. My work [the Origin
less
for twenty
have now been at work more or
]
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,

1

.

]

—

years, will not fix or settle
anything; but I
hope it will aid by giving a large
collection of
facts with one definite end. [213]
But discuss it he did.

wide open.

His Descent broke the subject

Wallace agreed with the main conclusion.
Th® Descent of^ Man ... proved ... that the
physical
structure of man was in all its parts and organs
so extremely similar to that of the anthropoid
apes as to demonstrate the descent of both
from
some common ancestor. [214]

Even before the Descent was published, Wallace
had

pioneered the position that evolution applied to human
behavior
The view above expounded of the transference of
the action of natural selection from the bodily
structure to the mind of early man was my first
original modification of that theory, having been
communicated to the Anthropologica Review in
1864.
It received the approval both of Darwin
himself and of Herbert Spencer... [215]

Beyond the basics, however, he and Darwin parted ways,
for Wallace opted for a radical break between humans and

beasts

:

1. The Origin of Man a s an Intel lec t ua 1 and Moral
Being
On this great problem the belief and
teaching of Darwin was, that man's whole nature
physical, mental, intellectual, and moral--was
developed from the lower animals by means of the
same laws of variation and survival; and, as a
consequence of this belief, that there was no
difference in kind between man's nature and
animal nature, but only one of degree.
My view,
on the other hand, was, and is, that there is a
difference in kind, intellectually and morally,
between man and other animals ...[ 216
.

—

When Darwin first heard of what was coming from Wallace, he
let out an involuntary screech
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(1869);

:

I shall be intensely
curious to read the
Quarterly I hope you have not murdered too
completely your own and my child. [217]
;

And when he read the article, he was not
pleased.
I presume that your
remarks on Man are those to
which you alluded in your note
If you had not
told me I should have thought that they had
been
added by someone else. As you expected, I differ
grievously from you, and I am very sorry for
it... I can see no necessity for calling in an
additional proximate cause in regard to Man. But
the subject is too long for a letter... I have
been particularly glad to read your discussion,
because I am now writing and thinking much about

Man.

[218]

And again, nine months later he iterates his displeasure.

—

But

I groan over Man
you write like a
metamorphosed (in retrograde direction)
naturalist, and you the author of the best paper
that ever appeared in the Anthropological Review!
Eheu! Eheu Eheu!
Your miserable friend, C.
Darwin. [219]
!

In Darwin's

—

letter of Nov. 22, 1870, which came ten

months after the one above, he wrote that he hoped his

differences with Wallace over man would not "kill me in
your

[Wallace's]

good estimation."

Here Darwin projects

his extreme displeasure onto his friend and colleague.

Wallace nowhere talked of killing anything.

He dealt with

this exchange with typical good-naturedness and deference
to Darwin.

He thought the issue complicated enough to

warrant agreements to disagree without rancor.

Darwin's

emotional involvement with the argument struck Wallace as

overblown
The above remark, "kill me in your good
estimation," refers to his views on the mental
and moral nature of man being very different from
mine, this being the first important question as
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1

to which our views had
diverged. But I never had
the slightest feeling of the
kind he supposed,

^

the difference
one which did not
our general agreement, and also as
h
being
one on which no one could
dogmatize, there
emg much to be said on both sides.
[220]
9

^°an J?°\
affect
.

Luckily, this grave difficulty did
not prevent Darwin
from continuing his friendship and
debate with Wallace.
Even though the issue was highly
charged, Darwin had

earlier missed some clues that indicated
Wallace was
splitting off from the radical-materialist
camp.

in a

letter of 1864, Darwin muses over Wallace's
"The Origin of
Human Races..." article:
But now for your Man paper, about which I
should
like to write more than I can.
The great leading
idea is quite new to me, viz. that during late
ages the mind will have been modified more than
the body; yet I had got as far as to see with
you
the struggle between races of man depended
entirely on intellectual and mora qualities.
The latter part of the paper I can designate only
as grand and most eloquently done.
I have shown
your paper to two or three persons who have been
here, and they have been equally struck with it.
I am not sure that
I
go with you on all
minor points. When reading Sir G. Grey's account
of the constant battles of Australian savages, I
remember thinking that Natural Selection would
come in, and likewise with the Esquimaux, with
whom the art of fishing and managing canoes is
said to be hereditary.
I rather differ on the
rank under the c lass if icatory point of view which
you assign to Man: I do not think any character
simply in excess ought ever be used for the
higher division. Ants would not be separated
from other hymenopterous insects, however high
the instinct of the one and however low the
instincts of the other.
...Secondly, I suspect that a sort of sexual
selection has been the most powerful means of
changing the races of man.
I can show that the
different races have a widely different standard
of beauty.
Among savages the most powerful men
will have the pick of the women, and they will
generally leave the most descendents.
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I have collected
a few notes on Man, but
I
do
not suppose I shall ever use them
would you
ike at some future time to have...
my notes?
I am sure I hardly
know whether they are of
any value, and the are at present
in a state of
chaos.

.Our aristocracy is handsomer? (more
hideous according to a Chinese or negro) than
middle classes, from pick of women; but oh
what
scheme is primogeniture for destroying Natural
Selection.
I
fear my letter will be barely
intelligible to you. [221]
.

.

This letter provides

topic.

In paragraph one,

away from

a

a

a

plethora of entry points to our

Darwin senses Wallace's drift

radically reductive materialism.

Darwin allows

that race-struggle revolves around the issue of mental

abilities, but cannot see why these mental abilities should
be separated from physical selection.

Whereas Darwin wants

to unite the two, and looks to craniometries for

a

quantification and index of intelligence and survivability,
Wallace developes the idea that physical development has
given out and emergent cultural factors have begun.
In paragraph two,

Darwin implies that humans differ

from primates in the same way ants differ from gall-flies.
He argues that there are no qualitative differences.
In paragraph three we get an oddity of Darwin's

thought.

Since he is willing to use evolutionary arguments

for almost any human quality, the invocation of sexual

selection as the "most powerful" agent of change is
astonishing.

His motive is unclear.

topic later.
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I

will return to this

The fourth through sixth paragraphs
reveal another of

Darwin's ambivalences.

On the one hand, he would like to

turn the whole enterprise over to Wallace--by
letting

Wallace take his notes.

Yet doubts linger, for he would

rather the whole topic would vanish

valuelessness, and chaos.

— hence

the claims of

Perhaps, too, he fears what

Wallace would write— both in terms of anticipating
his own
work and in offering an alternative view.

Buried within the last section is the key to the
debate.

Darwin, to illustrate the chaos and perhaps the

uselessness" of his notes, supplies
and then turn our spade over.
lies

a

Under

a

sample.

a

few lines of earth

cryptic comment about primogeniture.

Let us dig

But how can

primogeniture "destroy" Natural Selection?
The problem with primogeniture is twofold.
hand,

On the one

it subverts the natural order by favoring the first

born who is not necessarily the more fit than subseguent

offspring.

On the other hand it is

complex social

a

practice which ties into an infinite web of social
relations.

Despite Darwin's reductive contentions,

primogeniture implicates the existence of cultural factors
that influence "man's" behavior in ways that are not

readily explainable in terms of his biology.

despite the possibility of appeal to

a

This is so

conservation of

resources (i.e. focus on one child) or social stability

(a

settled successional custom to prevent political upheaval).
Any comparison with primate correlates of primogeniture
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falls short.

Where are the chimp inheritance laws,

barristers or clerics?

Primogeniture touches on too much.

Unhappy with the way things are going,
Darwin ceases.
The degree of distress is evident in the
degeneration of

grammar and the conflicted nature of the message
he sends
his friend.

Rather than admit to the seriousness of the

disagreement, and debate the specifics, he offers his
notes, intimating that he would like Wallace to continue
the debate in place of himself.

But Darwin's offer is made

in such a way that it is clear Wallace is not to ask for

them;

they're useless and chaotic, after all.
It

is too bad Wallace did not respond to the

primogeniture comment, for then perhaps Darwin would have
been motivated to expand on the topic.

In any case,

Wallace thought that Natural Selection's culling of
physical and mental qualities gave out rather early in
"man's" history;
I... no doubt overlook a few smaller points in
which Natural Selection may still act on men and
brutes alike. Colour is one of them... [222]

He not only attacks the conceptual core of Darwin's racism:

radical materialism, but he brings the topic to the fore by

calling differences of race, such as color,
point."

a

"smaller

He held that human body color was developed for

survival, even though it was relatively unimportant in

other respects.

He also believed that the original color

was that of the Mongolian, or American Indian.
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We may well suppose it to
be due to its being
more or less correlated with
constitutional
characters favourable to life... white
and black
from this ["original warm
f^^ions
brown of^ the American Indian],
and are probably
C rr 1 ted With mental or
Physical
peculiarities
K
K ?
which
have been favourable to the increase
and
maintenance of the particular race.
224
[

]

Furthermore, Wallace didn't accept Darwin's
idea that
sexual selection replaced Natural Selection
as the motor
for human adaptation 225
.

With regard to the constant battles of savages
leading to selection of physical superiority, I
think it would be very imperfect, and subject to
so many exceptions and irregularities, that it
could produce no definite result.
For instance,
the strongest and bravest men would lead, and
expose themselves most, and would therefore be
most subject to wounds and death.
And the
physical energy which led to any one tribe
delighting in war might lead to its extermination
by inducing quarrels with all surrounding tribes
and leading them to combine against it...
Moreover, this kind of more or less perpetual war
goes on among all savage peoples.
It could lead
therefore to no differential characters, but
merely to the keeping up of a certain average
standard of bodily and mental health and vigour.

Even in this early document Wallace is already drawing
the line between selection, whether sexual or natural, and

culture.

Given the demands of bravery, it is to be

expected, according to Wallace, that there would be

mortality for leaders.

a

high

Thus the coward, or at least the

prudent coward, would live to see another day and therefore
be able to leave more children than the leader.

More

importantly, the selective pressure of warfare would not
simply act in favor of the "strongest."
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Politics, in the form of alliances
against aggressive
neighbors, would soon take over. Thus
selective pressure
would favor the tribes (here we have
suggestion of group
selection) that promoted the right mix of
physical prowess
and political savvy.
Therefore sexual selection, according
to Wallace, could do but little in this
context.
...the sexual selection you allude to will
also,
think, have been equally uncertain in its
results.
In the very lowest tribes there is
rarely much polygamy, and women are more or less
a matter of purchase.
There is also little
difference of social condition, and I think it
rarely happens that any healthy and undeformed
man remains without wife and children.
I very
much doubt the often-repeated assertion that our
aristocracy are more beautiful than the middle
c lasses ... and besides, we unavoidably combine
in
our idea of beauty, intellectual expression and
refinement of manner, which often make the less
appear the more beautiful. [226]
I

He noticed a fundamental error on the part of Darwin

and the eugenicists.

In order to claim that selection of

any kind affects humans, differential reproductive and

survival rates must be established.

Wallace points out

that the first, differential reproductive rates, are

doubtful.

Do leaders leave more children?

Do they

live longer?

Both Darwin and Malthus bring up the fact that

reproductive rates decrease with advancement in social
class.

Rather than attempting to force corr igibi 1 ity from

this evidence, Wallace draws the obvious conclusion:

reproductive success in humans depends at least in part
upon cultural factors which are artificial.
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In the case of homo sa piens

Wallace believes, there

,

is a factor of intent iona 1 ity
which is

of the animal kingdom.

lacking in the rest

Thus daughters of aristocracy

appear more beautiful because they
are rich and linked to
powerful father.
The possibility of a Prince and
the
uper is lin, ited to human culture not
just because
nobility is a human concept. He need
not go into details
here— as Darwin must be aware of the use of make-up,

a

—

jewelry, finery, wills of inheritance
and the masked-ball.
As the debate goes on the difference
becomes more and

more clear.

Darwin is willing to equate, without

modification, sexual selection by
by

a

a

pea hen with selection

woman!
In regard to sexual

selection. A girl sees a
handsome man, and without observing whether his
nose or whiskers are the tenth of an inch longer
or shorter than in some other man, admires his
appearance and says she will marry him. So, I
suppose, with the pea-hen
[227]
In

Wallace's view this approach is simply off the wall.

He

may admit that humans experience what we might call "animal

attraction

'

but the selection of

consideration.

a

mate goes beyond this

Social class, ambitions, and all the

accidents and aspects of culture and human complication

attenuate mere mating by "rutting instinct."
an odd example for Darwin to pick

Also, what

— whiskers — these

are

trimmed by barbers, and are not particularly biologically

determined traits!

Do women really select barbers, at

bottom?
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Darwin's appeal to the continuity
thesis extended the
domain of biology between the extremes of
atomic forces and
all human activity.
For him imponderables were limited to
the origin of life.
He hoped that spontaneous generation,
or archebiosis, would lay the problem
of the origin of life
to rest. 228
I
should like to live to see archebiosis proved
true, for it would be a discovery of transcendent
importance; or if false I should like to see it
disproved, and the facts otherwise explained...

But the beginning was opaque: 220

Looking to the first dawn of life, when all
organic beings presented the simplest structure,
how, it may be asked, could the first steps in
the advancement or differentiation of the parts
arisen? .. .But as we have no facts to guide us,
speculation on the subject is almost useless...
As we saw earlier in the case of atomic forces,

best to avoid the topic in public.

he felt it

Wallace, however, was

not so shy.

By 1864 Wallace

(in "The Origin of Human Races..." 230

had decided that mind could not be derived from

evolutionary forces alone, but offered no explicit
explanation.

In 1868 he had attempted to motivate his

emergentist position by invoking the action of

a

generic

deity in "The Limits of Natural Selection Applied to Man."
His letters of approximately 1886 had mind producing

matter

and by 1889 in Darwinism he spoke of "Spirit" as

the power creating uniquely human attributes.

At the end

of his life he had "infinite grades of being" directing

emergent events.
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)

.

Retracing his steps, we see that
during his "middle
period" (around 1869), Wallace argued
for a non-pantheist,
non-teleological and non-homocentr ic view
of physical
reality.
in the Malay he mentioned Durian
fruit, which are
quite large and spiked, as proof that
the world was not
designed for humans because the Durian
reproductive
,

—

apparatus sometimes falls from great heights
and injures
people
From this we learn two things: first, not
to draw
general conclusions from a very partial view of
nature, and secondly, that trees and fruits, no
less than the varied productions of the animal
kingdom, do not appear to be organized with
exclusive reference to the use and convenience of
man.

[232]

In another passage Wallace broods on the

"melancholy" fact

that some recesses of the world are better off without man,
so that some radical gulfs between humans and nature
ought

never be crossed:
I
thought of the long ages of the past, during
which the successive generations of this little
creature [King Bird Of Paradise] had run their
course year by year being born, and living and
dying amid these dark and gloomy woods, with no
intelligent eye to gaze upon their loveliness; to
all appearance such a wanton waste of beauty.
Such ideas excite a feeling of melancholy .. .while
on the other hand, should civilized man ever
reach these distant lands, and bring moral,
intellectual, and physical light into the
recesses of these virgin forests, we may be sure
that he will so disturb the nicely-balanced
relations of organic and inorganic nature as to
cause the disappearance, and finally the
extinction, of these very beings whose wonderful
structure and beauty he alone is fitted to
appreciate and enjoy. This consideration must
surely tell us that all living things were not
made for man.
Many of them have no relation to
him.
They cycle of their existence has gone on

—
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independently of his, and is disturbed
or broken
by every advance in man's intel
lectua 1
development...
233
[

]

Later he emphasizes emergence through
appeal to
Vitalism:
The first stage is the change from
inorganic to
organic ... This is often imputed to a mere
increase of complexity of chemical compounds;
but
increase of complexity .. .could certainly
not have
produced living protoplasm ... Here then, we
have
indications of a new power at work, which we may
term vitality since it gives to certain
forms
matter all those characters and properties whichof
constitute Life. [234]
,

,

Huxley also supported this idea in an early work
(1854):
On the other hand, systematic teaching in
Biology
cannot be attempted with success until the
student has attained to a certain knowledge of
physics and chemistry: for though the phaenomena
of life are dependent neither on physical nor
on
chemical, but on vital forces, yet they result in
all sorts of physical and chemical changes, which
can only be judged by their own laws. [235]
But as time passes Wallace begins to explain emergence
in terms of spiritual forces:

—

—

...all life development
all organic forces
are
due to mind-action, we must postulate not only
forces but guidance... [236]

By 1911 he is writing:

...hardly one of my critics (I think absolutely
not one) has noticed the distinction I have tried
and intended to draw between Evolut ion
and the
fundamental powers of Life growth, assimilation,
reproduction, heredity
But this [i.e.
evolution] , as Darwin, Weismann, Kerner, Lloyd
Morgan, and even Huxley have seen, has nothing to
do with the basic mysteries of life. [237]

—

.

.

.

Wallace was, of course, underestimating the progress
to be made in cellular biology and genetics, and failed to

appreciate the fact that science must often operate as
270

if

.

it will

be able to locate the
machinery for events it

cannot explain despite lack of
success or even direction at
any particular time.
Whereas Darwin was attempting to
"materialize" the spiritual, Wallace
could be said to

"spiritualize the material."

Even late in his life,

Wallace could point to the failure of
biology to account
for cellular processes.
Thus Wallace scored a direct hit,
even if to no avail, in attacking Max
Verworn, 238 author of
- eneral Physiology, because Verworn could not produce
any
explanation of how hereditary information was
passed from
cel

1

to cel

1
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Although Wallace was attacked with what Darwin,
Huxley
and others saw as adequate refutations, an
underlying

discomfort and dissatisfaction with their own arguments
plagued Wallace's critics. 240

But after the dawn of the

new century Mr. Thiselton-Dyer sets Wallace straight on Feb
12,

1911, by telling him that science does not admit

a

"directive power."
One interesting aspect of Wallace's attempts to

motivate emergence was that he never appeals to concepts
current in the universities, such as Idealist critiques of

radical-materialism. Of course in this he parallels Darwin
and most of the British biologists, who also ignored

developments in academic spheres relating to issues in
biology and created their theories on their own terms.
Worse yet, Wallace argued, a la Leibniz, or Voltaire's
Pangloss, that this is the best of all possible worlds
271

(1889). 241

He even reversed his
earlier agnostic/atheistic

opinions and argued for

a

"dual purpose" in nature.

He

claimed that flowers, for instance,
are given color by
Spirit in order both to lure insects
and to please
242
humans.
Another implausible passage argued
that
carnivores have such efficient teeth because
they spare
their victims pain that way. 243
1913, at the very end

m

of his

life, he summarizes his development
in

a

letter to

James Marchant:
The completely materialistic mind of my
youth
early manhood has been slowly moulded into the and
socialistic, spiritualistic, and theistic mind
I
now exhibit a mind which is, as my scientific
friends think, so weak and credulous in its
declining years, as to believe that fruit and
flowers, domestic animals, glorious birds and
insects, wool, cotton, sugar and rubber, metals
and gems, were all foreseen and foreordained for
the education and enjoyment of man.
The whole
cumulative argument of my 'World of Life' is that
in its every detail it calls for the agency of a
mind ... enormous ly above and beyond any human
mind ... whet her this Unknown Reality is a single
Being and acts everywhere in the universe as
direct creator, organizer, and director of every
minutest motion... or through 'infinite grades of
beings,' as I suggest, comes to much the same
thing.
Mine seems a more clear and intelligible
supposition. .and it is the teaching of the
Bible, of Swedenborg, and of Milton. [244]
.

He says his solution to the imponderable question of "why

this world is," is that it is

...for the development of life culminating in
man; secondly, as a vast schoolhouse for the
higher education of the human race in preparation
for the enduring spiritual life to which it is

destined.

[245]

He reminds us that Edgar Allen Poe put forward the same

view 2 4

.

in Farewe 1

1

to Earth

.
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Despite the literary

.

:

support for such

a

view, the professional
biologists were

not tempted by this option.

2.

Human qualities

The most important emergentist
aspect to Wallace's

program concerned the unique status of humans.
latest

f orm

when

"

a

In its

(1913), he argued that Natural Selection
ended

spiritual influx" allowed the acquisition of

speech
The fundamental diversities we find seem
to
accord better with the conception that when, as a
mere animal, his material organism had reached
the required degree of perfection, there occurred
the spiritual influx which alone enabled him to
begin that course of intellectual and moral
development, and that marvelous power over the
forces of Nature, in which speech and writing,
followed by printing, have been such important
factors. [247]

This was not

a

new idea for him, for he hinted at it in

his 1870 Contrib u tions to the Theory of Natural Selection
Some,

such as Darwin and T.H. Huxley, were appalled.

others, for example Mivart

(

Genesis of the Species

,

.

But
1871)

agreed with the conclusion of "man's" special status, even
if they did not accept spiritual

reviewed Mivart

's

"influxes."

Huxley

and Wallace's objection to the continuity

thesis and attacked both.

His assault was typically

sharp-tongued
Mr. Wallace thinks it necessary to call in an
intelligent agent a sort of supernatural Sir

—
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—

John Sebright to produce the animal
frame of
man; while Mr. Mivart requires no
Divine essence
till he comes to man's soul. [248]
The reference to the animal frame
concerns Wallace's

various arguments that the hand, hairlessness
and color
were not deducible from the process of Natural
Selection.

Despite Huxley's ridicule, Darwin found these
objections

difficult to repel. 249
While Huxley held nothing but contempt for Wallace's
"spiritual influx," he responded tactfully:
The several publications of Mr. Wallace and Mr.
Mivart contain discussions of some of Mr.
Darwin's views, which are worthy of particular
attention, not only on account of the
acknowledged scientific competence of these
writers, but because they exhibit an attention to
those philosophical questions which underlie all
physical science, which is rare as it is
needful. [250]

Huxley was at this point, however, not ruling out emergence.
There is every reason to believe that
consciousness is a function of nervous matter,
when that nervous matter has attained a certain
degree of organizat ion
As I have ventured to
state .. .elsewhere
"our thoughts are the
expression of molecular changes in that matter of
life which is the source of our other vital
phenomena." [251]
.

.

.

,

Wallace objected, writing that without

a

theory and

evidence of how organization produces new qualities, Huxley
was, in effect, begging the question.

Huxley thought that

Wallace misunderstood the issue, and that no such theory or

evidence was needed.
With all respect for Mr. Wallace, it appears to
me that his remarks are entirely beside the
I
question.
really know nothing whatever, and
hope
never
to know anything, of the steps by
274

which the passage from molecular
movement to
a
C ° nSC
USneSS iS effe cted... Whether we
i? to express
shall ever be able
consciousness in
Und
1S n '° re than 1 wil1 ventur e
to°say°

L n%°L

^

'

^252^

In order to render Wallace's
view intelligible one

might conceptualize "spiritual influx"
not in terms of a
deity pouring spiritual juice into
humans, as it were, but
rather as a metaphor or heuristic device for
coming to
grips with the sudden appearance of qualities
which cannot
be derived from previous levels of organization.

The

appeal to religious concepts was especially
problematic due
to the antipathy it generated. Whereas Wallace
offers an

explanation, be it of whatever value, Darwin denies the

existence of discontinuity but finds ruptures

a

plenty.

The problem of emergent qualities has remained

intractable.

A

difficulty of similar structure has

attached itself to contemporary evolutionary biology.
Gould and Eldridge have attacked the idea that speciation
is a slow process by suggesting that major changes may

occur in an essentially quick and discontinuous fashion.
In their theory of

"punctuated equilibria" organisms

speciate rapidly and then maintain lengthy periods of
stabi 1 ity--during which time the Darwinian descent with

modification fine-tunes the new organism.
a

minor genetic change produces

a

The idea is that

cascade of effects which

result in major morphological discontinuity with previous
forms, thus creating

a

new organism (new species) which
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.

then is modified only incrementally
by evolution in the
traditional Darwinian manner.

Punctuated equilibria flies in the face
of traditional
ideas about environmental uniformity
(i.e. the down-playing
of catastrophic events), slow change
and the
step by step

approach to alterations in physiology.

However it neatly

explains the incoherent fossil record, as
"transitional"

organisms exist only momentarily, if at all.

Similarly,

suggestions have been made in other fields, such
as
linguistics, that language formation emerges suddenly
and

discont inuously from earlier forms.

Language

Spec i es

&

ideas, that

a

(1990)

Derek Bickerton, in

argues, in an echo of Huxley's

minor genetic change is responsible for the

sudden appearance of language abi lities
Thus it would be

a

mistake to view the Darwin/Wallace

debate over emergent qualities as one of science versus

pseudo-science.
it

The reason this must be stressed is that

is all too easy to think of Darwin as a precursor of

contemporary biology and Wallace as

a

throw-back to

theistic "prescience" by ignoring the particulars of each
theory which make both Darwinian and Wallacistic evolution
very unlike contemporary theories of change.

It

is

imperative that the reader keep in mind that Wallace was
not alone in his point of view, for

a

...considerable number of renowned scientists
were favorably disposed toward such psychical
phenomena as telepathy, clairvoyance,
precognition, and spirit photography ... during the
second half of the nineteenth century. [254]
276

In any case Wallace's
appeal to the sudden emergence

of language had the advantage
in that it removed the need
for a search for "transitional"
humans, and thus limited

the motivation to see "savages"
as links to the animal
kingdom. This helped to deprive
racists of evolutionary

fodder for their eugenic arguments.
...we should not expect to find any
living
examples of the unspiritualized man,
since
assumption is that the whole race received the
the
influx which started them on their
course of
purely human development within a
strictly
limited period, perhaps of a very few
generations, or even one generation. [255]

This argument must be seen in the context
of traditional

appeals to the divine nature of all men
for countering

slavery and colonialism. The strongest evidence
lay in
human linguistic ability:
If this were not so we should expect to
find some
isolated groups of speechless man
on the
contrary, the lowest of existing races are found
to possess languages which are often of extreme
complexity in grammatical structure and in no way
suggestive of the primitive man-animal of which
they are supposed to be surviving relics.
So
long as we got our knowledge respecting them from
low class Europeans who captured them for slaves
or shot them down as wild beasts, we could not
possibly acquire any real knowledge of them as
human beings... we have... ample evidence ... that
they possess human qualities of the same kind as
our own. [256]

Oddly enough, Huxley agreed:
and the man who risks his life by even a short
visit to the malarious shores of those regions
may well be excused if he shrinks from facing the
dangers of the interior; if he contents himself
with stimulating the industry of the better
seasoned natives and collecting the more or less
mythical reports and traditions with they are
too ready to supply him.
277

In such a manner most of
the earlier
accounts of the habits of the man-like
Apes
originated... [257]

Wallace throws the burden of providing
evidence back
onto those who would claim savages
are the missing
link.

His extensive travels gave him great
authority in this

matter— he had provided ample evidence that even
the lowest
of the low— the aborigine of Australia,
had a complex
language far exceeding the expectations and
lore of those
who never visited the continent or relied
on the accounts
of those who had spent but little time living
amongst the

indigenous people of that continent.

Additionally, these passages strike at the evidence
provided by those who use an assumption of superiority
to
prove the wider claim that their higher status rests on

scientific fact.
a

Even though Darwin ends the Descent with

depiction of inarticulate brutes as the ancestors of

"man," such beasts are chimeras.

Unlike any other creature humans modify the

environment in unnatural ways, he thinks:
But so soon as man appeared upon the earth, even
in the earliest periods at which we have any
proofs of his existence, or in the lowest state
of barbarism in which we are now able to study
him, we find him able to use and act upon the
forces of Nature, and to modify his environment,
both inorganic and organic, in ways which formed
a completely new departure in the entire organic
world. [258]
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The key to this debate is of
course

racist utilization of "savages

a

scientific and

as cusp creatures.

Darwin

writes that:
• .
turning f rom animals to man, it is
shown that
in the lowes t savages many of these
faculties
are
very little advanced from the
condition in which
they appear in the higher animals...
[259]
.

But Wallace would have little to
do with this.

Although he allows some selective force for
Natives, for
the most part he sees cultural factors
disrupting
the

natural state of affairs.

Wallace:

The less fit

[humans] are therefore not
eliminated as among all other anima Is
f or the
first time... the great law of natural selection
by the survival only of "the fittest" to some
extent neutral ized ... But this is only the first
and least important of the effects... [260]
.

.

.

He writes:

...one in five, one in ten, often only one in
a thousand [261]

hundred or even one in

survive in the short run (reach maturity)

.

a

In the case of

humans, however, overall mortality rarely met these levels;

Wallace put mortality around fifty percent for those up to
age twenty. 262

Furthermore the idea that even the "savage"

demonstrates advanced linguistic abilities was based on his
earlier contact with Natives and fit well with his earlier

published views.

This can even be said of the Australian

bush people:
Indeed the comparative perfection of their
speech, standing in such striking contrast to
their degraded state, has occasioned some
surprise. [263]
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Wallace saw such evidenrp
a n
laence all
around him: "But the
phenomenon is far fro, rare
... (witness the, rich
Hottentot
declension..." 64 He attacks
those whQ through ignorance
claim that Natives are
inarticulate by quoting B.
Smythe,
who was well aware of
the complexity of Native
tongues:
The illusion of those who
believe that the
language of savages is simple
would be rudely
addressed themselves
In
examination' of any of the
examination
dialects of Australia
lY lnflected
complex, and many of'
the^sentenceq are s ° c °n s tructed
as to make
translation ?impossible.
265

™

'

[

]

Still another emergent quality
of human behavior is
the desire to create art.
Wallace uses this point to show
that there is no "missing
link," as even savages make
art. 266

curious that a rudimenta 1 love
of art
should co exist with such a very
low state of
civilization. The people of Dorey
carvers and painters .. .of ten of veryare great
tasteful
We n0t alread y k now that such
taste
Con, P atible with ^ter
barbarism,
we
could hardly believe that the same
people are, in
other matters, entirely wanting in all
sense of
order, comfort, or decency. Yet such
is the case.

^

^ ^

He continues

2
.

^

f these people are not
savages, where shall we
find any? Yet they have all a decided
love for
the fine arts, and spend their leisure
time in
executing works whose good taste and elegance
would often be admired in our schools of
design!

Such admiration would have to wait until the
next century.

Wallace concludes: 2 ^®
.certain physical modifications and mental
faculties in man could not have been acquired
through the preservation of useful variations,
because there is some direct evidence to show
that they were not and are not useful in the
..
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ordinary sense, or, as Professor
Lloyd
puts it, not of "life-preserving Morgan
value"...
Furthermore he claimed that history
showed that all
peoples have had relatively similar
capacities for
intellectual and moral development.
This means, according
to Wallace, that there was a
radical break and then
relative stability of physical endowment.
we

The long course of human history
leads us
conclusion that this higher nature of man the the
arose
at some far distant epoch, and
through it has
developed in various directions, does not
seem
yet to have elevated the whole race much
above
its earliest condition, at the time
when, by the
influx of some portion of the spirit of the
Deity, man became "a living soul."
[269]

Huxley made similar arguments at times for language
and art.
I
said almost all," for a reason.
Among the
many distinctions which have been drawn between
the lower creatures and ourselves, there is one
which is hardly ever insisted on ["I think that
my friend, Professor Allman, was the first to
draw attention to it." in footnote to text], but
which may be very fitly be spoken of in a place
so largely devoted to Art as that in which we are
assembled [South Kensington Museum].
It is this,
that while, among various kinds of animals, it
is possible to discover traces of all the other
faculties of man... yet that particular form of
mimicry which shows itself in the imitation of
form, either by modelling or by drawing, is not
to be met with. [270]

As we saw earlier, Huxley also plugs for rational speech as
a

defining characteristic of "man."

He makes the human

ability of language acquisition universal: even savages can
learn 2 71 any language, thus separating humans from all

other animals absolutely.

Wallace was not alone in the

circle of biologists in his argument for
281

a

unique status

for humans, and the linkage
to the issue of racial worth
was also made by others-surprisingly
enough, by Huxley

himself, who at other places had
harsh things to say of the
"lower" races.
...it has been my fate to know many
lands
climates and to be familiar, by personal and
experience, with almost every form of
from the uncivilized savage of Papua society,
and
Austraira and the civilized savages of the
slums
and dens of the poverty-stricken
parts of great
cities, to those who perhaps, are
occasionally
the somewhat over-civilized members
of our
upper ten thousand.
And I have never found, in
any of these conditions of life, a deficiency
something that was attractive. Savagery has of
its
pleasures, I assure you, as well as
civilization
[272]
,

Stephen Jay Gould points out that the unintended
(to
use

a

psychologized form of argument) results of selection

provide

a

cornucopia of opportunity for the organism:

—

A potentially minor genetic change
a rise of
androgen level in this case [which produces a
male-like genetalia in the female Hyena]
entails
a host of complex, nonadaptive consequences.
The
primary flexibility of evolution may arise from
nonadaptive by-products that occasionally permit
organisms to strike out in new and unpredictable
directions. [273]

—

Indeed,

if this

"mechanism" were not available, things

would be far less flexible, and evolution would have

a

much

harder time of it:
What "play" would evolution have if each
structure were built for a restricted purpose and
could be used for nothing else? How could humans
learn to write if our brain had evolved for
hunting, social cohesion, or whatever, and could
not transcend the adaptive boundaries of its
original purpose? [274]
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s

Thus Darwin's work contains
the germ of emergence

"transcendence

"
,

even if he cannot justify such

a

or

leap with

his metaphysics.

Another factor in human activity
not present in
animals is lack of uniformity. Whereas
humans like
novelty and present a range of interests
and pursuits,
anima 1
tend to perform things by rote,
as it were:

Every wren makes

a fairly good nest like its
.but in those specially developed
faculties of civilized man... the case is
very
difforent.
They exist only in a small proportion
of individuals, while the difference
of capacity
between these favored individuals and the averaqe
of mankind is enormous. [275]

fel lows

..

Wallace is free to bring almost any aspect of
culture
into this fray.

In the cases of metaphysics, humor, and

wit, there are few obvious arguments for "utility."
he points out,
a

in terms of wit,

Also,

the faculty to create

good line is quite unusual:
...the majority [of people] being, as is well
known, totally unable to say a witty thing or
make a pun even to save their lives. [276]

I

guess this would give humorists special survival

advantages, even if they rarely got the chance to use them.

Wallace concludes:
...the f acts ... compel us to recognize some
origin .. .whol ly distinct from that which has
served to account for the animal characteristics
--whether bodily or mental of man. [277]

—

283

—

Spiritualism,

Alluding in
agency,

or

heterodox 278

p hrenology

a

and craniometries

general way to "Spirit," "unseen

grades of beings," Wallace presents

a

but popular position, even if most
scientists

debunked the new movement.

At various times he offers

vague references to an Aristotelian-like
prime mover,
angels, and proof through seances.

Wallace attempted to

convince his friends to join him in this pursuit.
In the two years 1867-1868 Wallace tried
to
interest Huxley, W.B. Carpenter, Tyndall, and
G.H. Lewes in psychical phenomena but failed.
Though he received encouragement from other
scientist friends (H. Bates, E.B. Tylor, A. De

Motgan, and R. Chambers) and willingly gave
advice to interested scientists when they
approached him (St. G. Mivart, and a decade
Ister, G.J. Romanes)
Wallace abandoned the role
of missionary and the hope of introducing his
spiritualist evidence into his scientific
discussions of the origin of man. [279]
,

He also worked on Darwin,

as we shall see.

Darwin's

cousin, Francis Galton was unfavorably disposed towards the
new enterprise, calling it "rubbish," although he "was

convinced the affair [was] no matter of vulgar legerdemain
and

[believed]

it well worth going

into..." 288

Despite their reluctance, Darwin, Huxley and others

eventually attended seances.

Typical to form, Darwin left

his seance before things started to happen,
(his cousin), Lewes,

keep vigil.

leaving Francis

and George Eliot along with others to

Wallace's views on Spiritualism upset several

of his colleagues immensely.
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Although sessions of spirit

manifestation with Miss Florrie Cook
were witnessed by both
Wallace and Sir William Crookes, a
prestigious scientist
and president of the Royal Society,
the vast majority of
scientists remained skeptical.
While Wallace gave undue credulity
to the
performances, and it may be true that Crookes
was

blackmailed into endorsing the events 281
his insistence
that the spiritual life of humans be
investigated
,

scientifically demonstrated his disenchantment
with
Darwin's materialism.

An analysis of Spiritualism in terms

of feminism and psychoanalytic theory provides
reasons to

finesse the easy argument that Wallace and others
were
"duped," even if that is what "actually" happened.

Older scholarship, such as that of Kottler's

article

,

I

sis

focuses upon the the fraudulent nature of the

enterprise, although even Kottler argues that Wallace had
good scientific motivations for his point of view.

Newer work takes another tack.

Concentrating on the

social and political context of Spiritualism, Ann Braude
and Alex Owen simultaneously

back to back) arrive at

Spiritualism in terms of

(their books come out almost

feminist interpretation of

a

a

complex movement born of

unstable subjectivities: Victorian females of upper-working
and middle class.

Thus attention to proof of spirits'

existence may be considered only

a

small facet of the

larger project of understanding Spiritualism, and

a

restricted focus upon this represents by implication the
285

narrow interests of males,
then and now, at maintaining
hegemony.
In this context Wallace's
fervent belief in
mediumship reflect feminist
credentials and his anomalous
stance within male-dominated
Victorian science.
During this time many people in
England, the Continent
and the United States were
experimenting with "new"

Phenomenon that challenged traditional
secular and
religious ideas and as well as newly
developing scientific
views on human nature.
The origins of Victorian

Spiritualism are traced to Friedrich Mesmer 282
(17337-1815;
birth date uncertain). Mesmerism, or
"animal magnetism,"
sought to explain the phenomenon of what would
later be

called hypnosis through appeal to

a

transfer of "fluid" or

energy from the hypnotist to patient.

Popular with artists and literati of London in the
1840's, the new science was taken up by such people as the

distinguished physician" Dr. John El liotson--the doctor of
Charles Dickens and other well known writers. 282
impending demise at the middle of the century

Despite

— with

the

invention of ether and chloroform. Mesmerism was to have

long-reaching legacy.

In addition to paving the way for

Spiritualism, through Charcot mesmerism reached Freud and
played

a

crucial role in development of psychoanalysis.

Introduced to Mesmerism by Spencer Hall in 1844,

Wallace and his brother Herbert
in Brazil)

(who died of yellow fever

tested the technique within

a

unique

environment; the rain forests of the Amazon.
286

Much later,

a

while in the Pacific, he
witnessed "trance mediums" of the
Sarawaks— who piqued his interest in
this topic 28
But it
was not until 1865 2 85 (a key
date in the development Qf
Idealism in England, with the
publication of J.H.
.

Stirling's The

S ecret

of Hegej.)

interested in Spiritualism to
became

a

that Wallace began to get

larger extent.

The topic

significant part of his correspondence, 286

a

He

joined groups interested in exploring
psychic events and
tried to interest his scientific friends
in the matter. 287
He remained committed to the cause
throughout his

life.

When in the United States (1886-7), 288 he
had many
more people to talk to on this topic,
as interest
ran

higher there. 289

Crookes

a

Back in London Sir W. Huggins, like

president of the Royal Society, shared this

enthusiasm. 298

Although many scientists resisted the

enterprise, Wallace brought the topic up with his friends.
He even gave Darwin a try.
I

can quite comprehend your feelings with regard

to my "unscientific" opinions as to Man, because
a few years back I should myself have looked at
them as equally wild and uncalled for... My
opinions on the subject have been modified solely
by the consideration of a series of remarkable
phenomena, physical and mental, which I have now
had every opportunity of fully testing, and which
demonstrate the existence of forces and
influences not yet recognized by science. This
will, I know, seem to you like some mental
hallucination, but as I can assure you from
personal communication with them, that Robert
Chambers, Dr. Norris of Birmingham, the well
known physiologist, and C.F. Varley, the well
known electrician, who have all investigated the
subject for years, agree with me both as to the
facts and as to the main inferences to be drawn
from them, I am in hopes that you will suspend

287

,

ment f ° r 3 time tin we
exhibit some
corrohnr^
corroborative
symptoms of insanity.
291
A more logical choice
(even if
[

]

absurd— as will

be

discussed below in terms of medical
opposition to
Spiritualism) for sharing this topic

lay with T.H. Huxley.

Huxley at least espoused an emergentist
conception
ethics and physiology (vitalism) 292
He attempted
display a tolerant response to Wallace's
interest,
him not to worry so much about what
more skeptical
of their circle might think,

of
to

telling

members

although his lack of

enthusiasm was evident in this diplomatic
response.
am neither shocked nor disposed to issue
a
Commission of lunacy against you. It may be all
true, for anything I know to the contrary,
but
really I cannot get up any interest in the
subject... [293]
I

This comment about lunacy touched upon the
fact that up
until 1882

Spiritualists were in real danger of being

involuntarily incarcerated for merely admitting to
Spiritualist beliefs.

He was in no real danger, being

male, but Huxley's joke must have stung

a

little even

though Wallace was the one to bring it up first.

Actually, his solicitation of Darwin and Huxley was

doomed from the start

— only

his naive faith in friendship

with these two men coupled to his enthusiasm could have
enabled him to broach the topic. In addition to an

emergentist metaphysics anathema to Darwin, and
the soul that would make both Huxley

a

(the coiner of the

phrase "agnostic") and Darwin (an atheist) cringe.

288

view of

Spiritualism was th e social

,

political and professional foe

of the likes of Darwin and to

a

lesser extent, Huxley.

For starters, Darwin and Huxley
were trained as

allopathic physicians.

Far from focusing on "spirit

manifestations," "rappings," or the
"planchette"
board)

(Ouija

which make Spiritualism appear so
outrageous within
the scientific context, the
doctrine's central tenets
revolved around medical and feminist
concerns.
The
,

first

item concerns us here.

Spiritualist medicine promoted vegetarianism,
loose
clothing for women (this was a time of corsets,

stays and

laces)

,

homeopathy, the water cure, and non-invasive

treatment of disease, all of which offended allopathic
physicians.

Not the least of physicians' worries

concerned loss of their monopoly.

Since the metaphysics of

Spiritualism was essentially democratic and based upon the
idea that the body was inherently self-healing, the

doctors' very premises for existence:

upon expertise,

a

a

hierarchy based

necessity of invasive techniques

(leaches, surgery, opiates and purges)

,

and the naturally

disease-prone female constitution came into question.
Given the state of Victorian medicine allopathic medicine
was not obviously more effective than these alternative

measures.

Worse yet. Spiritualists promoted the idea that

women were inherently more suited to give medical treatment
than men--and to add insult to injury this view was
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a

logical extension of the Drpvsion*prevalent ideology promulgated by
men 29 6
.

UndoubtrecJly democratic healing,

the alternative
ltion, and its practitioners
represented a
0rthodo * med i=ine. Alternative methods
relied
led on principles which allopathy
could not
a ford to recognize and
embraced a heterodox
practice which was anathema to the league
of
professional gentlemen. [297]
a

The threat was met by lobbying for
tighter legal

restrictions on the practice of medicine—
and new laws were
passed in 1878 to amend the 1858 law giving
allopathic
medicine

a

monopoly. 298

Furthermore, in efforts to

undercut the claim that women were constitutionally
suited
for doctoring because of "natural" nurturing
powers,
doctors further developed

a

competing view of women as

congenitally weak and prone to disease:
Male doctors attacked women in general during
this period as unfit to practice medicine, or any
other profession, because of an anatomical
proclivity to hyster ia ... Doctor s who viewed the
female organization as inherently pathological
saw mediums, who exemplified so many female
qualities, as prime examples of pathology. Not
coincidentally, mediums also constituted a highly
visible and vocal case of the assertion of the
rights and the wisdom of women practicing healing
and using heterodox methods
[299]
This was the rub: coming from activism within the

Anti-Corn Law League, anti-slavery movement,

ancj

feminism, women began to assert themselves and improve

their lot.

Much needed to be done.

For unmarried middle

class women there were no significant careers available

except that of wife; before 1882 married women could not
own property and had no legal status
290

— they

could not

execute legal documents, have debts nor could
they sue or
be sued.

husband

They had no right to refuse or resist their
s

sexual advances, and could be imprisoned under

the Lunacy laws without any recourse whatsoever

— except

an

appeal to their husband, which was useless as he was

usually the one to sign the documents for imprisonment.
...prior to the... 1882 Married Women's Property
Act, married women were effectively placed in the
same category as criminals, lunatics, and minors
--they were held to be legally incompetent and
irresponsible.
This meant that a woman who
wished to fight or contest her incarceration in
an asylum would be unable to do so without her
husband's active support, and she was at an
obvious disadvantage if it was her husband who
had been instrumental in the committal. [301]

Spiritualist women attempted

weakness as

a

springboard to power.

a

strategy of using

Defined by Victorian

mores as naturally nurturing, they claimed medicine as

their logical calling.

Thought to be more spiritual than

men, they developed an ability to let the spiritual world

speak through them--all the while asserting that as mediums
they could not be held responsible for what they said

during trance.

In this way patriarchal ideology enabled

them to assume more power within the family, forge careers

outside the home, and indulge unconscious desires or vent
frustrations through automatic writing, seances, and spirit

manifestations. 202
The reaction of male doctors to female assertiveness
was to categorize Spiritualism, and assertiveness itself,
as disease.

Whether arguing that women would become
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—
diseased if they attempted education,
or that independent
thought was a symptom of sexual dysfunction,
the medical
community was united in the view that any
woman with strong
views was dangerous, and should be sent to
the asylum.

Professor R. Frederick Marvin put it bluntly:
Utromania frequently results in mediomania
The
angle at which the womb is suspended frequently
settles the whole question of sanity or insanity.
the organ a little forward
introvert it,
and immediately the patient forsakes her home,
embraces some strong ultraism Mormonism,
Mesmerism, Fourierism, Socialism, oftener
Spiritualism.
She becomes possessed by the idea
that she has some startling mission in the world.
She forsakes her home, her children, her duty, to
mount the rostrum and proclaim the peculiar
virtues of free-love, elective affinity, or the
reincarnation of souls. [303]
.

.

.

—

—

Thus any woman with political views was mentally deranged

due to a physical problem with her uterus.
"free love" deserves explanation.

Criticism of

As part of the feminist

platform, free love was taken by its supporters to mean
that divorce should be allowed if

a

woman desired it,

a

married woman should have the right to refuse sex with her
husband and to control the timing of births, and that

marriage and sexual relations should be premised on

a

mutually loving relationship between man and woman.

To

critics, free love meant immoral indulgence of the sexual

appetite, adultery and

a

subverting of man's God-given

right to control weak females. 304

Doctors had more than just the threat of socialism on
their minds, for Spiritualists also resisted vaccination
as did Wallace,

for its anti-democratic aspects.
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The

vaccination laws of 1853-71 coerced
people to comply by
threat of fines.
This particularly bothered the
pir i tua 1 is t s

,

as it was an invasive procedure
using

substances foreign to the human body,
was of disputed
efficacy and spent huge amounts of
capital which went into
the pockets of allopathic doctors
and those of their
cohorts--the pharmacists 306
.

Needless to say, as doctors, Huxley and
Darwin were
unlikely to be impressed with Wallace's
views on these
matters.

Spiritualist emphasis on diet, vegetarianism
and
antivivisection, as aspects of an ethics of
non-domination,
did not suit the doctors either: they
force fed

incarcerated women the meat they refused through their
noses. 306

But Wallace fought for the new ideas, even

within the unfriendly community of male scientists.
In 1876, Alfred Russel Wallace's defense of
Spiritualism from the chair of the
Anthropological Section of the British
Association made it an issue in the transatlantic
scientific community. [307]

He had witnessed what he thought was more than enough

physical evidence necessary to convince anyone who was not

overly biased against the powers of female mediums:
...both Florence Cook and Mrs Guppy claimed to
have had experiences of levitation and
transportation by spirit hands, and Mrs Guppy was
a demon with her spirit 'apports'.
When Dr
Alfred Russel Wallace requested a sunflower at
one seance a six-foot specimen complete with
clods of earth fell at his feet. [308]

Although the fraudulent nature of this event and the

manifestations of spirits is clear to most everyone today
293

and was probably self-evident
to many scientists of his
time, it would be a mistake to
dismiss Spiritualism as

simply ridiculous.
First

,

it must be

understood that excesses were driven

by the market place and restricted
career possibilities for
women.
Before market forces intervened, the
progression

from mediumship based on auditory and
visual hallucinations
to rapping and the planchette was
natural enough.

'Possession" by spirits of the dear departed also
has ready
explanations in psychological principles not too
difficult
to apply

especially when one takes into account that women

of the time were primary caretakers of
the sick and watched

many of their children die in their early years even
if
they survived birth.

Spiritual gifts were visited upon working and
middle-class girls and women alike.
Interestingly, cross cultural studies have
indicated that major factors in determining the
recipients of spirit possession are low status
and its accompanying powerlessness, combined with
a sense of personal deprivation
the lack of any
meaningful satisfaction or fulfillment.
309

—

[

]

Add to these elements the Victorian view that women

were more spiritual than men, and that

a

medium who

"manifested" objects or the dead could create

a

career

outside the home--al lowing access to money, fame and the

attentions of wealthy men, and an irresistible logic is
formed.

Each medium strove to out-perform the next.
The pressures on mediums were enormous.
In order
to retain a profitable or influential following
it was essential to keep up a high standard of
impressive manifestations, and this involved risk
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and innovation,
At the same time
plenty of critic s eager to expose there were
a medium as
fraud... [310]
Not surprisingly

,

a

as women’s lot changed towards
the end of

the century--what with the new
laws and the creation of

career opportunities in teaching
and nursing, and as the
theater became more spectacular and thus
a better

competitor, and scandals erupted time
and time again within
Spiritualist camps, mediumship tended to wane as
a form of
popular public entertainment 311
Using

a

mix of Foucault, feminism and Lacan, Alex
Owen

demonstrates why Spiritualism cannot be dismissed as
merely
a

fraud.

From Foucault, Owen constructs the view that

women used the position of the medium to exploit
conflicted

Victorian gender ideology in order to out-maneuver
patriarchy for power. 312

Thus the medium exploited the

view of women as more spiritual, more nurturing and weakwilled to its logical conclusions

— and

in so doing turned

the gender role on its head, transforming debits into

credits.

"Passivity became, in the spiritualist vocabulary,

synonymous with power." 313
The problem inherent in the contradictory schema of

Victorian femininity was that although

a

passive medium

could speak with the authority of the another world, she

could not ultimately claim the new voice as her own.
Female passivity, the leit-motif of powerful
mediumship, also positioned women as individuals
without social power. [314]
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From feminism

,

Owen takes the idea that
Spiritualism was

motivated from the democratic principle
of equality— which
fostered the idea of self-determination
and therefore
questioned male-dominated hierarchy—and
hence was a step
in the struggle over gender
construction.

Lacan
concepts

,

m

according to Owen, provides psychoanalytic
the form of desire and the symbolic
order,

which enable us to appreciate the immense
power of

Spiritualism to subvert the female gender role
and
fascinate men.

Given the fragility of subjectivity, the

license of mediumship creates

a

social situation in which

the desire of both males and females is signified
through

fantasy
For the female medium, giving up her normal and

conscious state gave
and titillated men
it this way

— were

a

new freedom and power which shocked

who although they could not articulate
struck by

a

fascination with an "other"

who was their equal or even superior and yet, contra the

possible,

a

woman:

When Cora Tappan mounted a public platform, a
great hush fell over her audience. Respectable
Victorians familiar with the religious diatribe,
and with male propounders of The Word; they were
less familiar with the spectacle of lovely women
taking the stage in order to 'speak spirit'. As
Mrs Tappan discoursed on the meaning of Easter or
the need for greater spiritual harmony in the
world, her listeners underwent an emotional
response that perhaps bore little relation to
what she actually said.
In fact, inspirational
discourses were rarely innovative and often
obscure, rambling and repetitive.
It was a
woman's presence, a combination of the theatrical
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and spiritual, which held the
audience rapt for
hours at a time.
316
[

]

Furthermore, this dissociation of
personalities within the
possessed speaker" allowed the medium to
say things that
would not be tolerated from her ordinarily:
Cora Tappan could move without apparent
contradiction from the spiritual to the social,
linking an attack on the materialist ethic
to an
outright condemnation of the London slums.
As a
colleague of the American feminist, Susan B.
Anthony, she also spoke of spiritualism as
an
essential component in the liberation and
fulfillment of women.
317
[

]

As Owen puts it:

...spirit and sitters were involved in a complex
exchange which can be understood as devolving,
as in the original fantasies, on positions
of
desire: active or passive, feminine or masculine,
mother or son, father or daughter'. As in day
dreams and fantasies, these positions were
interchangeable and could involve endless
computations on a particular theme or scene.
Possession and the seance experience, therefore,
bore witness not to the emergence of particular
sexual drives or needs as in a binary model of
sexual difference, but erratic, eccentric, even
scandalous' nature of desire--and its enactment.
The materialization seance, like a theatrical or
fantasied scene, established the conventions
which made possible the staging of desire.
318
[

Furthermore, since the players were engaged on

]

a

subconscious level with intricacies of the social

construction of sexual roles, their fascination with or
belief in the project of Spiritualism is not best

understood in terms of fraud and gullability:
It was not a matter of being deliberately duped,
hoodwinked, tricked, or gulled, although that
sometimes came into it. Nor was it the case of
mass hallucination or "epidemic Delusion '... If
medium and sitters were involved in a complex
interchange of desire, the spirits can be seen as
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[319]

In this context

,

the hostility of allopathic doctors and

scientists to their foe must be understood as
over deter mined

In addition to professional jealousy,
one

must add male fear of assertive women.

Furthermore,

charges of "unscientific claims" must be weighed
against
the bizarre nature of Victorian science: Newton's
ether and

Darwin's atomic psychology represent clear examples
of

absolutely unverifiable and in contemporary terms:
imaginary, entities.

In this

light, claims for spiritual

fluid do not seem so far-fetched if one grants

a

wider

perspective
Wallace's adherence to Spiritualism must also be

understood in terms of his dedication to women's rights.
Ann Braude emphasizes the need to take Spiritualism's

social and political impact seriously:

Historians have judged nineteenth-century
reformers harshly for bowing to expediency in
order to gain implementation of the measure they
proposed.
The woman's suffrage movement,
especially, has been criticized for making the
ideological concessions necessary to create the
broad coalition that led to its eventual victory.
In contrast. Spiritualists' staunch refusal to
compromise their convictions for any reason won
them the title "fanatic" both from their
contemporaries and from twentieth-century
authors.
To dismiss Spiritualists as a "lunatic
fringe" is to ignore the significant way in which
their faith reflected the values of Victorian
298

]

V

EVery practice or i^a developed
within
Spiritualism was an extreme idea already
afloat
in American culture.
Ever uncompromising,
Spiritualists asked other Americans to make
consistent application of their beliefs
about the
continuity of the personality after death,
the
natural piety of women, the reunion of
families
in heaven, the sacrality of the marriage
bond,
and the autonomy of the individual
conscience.
By the end of the century, the success
of the
moderate versions of the Spiritualist program
would be evident in the abolition of slavery,
the
triumph of liberal theology, drastically
transformed attitudes toward death and mourning,
the "feminization of American religion,"
and the
emergence of a popular movement for women's
rights.
By aggressively asserting radical
positions on the spectrum of contemporary
cultural trends, Spiritualism dislodged the
center of public opinion from traditional views
and contributed to the success of religious and
social liberalism. [320]

Although aimed at the history of the U.S., Braude's

comments apply to the situation in England.

complimentary poles of Spiritualism,

a

Given two

symbolic order of

discourse, and the social/political struggle, the need of

male-dominated sciences to debunk and destroy becomes clear
and not surprisingly is itself

a

focus of Owen's work:

Whether male psychical researchers were motivated
by anything more than enjoyment of a pretty
girl's company and an interest in psychical
phenomena is open to question. .Psychical
research (as opposed to mediumship) was a male
enterprise; the investigators were on the whole
considerably older than the subjects of their
experiments, and came from a different social
class.
Arthur Balfour, for example, was of
aristocratic 1 ineage ... together with Henry
Sidgwick and Walter Leaf, were all Oxbridge
men ...
321
.

[

Wallace objected to the machinations of his colleagues:
Wallace became very much concerned about the
skepticism of many of the society's members. He
was also dissatisfied with the manner in which
299

:

they conducted their
investigations,
They
treated mediums as if they were on
tr ial and
applied their own conditions from
the beginnings
of the investigations... [322]

Owen points out that unequal power
dynamics was in itself
stimulant to erotic encounter, and that
the other "lower"
forms of humanity were part and parcel
of the visual
display caught by, pandering to, and
exploiting, the male
gaze

a

Themes of difference, particularly as it
related to sex, class, and race, were to be found
in the spiritualist world.
In
an elaboration of
Victorian hierarchical ordering, working-class
female mediums were often debased, and their
spirit familiars sometimes vividly presented
themselves as blackened or besmirched
these
working-class young women ... [were
'secured'
inside the cabinet ^by a complex web of tape and
knots... The test seances at which these
arrangements were deemed necessary were held by
the so-called Sidgwick group
the class
dissonance in this case was particularly clear
and the degree of sexual fantasy involved that
much more apparent. Here, the motif of male
mastery surfaced around the relationship between
the psychical researchers and the lower-class
mediums in an expression of sexual and class
difference.
Female powerlessness was especially
evident in these bondage rituals and it is
possible that male spirit aggression was a
part ia 1 response to this enforced
denigration. [323]
]

In the light of the complicating factors of sexual

politics and gender construction the "purity" of sciences
that would discredit

medical record on

a

female enterprise that included

a

a

par or perhaps superior to allopathic

medicine deserves much scrutiny.
that it was "probably

a

It

is worth considering

health advantage during this
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,

period" to avoid the examining
room of allopathic

physicians.

2^

Owen states:

Of ali the aspects of spiritualist
phenomena,
mediumistic healing was perhaps the most
revered
by believers and sympathetically
attested to by
non-spiritua 1 ist s
the process often looked
remarkably like either hypnotism, or
therapeutic
touch... The efficacy of what is now often
referred to as 'alternative healing is
notoriously difficult to quant if y .. .Nonetheless
current medical research on both sides of
the
.

.

.

1

Atlantic suggests that it can achieve remarkably
positive results
[325]
Thus even from

a

conservative view of science there

are aspects of Spiritualist practice worth
investigation,

and Wallace's interest cannot be summarily dismissed, 326

despite efforts by some of his contemporaries to do so.
Lack of support from the inner circle of biologists did not

trouble him much.

He liked to recall Huxley's quip to

Spencer, who Huxley thought had made

a

bit much of the

scientific" nature of his project; 32 ^ "Given the molecular
forces in

a

therefrom."

mutton chop, deduce Hamlet and Faust
This comment could equally well apply to all

of the radical-materialists, who were large on claims but

short on theory and evidence when it came to explaining
"man's" qualities.

Wallace appreciated Huxley's sense of perspective,
although Darwin would not have felt the joke's humor. But
for

(the later)

Huxley and Wallace, the emergence of new

and unpredictable qualities was obvious.

Explanations

might be tenuous, but the fact of emergence was "obvious"
to many prominent people of the time.
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It did not do any

good to claim that ultimately
there was

a

"logical" or

"mathematically certain" and "calculable"
essence to the
material world, for no one was in
any position
to prove

this claim.

Wallace quotes Mill:

J.S. Mill wrote that mental
phenomena do not
admit of being deduced from the
physiological
laws of our nervous organization.
[328]

Wallace was aware that others made similar
claims:
Have you seen Mivart s book, "Genesis
of the
Species "?... The arguments against Natural
Selection as the exclusive mode of development
are some of them exceedingly strong, and very
well put, and it is altogether a most readable
and interesting book. [329]
'

And Professor Othniel Charles Marsh

(1831-99)

writes:

In most groups of mammals the brain has gradually
become more convoluted, and thus increased in
quality as well as quantity. [330]

Help came from contemporary philosophers, too; George
Lewes
had recently coined the term "emergent" for qualities that

arose systemicly but were not represented in the parts. 331
Lewes saw
f

ind

.

.

.

a

gulf between the natural and the human:

"We

anima 1 s having senses like those of man, but not

having the faculties of man." 332

The link to Vitalism is

obvious, if left unsaid until the end of his book on the

history of philosophy. 333

Organized bodies manifest all the phenomena of
the inorganized, whether chemical or mechanical;
but they also manifest the phenomena named vital
which are never manifested by inorganized bodies.
,

Thus this ontological insight required adjustments in the

structure of knowledge.

302

^

nic Physics requires a similar division
into
Biology and Sociology. The phenomena relating
to
mankind are obviously more complex than
those
relating to the individual man, and depend
upon
them... It would be manifestly as impossible
to
treat the study of the collective species as
a
pure deduction from the study of the individual,
as it would be to treat Physiology as a pure
deduction from chemistry. [334]

g-

While the basis of Lewes' views was compatible with

Wallace's ideas, Lewes was unimpressed with Spiritualism.
Wallace also took no notice of Hegel.

Maurice Mandelbaum

points out how Lewes' moves from difference between human
and animal psychology to elaboration of "World Spirit."
First, his quote from Lewes:

Biology furnishes both method and data in the
elucidation of the relations of the organism and
the external medium; and so far as Animal
Psychology is concerned this is enough. But
Human Psychology has a wider reach, includes
another important factor, the influence of the
social medium.
This is not simply an
addit ion
it is a factor which permeates the
whole composition of mind. [335]
.

.

.

Mandelbaum concludes that:
Thus Lewes'
historical
psychology
psychology

psychology was wedded to an
consideration of man's nature, and the
of the individual became in effect a
of the General Mind. [336]

Auguste Comte, from whom Lewes takes much, also argued for

emergence--in terms of

a

human collective: "Humanity,"

which was not reducible to individuals or, of course,
biology.

3 37

Thus distinctions between animal and human

were in the air, supported by mainstream academics and
scientists, as well as Spiritualists.
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Mandelbaum provides

,

.

useful description of the concept
of emergence, even if
he misses the connection to
Wallace, Huxley and Darwin: 338
There are two points concerning the
of
emergence to which I should here likedoctrine
to call
attention: first, that it can be
associated with
a vast variety of otherwise
very different
philosophic positions, and second, that
it is not
a doctrine which was new in
the twentieth
century, as has often been espoused by
those who
the thought of Samuel Alexander
and C. Lloyd Morgan.
One finds idealists such as Hegel,
materialists such as Marx and Engels, positivists
such as Lovejoy and Broad, all holding
doctrines
of emergence which (with the exception of
Hegel's) were remarkably similar.
Thus it is a
mistake to treat the concept of emergence as if
it were necessarily associated with an
interest
in metaphysics, or with a particular metaphysical
position, or with the denial of mind-body
dua 1 ism
The foregoing remark should also be
sufficient to suggest that an acceptance of the
doctrine was prevalent in all schools of thought
in the nineteenth century.
It is of special
interest to note that in Book III, Chapter V of
his System of Logic Mill gave the first careful
analysis of the difference between the principle
of the "Composition of Causes" and what he called
chemical causes." G. H. Lewes developed the
first full-fledged natural philosophy which is
based upon the principle of emergence in his
Problems of Life and Mind (especially in Volume
II)
which appeared in 1874-75; and it is said
that it is to him that we owe this use of the
term "emergence." Among the many other instances
of an acceptance of emergence in the nineteenth
century one further example may be noted, for it
serves to illustrate the way in which the
doctrine migrated freely from system to system.
Claude Bernard accepted a doctrine of emergence,
holding that the living was not reducible to the
non-living, and it was this doctrine and not his
positivism, nor his arguments for an experimental
science of medicine that was the primary
influence on the next generation of philosophers,
most of whom used this aspect of his thought in
support of some form of idealist metaphysics.
a

^

—

—
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Although he did not do so, Wallace
could also point to
another biologist who supported a
general concept of
"Spirit," George Romanes.
(See Mind, Motion and Monism.

I

Romanes, like others, was friendlier than
he would admit to
Spiritualism:

Romanes had obtained, in fact, much more
evidence
concerning psychical phenomena and had been much
more impressed than he admitted to Wallace.
In
two letters to Darwin four years before
(1876)
Romanes had discussed his experiences with
and
without a paid medium. He had received a
communication from what he believed had to be a
nonhuman intelligence, from which he concluded
there were spiritual intelligences, minds without
brains.
He also described physical phenomena at
a seance with the medium Williams.
Thus Romanes
like several other of Wallace's acquaintances had
been extremely reluctant to admit private
thoughts on the heretical subject of
spiritualism. Besides Mivart, Wallace knew the
same to be true of the geologists W. Pengelly and
D. T. Ansted. [339]
But rather than framing his argument in terms of

academic philosophy or Huxley's minima 1 ly—emergent biology,

Wallace took an approach guaranteed to upset both Darwin
and Huxley:

a

Spiritualism.

combination of Mesmerism, Phrenology, and
The lack of connection between Darwin and

Wallace on the one hand, and new developments in philosophy
on the other is interesting for what it says about the

structure of Victorian science.

Huxley, being the most

philosophically inclined of the biologists, makes no
mention to emergence or spiritualism in terms of

contemporaneous philosophy.

When Huxley relates biological

matters to philosophy, he sticks to comments on Kant, Hume
and Descartes.
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Wallace, too, may thus be seen to be
running parallel
to

a

tradition which he nonetheless ignores.

In his middle

period he turns to an ontology that makes
his special

version of "Spirit" primary.
I was limited to urging
the inherent and absolute
differences between matter and mind... [and
although we cannot conceive of matter producing
mind] we certainly can conceive mind as producinq
matter. [340]

Furthermore, all along Wallace pointed to craniometric
and physiological data which he thought showed the gap

between man and ape was greater than that between ape and
ape, or man and

man.^^

As we have seen, even in his

earliest mature work, the Malay Archipelago (1869), he was

already attacking craniometries as generally useless for
ranking races.

After attesting to the lack of superiority

of Europeans over Natives, he appends a section on

craniometries
No approach to a theory of the excessive
variations of the cranium has been put forth, and
no intelligible classification of races has been
founded upon it. [342]
He adds that Huxley debunks the whole enterprise of

measuring heads:
Professor Huxley has boldly stated his views to
this effect; and in a proposed new classification
of mankind has given scarcely any weight to
characters derived from the cranium. [343]

Although Wallace proceeds to accept the idea that cranial

capacity and intelligence are correlated, he uneasily notes
that the wide variations within any group preclude any

meaningful comparison.^ 44

He tells us that Malays vary
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from 60-91 cubic inches, Negroes 66-87
in?
His more
complete rejection of the value of
craniometries does not
take hold until he makes his notions
of emergence even more

dominant within his work.

Wallace's ambivalence to

craniometries can be understood in terms of
appreciation
for quantitative data, his waffling
on the status of

European moral development and technology, and
interest in
Phrenology. On the one hand Wallace will reject
the idea

that the "savage" brain is inferior to that of
the

European, but on the other he seeks to show "moral

advancement

in terms of faculties understood within

a

phrenological framework of physical manifestations.

While Spiritualism and emergentism make

a

likely pair,

the third leg, phrenology, appears an odd addition.

The

science of cranial topography is more logically associated
with craniometries and the worst of

which Darwin and others adopted.

a

radical materialism

Yet Wallace defended

phrenology from its critics with much enthusiasm.

One way

to come to terms with this is to see that although he makes

Spirit ontological ly prior to matter in

argument,

a

a

metaphysical

desire for quantitative and materially

verifiable evidence tugs him in an opposing direction.
Thus Wallace and Darwin can be seen as reacting to similar
needs, each waffling and ambivalently adjusting theory and

evidence
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In Ma lay Wallace takes pains
to praise Natives over

Englishmen, but then takes up the matter
of craniometric
data
The only conclusions that we can draw
from this
table [of craniometric data] are, that the
Australians have the smallest crania, and the
Polynesians the largest; the Negroes, the Malays,
and Papuans not differing perceptibly in
size.
And this accords very well with what we know
of
their mental activity and capacity for

civilization.

[345]

Here Wallace refers to civilization as if it were

a

ladder to be climbed, indeed he expects the Native to find
his "natural" place.

Quotes like these show Wallace caught

between his emergentist and craniometric/phrenological
conceptual schemes.

His ambivalence over European "moral

superiority" is interesting in this regard, and allows
him to hold both the view that Natives should be left
on their own

(due to European corruption)

they should be dominated by

a

and the view that

paternalistic European

colonial system (due to the superiority to European
morals)

.

He did not escape racist/imperialist ideology,

although his affliction was very different from that of
Darwin as the more pernicious aspects were temporary and

fleeting
In discussing the failures of the nineteenth century,

one of the most disturbing for Wallace was neglect of

phrenology.

O/

C

In order to more fully appreciate the

situation, let us turn to Wallace's list of the tenets of

Phrenology
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4)
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he brain is the organ of the
mind.
c
Size
is. ..a measure of power
3) The brain is a congeries
of organs, each
naving its appropriate faculty
4) The front of the brain
is the seat of our
perceptive and reflective faculties; the
top, of
our higher sentiments; and the back
and sides, of
our animal instincts.
5) The form of the skull during
life corresponds
so closely to that of the brain that
it is
possible to determine the proportionate
development of various parts of the latter by
an
examination of the former. [347]
i!
^

In what

looks like

a

fit of reductive materialism he

even attacked the "metaphysicians," such
as William

Hamilton (in 1898), because "They recognized no connection
between the mind and the organism.

1,348

Furthermore, Wallace

took the leap to linking phrenological traits to
racial

character

3

^

Given its materialist assumptions, it is odd

that more of the evolutionary biologists did not adopt the

doctrine.

Of course Darwin and Huxley, as trained

physicians, would resist this science which challenged

traditional medical hegemony.

defenders in high places.

Even so, Phrenology had its

Prof. George M. Humphrey of

Cambridge University complained of critics:
The arguments against phrenology must be of
deeper kind... to convince anyone who has
carefully considered the subject. [350]

a

But the new science fizzled out after 1845, 351 according to

Wallace, due to its association with mesmerism, which was
made obsolete

anesthesia

— in

(but not discredited)

by the introduction of

the form of ether and chloroform.

In what appears to be an echo of Darwin, Wallace even

claims that "Character ... is very strongly hereditary..." ^
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And yet he has not converted to

reductive materialism.

a

racist and radically

He thought that craniometric ranges

for the various races were so large
that racial averages

had little significance.

-

lay

'

He noted that the data cited in

taken fron Dr. Joseph B. Davis' Thesaurus
Craniorium
>

showed that the largest English skull barely
edged out the
largest Malay skull, with 92.5 cubic inches
to 91.
Given
that these were extremes in any case, he felt that
"no

intelligible classification of races" had come from
this
data.

Here Wallace's ambivalence, driven by

a

competition

between Phrenology and Spiritualism, comes to the fore.

Whereas all Natives are inferior, according to the
recapitulationists, Wallace sees no such generalization.
Speaking of Polynesians, he agrees that these Natives are

physically every bit the equal, if not the superior of
Europeans.
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He writes that Lord George Cambell can

corroborate his own view:
The Mahoris or Brown Polynesians, according to
the universal testimony of travellers and
residents, are one of the very finest races on
the globe.
A recent writer says--"There are no
people in the world who strike one at first as
these Friendly Is landers ... a novel and splendid
picture of the genus homo and, as far as
physique and appearance goes, they gave one
certainly an impression of being a superior race
to ours. [354]
;

Turning to the question of mental faculties, Wallace
sees the limitations of inheritance as no impediment to

moral worth, thus undercutting any normative component of

phrenology, and by extension, of craniometries.
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u t l a t er on, as I came to
see the baneful
influence of our wrong system of education
and
of society, I began to realize
that people who
could talk of nothing but the trivial
amusements
of an empty mind were the victims of
these social
errors, and were often in themselves quite
estimable characters.
Later on, when the teachings of spiritualism
combined with those of phrenology led me to the
conclusion that there were no absolutely bad men
or women, that is, none who, by a rational and
sympathetic training and a social system which
gave to all absolute equality of opportunity,
might not become useful, contented, and happy
members of society... [355]

For Darwin and the others, equal opportunity has
nothing to
do with anything.

The limitations of inheritance would

confirm the thief for

a

thief, and the beggar for

For Wallace Phrenology provides

a

a

beggar.

gauge for assessing the

capacity for various mental characteristics, but these

capacities do not prevent achievement of
within society.

The notion that there is

worthy position

a
a

war of each

against each to be settled according to cranial merit has
no grip here.

Even early on, Wallace uses emergentism to claim that

humans occupy

place removed from the animal world, thus

a

he is able to claim that there has been no advance in human

capacities since man's inception, despite the claims of
Darwin and Vogt.

Different people manifest different mixes

of abilities and varied access

O C £

to technology and

culture, and he warns us to be careful when evaluating

societies to separate the hereditary from the accumulated
(the cultural).

3 57

Thus an Englishmen might be "higher" on

the ladder of civilization, be more cultured and have more
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technology at his disposa l--but if he
be

a

robber barren he

would rank below the Native who lived an
honest, low-tech
lif e

Ultimately phrenology functions for Wallace
roughly in
the same way as diagnostic tests are supposed
to in

contemporary culture.

Phrenology allows insight into the

abilities of individuals, but it does not indicate moral
worth or have meaningful relation to survival
status.

Therefore he feels free to title
book:

a

chapter of his last

"Savages not morally inferior to civilized races.

When he speaks of "capacity for civilization," he

ambivalently uses an idea he will refine, alter, and in the
end reject.

In the early work he is torn between the

notion that intelligence and "high" civilization go
together and the idea that general capacities are

irrelevant to achievement of
he says

a

worthwhile life.

By the end

:

Many other illustrations of both intelligence and
morality are met with among savage races in all
parts of the world; and these, taken as a whole,
show a substantial identity of human character,
both moral and emotional, with no marked
superiority in any race or country. [359]

E.

Conclusion to Chapter Three

To those who would excuse Darwin's justification of

race war with the claim:

"But all Victorian men held
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similar views," one can respond:
"Not Wallace."

presents

Wallace

counter example to assumptions that the
theory

a

of Natural Selection had to be
racist because of its social

context.

Being the co-discoverer of the theory that

transformed biological sciences and the
cultural milieu
forever, he presents an alternative world view
which

demonstrates the lack of homogeneity of Victorian
science
and society.
This chapter has shown that a diversity of
scientific, philosophical, social and political
beliefs
must be taken into account if Darwinism or late nineteenth

century science is to be fully appreciated.
The reasons for Wallace's divergence from the Social

Darwinism of Darwin are many.

A respect for Natives

generated by years of living amongst indigenous peoples of
several continents,

a

witnessing of the horrors of laissez

faire capitalist imperialism

— both

throughout the British Empire,

a

in England and

desire for obtaining

social and political equality for women, and an interest in
a

metaphysics of Spiritualism as opposed to reductive

materialism: all these things prompted Wallace's differing
view of biology, metaphysics and politics.
All of Wallace's motivations against reductive

materialism share

a

human qualities.

He was not alone in this view; others

core idea: the emergence of unique

believed there are some human aspects which can not be
reduced to movements of atoms.

pioneered

a

George Henry Lewes

concept of emergence and despite the fact that
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the times were right to appeal to
developments within the

universities or the intellectual community,
Wallace rarely
referred to academics or others that could
help motivate
his own view.

George Eliot and even others outside Lewes'
circle,
such as T.H. Huxley

(despite his materialistic leanings)

also wrote in favor of human qualities beyond
the domain of

biological explanation.
might be seen as

a

Wallace's independence of thought

result of the fact that he moved from

the working to the professional classes and was self-

educated.

Whatever his motivation or the etiology of his

views, most professional biologists who by and large were

wealthy or at least solid middle class did not take

Wallace's ideas on emergence seriously, but moved ahead
with

a

Social Darwinist program.

Explanation of this

plunge into racism is overdetermined and may be made in
terms of the radical materialist bias and class/gender

position of most biologists.
The unfortunate result was that Darwinism promulgated
an imperialist, racist, sexist and Social Darwinist version
of Natural Selection.

The reasons for the rapid spread of

Social Darwinism within British science and even European

science deserve recognition and further investigation.
An unlikely-looking source of proof for the resistance

value of emergentism comes from Wallace's adherence to

phrenology.

Even though phrenology by its very nature

pushes for description of mind in terms of crude physical
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measurement, Wallace turns the science
on its head, as it
were, by uncoupling values and genetics.
By starting with
assumptions about the moral equality of
all humans, he
created a relatively non-racist materially-based
phrenology
that was not reductive in the last
analysis because of his

emergentist bias, even if this bias in the end
contradicts
the central tenets of phrenology.

This brings us back to the uncomfortable topic
of

scientific racism.

Darwin

,

In order to make the charge against

it must be shown that he should have been aware
or

was aware of alternative views.

This is easy to show, and

has been demonstrated in this chapter by simply contrasting

Wallace

work with that of Darwin.

s

Yet even Wallace at

times shared in the view that Natives were "children."
Even though he dropped this view, during the period we are

discussing (1859-1890) he sometimes used the vocabulary of
social recapitulationists.

The discussion has to be

somewhat complicated because he did not tie "lower" status
to genetics in

a

way that precluded Natives vaulting out of

an "inferior" position or even restrict any particular

group to

a

unique status on the "ladder of civilization,"

and "higher" status did not mean that Wallace eschewed

damning criticism of his own country and culture.

Furthermore he presents an ambivalent attitude towards
social hierarchy, sometimes endorsing it, sometimes

declaring it bankrupt.

But the fact remains that for the

period so crucial to us, because that is when Social
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Darwinism got its impetus, Wallace was
not free of the
racist virus— even if his particular and
sporadic
affliction was of a much-attenuated form.
One mitigating factor on Wallace's side
is that his
version was much less deadly, for it centered
on a cultural
chauvinism which was already diluted by severe
critique of
his own culture.

He was already advocating reforms which

had as their goal achievement of social and
political

equality for all races, as opposed to Darwin's view
of

obligatory and fatal racial and social struggle.
this understanding, Wallace's work deserves

a

Given

rescue from

relative obscurity if only to restore the social and
political context.
The failure of Wallace's more egalitarian science to

take hold within the community of biologists needs to be

further investigated so that mechanisms of scientific

progress can be further revealed and understood.

To this

end we turn now to Chapter Four, the wider social and

political context of Darwin's Social Darwinism.
In closing this chapter it does us well to take

another look at his first successful book, the Mala y

Archipelago

.

Even in this early work Wallace tries to

disrupt the favorite line of attack on the Native, namely
that the savage is the "missing link" between "man" and

animal.

In the standard edition

(the tenth edition)

the

title page and its facing leaf tell much about his views.
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The first edition had the
"Orang-utan attacked by
Dyaks" plate as the first page, while
the title page faced
a

blank and was illustrated with

17.

In the tenth edition

a

bird.

(Illustration 16)

"orang-utan," baby-like and sporting
by

a

depiction of

which attacks

a

Native.

a

a

strange

goofy look, is faced

dangerous and full-grown orangoutang

human (in what appears to be self-defense;

note the caption)
a

a

See Illustration

.

The animal has one hand on the spear of

While the baby creature looks comically human,

although certainly not to be mistaken as human, the fully
grown animal, standing erect and appearing to be only

a

grasp away from mastering spear-throwing, looks like he/she
might vault into humanhood at any moment.
Yet there is opposition to how Darwin would have it,

there is an abyss to such crossing over.

The Natives

live an erect life, the orang rears upwards only in

emergencies.

The Natives are clothed, the orangoutang is

oblivious to such amenities.

The smooth skin of the Native

allies him firmly with the European, and removes him from
the realm of the orangoutang.

The lowly Natives sport

artistic bangles, the orangoutang is naked of art.

The

Natives are clearly working together, one can almost hear
their yells; the orangoutang is alone and inarticulate; its

screams touch any man's heart--but they are not

a

prelude

to rational conversation, a curse, or even a joke.
It

is no accident Wallace chose this piece of art for

beginning his work on Malaysia
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— which

is

"perhaps the least

known part of the globe.

*

360
•

After all, the Dyaks, the

Natives depicted, are re vealed by
Wallace to be highly
civilized headhunters, Thus if he
succeeds in il luniinati ng
the frontispiece to the point
that his closing remarks on

THE

MALAY ARCHIPELAGO
THE LAND OF THE

ORANG-UTAN AND THE BIRD OF
PARADISE
a narrative of travel

WITH STUDIES OF MAN AND
NATURE

DOVER PUBLICATIONS,

INC.

NEW YORK

UtUhO CTAW ATTACKED BY OVA KB.

Illustration 16: Malay frontispiece, tenth edition.
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THE

MALAY ARCHIPELAGO:
the land of the

ORANG-UTAN, AND

T1JE BIRD

OF PARADISE.

A NARRATIVE Ol TRAVEL,

WITH

STL'DIES OJ;

MAN AND NATURE
BY

ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE,
TRAVELS

AMAZON AND

Rl" NEGRO, 1

NEW
HARTFR

&

'

“PALM TREES

AMAZON," *TV

YORE-

BROTHERS. PUBLISHERS,
FRANKLIN SQU ARE

1869.

native? or arc shooting the great rihd or taradise.

Illustration 17: Ma lay frontispiece, first edition.
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the need of "civilized Englishmen"
to learn from the black

Native ring true, he has accomplished much.
At the commencement of his book Wallace
discusses

raising

a

baby orangoutang, and probably the title page
is

homage to this hapless animal.

Having shot its mother in

the interests of science, he tries to save the
tiny

creature.

He enjoyed this "fatherhood," despite demanding

moments brought on by foster care.
a

scream very like that of

circumstances

.

a

The orangoutang "set up

baby in similar

361

Wa 1 lace explains that the orangoutang will never

qualify as

a

proto-human:

It may be safely stated,

however, that the Orang
never walks erect, unless when using its hands to
support itself by branches overhead or when
attacked.
Representations of its walking with a
stick are entirely imaginary. [362]

Nor was Wallace alone in this view, even Huxley criticized
the view that orangutans were the bottom of the

savage/orangutan cusp:
I do not wish to crow unduly over my humble
cousin the orang, but in the aesthetic province,
as in that of intellect, he is nowhere... he has
never been awestruck ... by the dim religious
gloom, as of a temple devoted to the earthgods,
of the tropical forests which he inhabits. [363]

This was so even if one must, according to Huxley, admit

that the orang does have

a

consciousness, and thus some

aspect of his existence is outside even the realm of

science
Physical science may know all about his clutching
the fruit and munching it and digesting it, and
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how the physical titillation of
his palate is
transmitted to his brain. But the feelings
of
sweetness and of satisfaction which,
for a
moment, hang out their signal lights
in
melancholy eyes, are as utterly outside his
the
bounds of physics as is the "fine frenzy"
of a
human rhapsodist.
364
[

]

Huxley's comment about human gloom fits
uneasily with his
choice of the word "melancholy" for the
orang.
However he
held the differences between man and beast
to be based in
the details of physiology, even though
he considered the

disparity to be

a

major one of kind:^^

The ape-like arrangement of certain muscles
which
is occasionally met with in the white races
of
mankind, is not known to be more common among
Negroes or Australians: nor because the brain of
the Hottentot Venus was found to be smoother, to
have its convolutions more symmetrically
disposed, and to be, so far, more ape-like than
that of ordinary Europeans, are we justified in
concluding a like condition of the brain to
prevail universally among the lower races of
mankind, however probably that conclusion may be.

Thus Wallace confronts the major arguments of Darwin
and others purporting to show Natives as links between

European and ape.

For Wallace and others such as T.H.

Huxley or George Eliot, there was
humans and animals.

a

great divide between

The fruit of this view was that race

war fails to be necessary or justifiable.

Ultimately in

the Victorian context it is emergence which allows for

humanity
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CHAPTER

IV

THE WIDER SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF
DARWINISM

A.

Malthus:

a

Stick to Beat the Poor With

As we have seen in the second and third chapters,

Darwin kept discussion of social and political implications
of Natural Selection to an absolute minimum and he informed

Wallace that the topic of politics caused him particular
distress.

He thought that by avoiding "contaminating"

discourse he could maintain an objective status for

evolutionary biology.

Despite these claims his use of

Malthus' doctrine contained

a

particular and, to at least

some of his contemporaries, controversial political agenda.

Malthus wrote with the expressed intent of refuting
the nemesis of capitalism: socialism.

As his ideas

developed subsequent to the various reactions to his Essay
of 1798 his revised work became

be characterized as

a

a

manifesto for what might

"right-wing political view" in the

early nineteenth century and even for the whole of the

Victorian period.

He was a controversial figure and

various flaws in his argument for repealing the Poor Laws
were discussed by countless readers and commentators.
he became a "stick to beat the poor" with.
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1

The

Yet

explanation of this fact, that

a

widely contested and

obviously problematic argument could be used within the
foundation of an "objective" science with grave political
consequences, is the first goal of this chapter.

Resolution of this conceptual problem will provide another
basis for evaluating the role of social and political bias
in the work of Darwin and Wallace.

Section B of this

chapter will widen the analysis of the context of the
theory of Natural Selection by examining the nineteenth

century construction of the concept of race by examining
the ideas of T.H. Huxley.

We turn now to Malthus.

Illustration 18: Portrait of Malthus. Frontispiece
from Malthus and his Work by James Bonar.
,
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Given the plethora of discussions of,
and opinions
about, the impact of Malthus's work on
Darwin (see Chapter
Two)

it

is best to start with a general
overview of the

reception of Malthus's work during the early
nineteenth
century and then to shift focus to the particular
context
of the Origin

(1859)

and the Descent of Man (1871).

Darwin and Wallace attribute to Malthus

a

Both

major impetus in

the creation of the theory of Natural Selection.

Each

asserted that it was Malthus' clear emphasis on excess

progeny and their subsequent demise which cleared the path
to understanding the creation of new species.

Malthus did not invent the idea of reproductive powers

outstripping food supply--David Hume, for instance, put the
idea forward at an earlier date,

3

nor even the idea that

populations expand faster than the food supply according to
some ratio

(Joseph Townsend did that),

3

nor was he the

first to use this idea to advocate repeal of the Poor Laws.
This last item provided public funds to the impoverished,

approximately one-seventh of the population of England.^
Despite his lack of originality, Malthus' essays captured
the attention of friends and foes alike.

His "brilliantly

written" Essay of 1798 brought together ideas that had been

inelegantly "floating" about for some time and made them
clear, orderly, presentable and politically attractive to

those of

a

conservative persuasion.

Despite the homage Darwin pays him, the index to the
Descent gives only one reference to Malthus (to pages 428
335

and 429).

In this work Darwin starts with the
then

controversial evidence that the population of the United
States had doubled in

a

period of 25 years. ^

He later

writes that Euler "calculated" that such an increase
could,

theoretically, occur in

"little over twelve years.

a

This passage is footnoted

(number 57)

the 1826 rendering of the

3

rd

edition.

to Malthus

1

Essay

,

By the time of

these later editions, Malthus had shifted his focus from

attacks on the socialism of Condorcet and Godwin to the
evils'

of the Poor Laws

.

^

Darwin reproduced the premise

crucial to obtaining political relevance for Malthus'
argument, namely:
The primary or fundamental check to the continued
increase of man is the difficulty of gaining
subsistence, and of living in comfort. [9]

The point to the premise is that an "objective,"

"natural" and "biological" restraint holds "man's"

population in check.

It

is claimed that the specific

quantity of food available restrains human population to

a

particular level no matter how prolific individuals tend to
be or how creative their food-production technology is.

Furthermore, since citizens of the United States were

perceived to be by and large an extension of British

breeding stocks and that the climate and topography of the
United States was similar to England's, this case avoided

complications arising from considerations of disparate
cultures, exotic genetic pools, different climates and the
like.

Darwin deals with "savages" and their reproductive
336

rates

a

little farther on, making

a

special case of them

but in the end claiming that he "knows nothing positively"

about their reproductive rates. 10

Application of the Malthusian principle to the British
Isles is then attempted by Darwin:
If such means [food] were suddenly doubled in
Great Britain, our number would be quickly
doubled. With civilized nations this primary
check acts chiefly by restraining marriages. The
greater death-rate of infants in the poorest
classes is also very important; as well as the
greater mortality, from various diseases, of the
inhabitants of crowded and miserable houses, at
all ages.
The effects of severe epidemics and
wars are soon counterbalanced, and more than
counterbalanced, in nations placed under
favourable conditions. Emigration also comes in
aid as a temporary check, but, with the extremely
poor classes, not to any great extent. [11]

Darwin promulgates the central recommendation of
Malthus: the poor should control their numbers through
late, or "restrained," marriages.

In the absence of this

technique's effectiveness child mortality, disease and

starvation are assumed to perform the "unavoidable"
function of weeding out those who are the result of

reproduction's ability to outperform agriculture's ability
to feed.
It

is important for the suppressed political moral

involved that the "unusual" events of wars and epidemics be

discounted from calculations.

Epidemics tend to cross

class lines, and wars smack of political considerations

effected by the ruling classes.

Starvation and poverty,

however, are more easily assumed to be "natural" conditions
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.

because they are "beyond" human control and
thus their role
in the population equation may be portrayed
as "objective."
Thus, according to Darwin and Malthus, any
effort to aid
the poor--with money, food, medicine or better
working and

living conditions, would be "sadly misplaced."

Such help

would result in the population of the poor being

temporarily disconnected from "reality" by
sighted

a

"short

public policy, and soon the numbers of the poor

would increase beyond the enlarged means at hand and
poverty, along with starvation, would reassert itself.

In

this way all motives for social reform are rendered

unsound,

"unscientific" and obsolete.

The only "artificial" restraint that Darwin considers
is that of destroying newborns.

Ma 1 thus ... does not lay stress enough on what is
probably the most important [restraint] of all,

namely infanticide...

[12]

Darwin's discussion of the topic is limited to considering
the practice with respect to savages and the inhabitants of

India

These practices appear to have originated in
savages recognizing the difficulty, or rather the
impossibility of supporting all the infants that
are born. [13]

Darwin wishes to make his disgust with the practice known
by asserting that:

Our early semi-human progenitors would not have
practiced infanticide or polyandry [one woman
with many husbands]
for the instincts of the
lower animals are never so perverted. [14]
;
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—
With this moral judgement/ Darwin attempts to
crush the
idea that the poor have any way out of Malthus'
bind.

Right away, however, Darwin finds the "objective"
state of things rather messy.

Even if one accepts

Malthus' premises, and Wallace among others did not, in
the

case of "man" the possibility of

a

ignored: namely, infanticide.

critic of Darwin could

A

remedy cannot be

argue that the moral cost of poverty is higher than the
moral cost of infanticide, thus providing an avenue for the

poor to alter their situation.

Once the population of the

poor is brought down, there would be plenty of food,

housing, and medicine, and wages could rise.
It must be remembered that part of Malthus'

pessimism

relies on the idea that due to the strictures of wage-fund

theory 1 5 the capital available for paying workers is fixed
for any productivity level of the society.

Thus as long as

population outstrips the funds available, insufficient
wages are unavoidable.

However if infanticide decreased

worker population, higher wages would inevitably result

according to the "iron laws of economics."

For Darwin, as

for Malthus and his host of supporters, this simply would

not do.

Sripati Chandrasekhar, introducing Charles Knowlton's
work, points to

a

passage by Malthus in which wages and birth

control are linked though

a

claim that bettering the lives

of workers results in depravity:
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Regarding birth control, Malthus asserted,
"I
should always particularly reprobate any
art if icial and unnatural modes of checking
population, both on account of their immorality
and their tendency to remove a necessary
stimulus
to industry.
If it were possible for each
married couple to limit by wish the number of
their children, there is certainly reason to fear
that the indolence of the human race would be
greatly increased." Malthus, Essay, 6th ed.,
1826, p.

543.

[16]

First, note the denial of any right to alter "nature's"

course is based on moral claims.

(Remember that Darwin

waffles on the relation between reason/evolution and
morality.)

What gets the most attention, however, is an

economic/ socia 1 "problem."

If

workers became scarce they

could demand higher wages and shorter hours

— this

would

lead to "moral depravity," as leisure time for workers is

assumed to be evil.
engage

a

Thus Darwin's and Malthus' need to

messy argument they would rather avoid, and the

only weapon available is an appeal to moral indignation.
It

should be noted that Darwin never elaborates on the

moral argument against infanticide, and thus his strongest

armament relies on an appeal to the reader's repugnance for

Native practices.

The shaky argument that even lowly

"ear ly-progenitors" would reject infanticide as

a

"perversion" is indicative of Darwin's tenuous position--he
is forced to rely on his audience's indulgence in order to

assert his point of view.

He could just as forcibly have

argued that science demands infanticide, and moral scruples
to the contrary are "primitive" emotions out of sync with

scientific understanding of the "iron laws" of biology.
340
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.

At this point the ideological component of
Darwin's

use of Malthus should be coming into focus.

Darwin's

radical reductive materialism allows, or perhaps forces,
him to understand human population in terms of Malthusian

shortages, while any claim for human control over

fertility

— which

denied.

Given premises of non-emergent materialism and

implies special human status

— must

be

success of the Empire, Darwin holds that English morality
is

"noblest" and carries an evolutionary mandate.

This

view was controversial, even though major forces in biology
and British politics supported it and eventually it won the

day

During the Bradlaugh-Besant trial during the late
1870's, Knowlton's book on contraception was attacked not

only in the courtroom, but in the press as well.
The Evening Standard became imperialistic to the
extent of pointing out that the Colonial Empire
needed a large population. [17]
The connections between overpopulation, wages and

imperialism were openly discussed.

Darwin's tactic of

simply ignoring the din of controversy may be understood in
terms of an assumption of homogeneity within the emerging

class of biological scientist s— to which Wallace proved an

exception
Huxley presents an amended form of Darwin's view in

which the demise of civilization results from bad human
planning added to Malthus' prophesy of doom.

Thus he

stresses the ability of "man" to alter the social world for
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—
his own purposes even if he agrees
with Darwin that the

poor are at times villainous indeed.

Huxley's comments

below arise in the context of his dislike
of the Salvation

Army— which

he considers anti-democratic and
metaphysically

deficient because it appeals to "religious emotions"
to
achieve its aims.
It is certain that there is an immense
amount of
remediable misery amoung us; that, in addition to
the poverty, disease, and degradation which are
the consequences of causes beyond human control,
there is a vast, probably a very much larger,
quantity of misery which is the result of
individual ignorance, or misconduct, and of
faulty social arrangements. Further, I think it
is not to be doubted that, unless this remediable
misery is effectually dealt with, the hordes of
vice and pauperism will destroy modern
civilization as effectually as uncivilized tribes
of another kind destroyed the great social
organization which preceded ours. Moreover, I
think all will agree that no reforms and
improvements will go to the root of the evil
unless they attack it in its ultimate source
namely, the motives of the individual man.
Honest, industrious, and self-restraining men
will make a very bad social organization prosper;
while vicious, idle, and reckless citizens will
bring to ruin the best that ever was, or ever
will be, invented.
18
[

Huxley,

]

like Darwin and Malthus, blames the poor for "lack

of restraint" and claims that some poverty is inevitable.

Unlike them he believes that
is not only possible,

amounts of misery.

a

change in human behavior

but that it would relieve "vast"

Given his stress upon the idea that

humans are outside much of evolutions' parameters, his

belief in the ability to alter "nature's plan" makes sense.
There is another fallacy which appears to me to
pervade the so-called "ethics of evolution." It
is the notion that because, on the whole, animals
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and plants have advanced in
perfection of
organization by means of the struggle for
existence and the consequent 'survival
of the
therefore men in society, men as
ethical beings, must look to the same
process to
help them towards perfection. [19]
For Huxley "man's" special status
allows alteration of the

cosmic process,

"

or nature, and thus he departs from

Darwinian ideas and approaches Wallace's
Social progress means the checking of the cosmic
process at every step and the substitution for
it
of another, which may be called the ethical
process; the end of which is not the survival of
those who may happen to be the f ittest
.but of
those who are ethically the best. [20]
.

.

Although Darwin and Malthus might think in terms of the
"best" being the upper classes, which show

failure to be fittest

— by

a

perverse

reproducing at "too slow"

Huxley has something else in mind.

a

rate,

Against Darwin and

Malthus he argues for maximizing the social welfare by
helping the "less fit."
In place of ruthless self-assertion it [ethics]
demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting
aside, or treading down, all competitors, it
requires that the individual shall not merely
respect, but that he shall help his fellows; its
influence is directed, not so much to the
survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as
many as possible to survive.
It repudiates the
gladiatorial theory of existence. [21]

Wallace goes further than Huxley for he was not bound
by "inevitable" Malthusian shortages and he agrees that

human morality goes beyond purely biological parameters.
He thought, as we shall see, human control of fertility for

the benefit of the poor was a distinct possibility.
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Darwin, on the other hand, attempted to
reassert

Malthus

program in such

a

way as to deny any political

motive, despite the fact that the political
component was

discussed widely from the moment Malthus

1

publication

efforts began many decades earlier.

Darwin's strategic use of abhorrence for infanticide
in order to cut the discussion off at its roots fails
to

maneuver the discussion out of the natural/artificial
debate.

The very concept of infanticide invalidates the

notion that there is no way to reduce and maintain

a

lower

population level for the working class, or any other class,
for that matter, because it implies conscious and

deliberate agency as well as power.

Thus the "law" of

population growth outpacing agricultural production was
certainly not

a

"natural" one, even if morality is taken to

be "natural," for ethics was not

a

settled field.

Other

considerations, soon to be discussed, will show that Darwin
must have been aware of the human capacity to alter

reproductive rates and so effect social change despite

Malthusian dicta.

1.

The political context of Malthus

1

essay

Malthus' Essay was written and promoted in order to

accomplish

a

specific political goal.

22

Conservative

theoreticians, economists and officials of late 18th
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century England were anxious to counter the ascending

popularity of Marquis Antoine Nicolas Condorcet
and William
(1789)

Godwin 23

(1756-1836).

(

1743 - 94

)

The French Revolution

being fresh in their minds,

2^

conservatives needed

definitive rebuttal to the concept that

a

a

redistribution of

wealth and power in England was necessary in order to
effect social justice.
The first edition of Malthus'

famous work focused on

pulling the rug out from under Godwin, the Chartists and
the Owenites.

n C

Starting with ideas already enunciated by

earlier conservative thinkers such as Hume, 26 Robert
Wallace, 27 Joseph Townsend, 28 and Sir Walter Raleigh,

29

but

organizing and clarifying them into an elegant argument,
Malthus hoped to demolish the idea that political change,
in terms of a radical redistribution of wealth and power,

was rational or even possible.

For the first few years

following his first edition, much attention was focused
upon the Godwin/Malthus debate.

Godwin spent years

rebutting his enemy, but to little effect.
The general argument Malthus used was that the poor

would always reproduce in excess of the available material
base, thus any redistribution of wealth would only

temporarily ameliorate their condition.

Arguments based on

concepts of justice became irrelevant in this context.
Furthermore, by including an allegiance to Adam Smith's
30 Malthusian doctrine "explained" why
"wage fund ratio,"

wages for the poor would often be at levels below
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^
subsistence.

Such

"sad" state of affairs was, on this

a

view, unavoidable.

Malthus even went so far as to assert

that it was poverty that drives the economy

.

Subsequent editions of Malthus' Essay were able to
shift focus due to reactions provoked by the first edition.
The second edition turned from Godwin to the business of

advocating dismemberment of the Poor Laws 32
.

The working

class press was, as one would expect, scandalized by every
new edition and so too were people from every niche of the

political spectrum.

From radical John Doherty to

conservative Michael Sadler, many were offended and many
offered criticism.

Herbert Spencer argued that increased

populations were beneficial and ultimately led to
birth rate.

3 ^

a

reduced

Utilitarians accepted the Malthusian

principle but urged birth control to turn Malthus to the
advantage of workers.

Despite the clamor his work

provoked, Malthus gained many adherents among the upper

classes and their theorists.

While this thumbnail sketch does scant justice to the

complexity of the debate, it indicates the level of
interest generated.

Of utmost importance for an appraisal

of Darwin's use of Malthus is the fact that since its

Even

inception, the Malthusian argument was controversial.

Malthus thought so 35
.

Darwin's interest in promoting

political agenda is made visible in this context.

a

By

failing to note the multitudinous objections to Malthus,
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both political and scientific, Darwin
smuggled

a

particular

right-wing political program into his project.
Three important critiques by contemporaries
of Malthus
are relevant to evaluation of Darwin's position.

Some

argued that the human/nature split rendered
biological laws

ultimately inapplicable to humans.

Others thought that the

existence of effective birth control technology undercut
Malthus

conclusions, and many writers, especially

political leaders within the working class, considered
Malthus' work to be politically motivated to the point of

being mere propaganda.
For Darwin it was essential to prove that the survival
of the fittest principle applied equally to civilized

humans as to the plants and animals of "nature" in order to

manifest the continuity of his science.

coincident ly

,

gave his political views

This drive also,
a

scientific status.

By assuming a struggle for survival, the over-production of

progeny must lead to necessar i ly-letha 1 competition.

Malthus wrote:
Among plants and animals its effects are waste
of seed, sickness, and premature death.
Among
mankind, misery and vice. [36]
In order to move from a parallelism to a claim of

identity, Malthus

(and Darwin,

rapid population increase

m

following him) points to the
.

the United States.

attempt drew detailed criticism from many.

37

In particular,

Michael Thomas Sadler (1830) tried to show through
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But this

.

statistical analysis that the geometric
ratio of increase
38
failed to hold.
More important than the argument over
the precise
formula of population increase is Sadler's
claim that the
source of rapid increase resided in
immigration, and that
Malthus "only begins to admit the volume of
immigration

when it is supposed to be no longer of any
consequence."
Thus Malthus was criticized for manipulating his
evidence
in a way which protected his notion of
"inevitable increase

based upon the natural affection of the sexes."
this to come.)

increase "

(More on

Sadler then deduces his own "law of

:

The prolificness of human beings, otherwise
similarly circumstanced, varies inversely as
their numbers. [39]

Although Sadler's criticism does not overtly invoke

a

human/nature split, its tendency to do so can be

demonstrated easily.

As everyone at the time knew, human

biological parameters allow for the generation of one child
per year,

40

or even, technically, at least one per

9

or 10

months
[Yet] neither Malthus nor his followers, nor
anyone else for that matter, would seriously
suggest such a standard. There are obvious
biological and social checks... [41]

such as reduction of fertility through nursing and

conscious decisions to limit the number of children through

abstinence or other methods.

Thus one can say that

Malthus's tendency [of the sexual drive to
maximize reproduction] is not a tendency at all
348

in the strict sense.
It is merely an inference
drawn from a statistical aggregate ... To give such
a rate of growth [geometric progression] the
force of a universal law of nature, to use it as
the foundation f or ... ruthless ly applied remedies,
can only be justified as an act of faith, and not
as the exercise of reason.
42
[

]

Sadler's insight includes reference to ideological aspects
of mathematical formulations,

aggregate" becomes

a

in this case a "statistical

"universal law."

Nor were these criticisms ignored by Sadler's

contemporaries.

William Hazlitt proposed that sexual

interaction is "as various in itself and its effects as
climate and all other causes, natural and artificial, can
make

it."^

Even Darwin notes the upper classes exhibit

a

fertility rate far below the "law of geometric increase,"
and this was of great concern to him.

This "deficient"

rate is doubly troubling, as the rich should

reproduce at

the highest rates, as they have virtually unlimited access
to food.

Other critics, such as Amy Besant, contested the

continuity thesis:
Mr. Darwin puts forward an argument against
scientific checks which must not be omitted here;
he says: "The enhancement of the welfare of
mankind is a most intricate problem; all ought to

refrain from marriage who cannot avoid abject
poverty for their children, for poverty is not
only a great evil, but tends to its own increase
On the
by leading to recklessness in marriage.
other hand, as Mr. Galton has remarked, if the
prudent avoid marriage, whilst the reckless
marry, the inferior members tend to supplant the
better members of society. Man, like every other
animal, has no doubt advanced to his present high
condition through a struggle for existence,
consequent on his rapid multiplication, and if he
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is to advance still higher
it is to be feared
that he must remain subject to a
severe
otherwise he would sink into indolence, struggle;
and the
"'^egifted men would not be more successful
in
the battle of life than the less
gifted.
Hence
our natural rate of increase, though
leading to
many and obvious evils, must not be
greatly
diminished by any means."
If the struggle for existence among
were waged under the same conditions as mankind
among
animals, then Mr. Darwin's argument would
have
great force... But Mr. Darwin forgets that
men
have qualities which brutes have not, such
as
compassion, justice, respect for the rights of
others ...
44
[

Besant,

like Wallace, denies the reductive hypothesis,
and

so rejects the necessity of the "natural course."

Furthermore, Besant compromises the moral argument against

contraception by pointing to the virtues of population
control within marriage.

She perhaps sinks the

Darwinian/Malthusian moral argument by pointing out that
contraception would promote the very eugenical goals Darwin
seeks.

Her argument gains all the more force since her way

would achieve the ends Darwin promotes without requiring
the evils which Darwin requires and yet claims to abhor.

Besant writes:

Scientific checks to population would just do for
man what the struggle for existence does for
brutes: they enable man to control the production
of new human beings; those who suffer from
hereditary diseases, who have consumption or
insanity in the family, might marry, if they so
wished, but would preserve the race from the
deterioration which results from propagating
disease.
The whole British race would gain in
vigor, in health, in longevity, in beauty, if
only healthy parents gave birth to children...
laisser al ler in marriage is no wiser that in
other paths of life. [45]
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Besides undercutting Malthus, Be sant's argument
points
to the crux of the matter: namely, that through
judicious

use of contraception, there is no reason for the
poor to

'restrain themselves."

Early marriages need not result in

worsening poverty and the rampant libidinous desires of the
poor need not lead to vice, offspring, or unnatural

restraint.

46

In the end the argument boils down to

considerations of the moral probity of recreative sexual
activity within marriage.

This is not an argument Darwin

would wish to be entangled with, so it is easy to see why
he opts to cut short his discussion.

An alternate form of criticism brought up similar

points in

a

different direction.

Working-class theorists

suggested that once social reform took place the fecundity
of the working class would drop as their living conditions

were improved.

Wallace supported this view.

The upper

middle classes had, by the 1870's, already linked lower

populations to their own financial well-being and were
limiting their reproductive capacities according ly--in

a

very conscious and calculated manner. 4 8

However workers were suspicious of arguments for
limiting their numbers and suggested that they would do so
after they were allowed to better their social situation.
Also,

leaders of the working class saw

a

large population

of workers as conducive to, and perhaps a necessary
4 9
prerequisite for, social unrest and subsequent change.

Thus they too debunked the Malthusian idea that high
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1

:

reproductive rates were an evil.

Another reason that

workers thought unrestricted reproduction was
beneficial
was that they relied on the existence of
large families as
the only practical guarantee of financial support
in their
old age.

0

None of these views were unavailable to Darwin

as they were prominent in the press of the time.

McLaren points to

large body of criticism

a

generated to counter the idea that social change was
impossible due to "natural" population pressure.
Dickens'

From

"Malthusian miser": Scrooge, to Owenite journals,

pot shots were taken at Malthus' claim that it was nature's

fault. 51

Even liberal proponents of birth control as

a

remedy to the Malthusian dicta ran aground this

criticism
In the popular press there were repeated attacks
on the Malthusian contention that unemployment
was a 'natural' problem which could only be
overcome by a restriction of the labour pool.

The liberals, such as Robert Dale Owen, and editors of
the Na t iona

,

pointed to feminist issues arising from

viewing fecundity as

a

"law" of nature.

In the National Linton had analyzed the
inequities of the existing property and divorce
laws, defended Robert Dale Owen and questioned
the morality of a society that executed the
murderer but left unpunished the man who killed
woman by forcing her to bear large numbers of
children. [53]

a

Even establishment liberals, such as John Stuart Mill, made
the distinction.
J.S. Mill argued in Principles of Political
that as women increased their
Economy 184 8
(

)

.

.

.
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political rights so too would they free
themselves from the restraints of their physical
functions. [54]
,

Perhaps the most damning evidence comes from Malthus
himself.
edition)

Shifting his focus from Godwin (in the first
to the Poor Laws

(in the second edition)

Malthus

submits that only through "moral restraint" can the poor
save themselves 55

Thus he recognized that people could

make choices about reproduction, and were not merely

automata. 56

Contemporaries called him to account on this

point, for example Thomas Jarrold 57 and Hazlitt. 58

Hence it is clear that the debate over the

human/nature split was
accessible one.

a

lively, complicated, and

That Darwin could ignore the din of voices

and resuscitate Malthus whole is remarkable for its brazen

disregard for Malthus' place in Victorian culture, even if
it went unremarked by most within the circle of

evolutionary biologists.
The recommendation of "moral restraint," or

deliberate celibacy, was

a

political ploy according to Adam

Smith, and contemporaries stated that it was "a stick to

beat the poor" with. 59

preached with

a

its efficacy."

60

Furthermore, such

bad conscience:

a

policy was

"Malthus had no faith in

Adam Smith's evaluation comes from the

fact that Malthus wanted it "coming and going."

If the

impoverished person listened to reason, he was then driven
by urges too powerful to contain and so would participate
in "vice," according to Malthus.
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"Vice" covered

prostitution, among other things, so that in either
event
population increase was possible, and in the latter

a

there

was also risk of "social disease."

Thus for Malthus the

lower classes were doomed either to breed themselves
out of

existence within marriage, or to breed and/or suffer
disease outside marriage.
One would think that Malthus would embrace birth

control technology as

a

solution to the problem he raises.

The opposite is true; Malthus took great pains to eliminate
the option of controlling fertility

— as

agenda would be lost otherwise. 62

He was forced to deal

his political

with the issue not only because the logic of his argument

demanded it, but because his arch enemy, Condorcet, pointed
out the obvious.
The main point is that Malthus was completely
opposed to birth control in the sense of any
means taken to prevent conception during
intercourse.
In the first edition of An Essay on
the Principle of Population he specifically
attacked Condorcet for alluding to such
stratagems: 'To remove the difficulty in this
way, will, surely, in the opinion of most men,
be, to destroy that virtue and purity of manners,
which the advocates of equality, and of the
perfectibility of man, profess to be the end and
object of their views.' [63]

Malthus was not the only one concerned about this

proposition: John Wade and J.R. McCulloch weighed in on his
side too.

The heat of the protestations underscored the

significance of the debate.

As McLaren puts it:

6 4

Their concern was that the preaching of birth
control could completely undermine both the
economic and moral foundation of their argument.
They saw in it a new optimistic ideology that ran
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COUn6er ° thSir OWn which held that
civilization
1
was based
on self-denial and progress on
competition resulting from pressure of
numbers.
Several points have already been raised on
this topic
in the course of this section.
To recapitulate
a

working class theorists thought that
interested in
science,"

(2)

of poverty,

a

bit, the

Malthus was more

(1)

conservative political agenda than in
social inequalities were the primary source

not overpopulation,

(3)

decline as social status increased,
power resided in numbers, and

(5)

a

workers' numbers would
(4)

present political

decent retirement

depended upon the existence of many sons and daughters
(hoping at least one would support and care for the

retiree)

.

Working class criticisms were coherent and rational to
the extent that they surely demanded an equally thoughtful

response.

Neither Malthus nor Darwin took the trouble to

marshall arguments that specifically dealt with their
opponents'

ideas.

Others concerned themselves with the development of

Neo-Malthusianism, which oddly enough embraced birth
control.

As noted above, Malthus abhorred birth control, 65

although it should be added that he at times proposed,

paradoxically, that infanticide might be acceptable.

66

Middle class neo-Malthusians had linked birth control to

maintenance of raised social-status in the face of
declining economic conditions of the 1860
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7

At first

look one would expect the working
class to

embrace birth control as
increase wages.

a

disproof of Malthus and

a

way to

But not only did they have reasonable

fears over reducing their numbers, as noted above,
but the
very topic of contraception was rendered more
complicated
as it was politically "loaded."

Some working class writers

associated birth control with degenerate sexual practices
of the wealthy.

^

In addition,

some thought that the very

concept of birth control entailed
it

strategic error because

a

placed responsibility on individuals as opposed to

conceptualizing the problem in terms of social groups.
Thus working class resentment of attempts to limit their
f ecundity--such

attempts were often taken as an

illustration of

a

poor.

70

middle class desire to control the

Also, many saw contraception as

a

violation of

Christian ethics: birth control "frustrated" nature and
took godly matters into human hands.

This was not an

argument Darwin could use, being an atheist.

Alongside these criticisms by working class activists
was the suspicion that Malthus was

a

political hack, and

his "law" was nothing more than an excuse to overturn the

Poor Laws and take what little social welfare there was

away from the destitute and the working poor.

72

This

confrontation also brought up issues of sexual politics, as

contraception implied

a

revision of women's position in

society 7 2 and this made many Victorian males nervous,

regardless of class status.
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should also be kept in mind that there
were plenty
of "scientific" arguments opposing
Malthus 74 even if they
dealt with the matter on a plane
inaccessible to most
It

people.

In any case, by the 1880's Malthus'

run its course. 75

indulgence had

Thus by the time Darwin was was

finishing up the Descent

(1871), Malthus' views had already

lost credibility for many.
At this time it is worth considering how
Wallace fits

into this discussion.

We have already seen that he thought

birth rates would fall as the social status of the
poor
improved, and that he favored giving women power over

reproduction.

Obviously his views on the human/nature

split would discount Malthus' argument from the start, even

though he could support the idea that Malthus

's

dicta might

hold at the earliest stages of human development or in
times of crisis.

Furthermore, as

a

phrenologist, Wallace

was positioned in opposition to vested interests of the

middle class: particularly doctors. 76

Thus it is easy to

see why Wallace occupies an ideological position very

unlike that of Darwin, even if at the same time Malthus'
work was crucial to both for discovering the engine of

Natural Selection.
A discussion of the position of physicians within the

Malthusian debate will help give insight into the politics
of Darwin and Huxley, and will hint at concerns that may

have shaped the newly-formed profession of biology.

Darwin and Huxley 7 7 were trained in medicine.
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Both

.

——Professionals

and birth control

Doctors during the Victorian period had

a

professional

interest in controlling the availability
of birth control

measures and devices.

Since Darwin's father was

and he himself was trained as

a

a

doctor,

physician, Darwin was well

placed to appreciate the complexity of the issues

surrounding the sexual and social politics of birth
control
The work of Angus McLaren is particularly interesting
for his explanation of why the medical profession opposed

birth control during the second half of the nineteenth
century.

McLaren claims that doctors, as

a

newly-formed

profession, were attempting to gain social standing within
the middle and upper classes as

entity.

78

a

legitimate professional

This meant they catered to the politics of upper

class patrons and shunned any controversy they could: birth

control seemed to be

a

topic worth avoiding.

Also, McLaren explains why contraception was

particularly troublesome for doctors.

Not only were there

delicate moral and religious considerations, but their
control of the medical market was threatened by others who

wanted to satisfy the demand for contraceptive goods and
services.

The means of birth control: herbs, pills,

condoms, syringes, diaphragms, and sponges, to name
were purveyed by midwives, quacks, and rubber-goods
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a

few,

.

4

.

—

manufacturers, all of whom threatened the
monopoly of
medicine that doctors were attempting to
cement in place. 79
Worse still, the practice of withdrawal
(82% effective)

allowed people to circumvent the marketplace
altogether. 80

a

Additionally, non-professional "interlopers"
presented
most alarming problem, for they advocated self-help
in

medical matters and so threatened the very authority
of the
new prof ession

8 ^

Thus doctors found themselves opposed to

birth control because of social and political forces having
little to do with the merits of birth control itself.
As an outsider

— having

risen from the working class

Wallace was more free to embrace socialism, feminism and
other doctrines opposed to the entrenched status of people
in positions of power.

Phrenology and Spiritualism

presented alternatives to the emerging medical
establishment, and thus took on
as forms of resistance. 88

a

political and social role

Darwin, of course, sat on the

other side to the fence.
Birth control presented other interesting problems for
doctors.

On the one hand, even though the Church tried to

stay out of the fray, 88 Priests did subscribe to the view
that birth control "frustrated" na ture/marr iage/God

8

These ideas were not new: Chaucer called withdrawal
murder.

o c

The commonly held Christian view was that God

had condemned women to bear children, marked certain eggs
and sperms to unite, as it were, and that birth control

would interfere with God's plan.
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In the nineteenth century

many people disagreed with this ideology. 86

It

should be

kept in mind that by mid-century
advances in microscopic
work had put a crimp into the old "frustration"
argument.

Male agency in human reproduction had been
known in

a

very concrete and ocular way since the seventeenth
century.

Antony Von Leeuwenhoek,

a

pioneer in microscope

construction, discovered the sperm in 1677. 87
this allowed for

a

finer articulation of the idea that the

man contributed the child

served merely as

a

At the time

(homunculus)

to the woman

house to the creature.

— who

By 1840,

however, Theodore Ludwig Wilhelm Bischoff (1807-82) had

discovered the human egg, and linked its presence to the
menstrual cycle. 88

This meant that the "frustration"

argument became merely probable at best, since it was

realized that in most cases the sperm and egg failed to
fuse and were unproductive.

Thus God himself ordained

"waste" of eggs and sperm within marriage.

One could still

argue that deference ought be given to higher authority by

allowing Him to choose when to be productive and when to
waste, but this was an adulterated argument at best.
In Darwin's case,

the evolutionary argument could be

applied quite handily to the sperm seeking an egg, thus

dispensing with God's wishes entirely.

As an atheist

evolutionist, the "frustration" argument holds no value
whatsoever.

Therefore one major obstacle to birth control

fell to pieces before Darwin and the evolutionists.
is so

despite rather interesting permutations of the
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This

"
"frustration" argument.

Some doctors went so far as to

claim that the health of males would be placed in jeopardy
if

vital fluids" of the female were not absorbed by the

male during copulation. 89

This argument falls short of the

desired goal of discrediting contracept ion--specif ically
the condom, for the man could gather vital fluids and still

frustrate conception (by timing the use of the condom,
withdraws 1

,

etc

.

)

.

The condom was first referred to in the written

English language in 1705."
to ancient Rome,

if not

Its long history reached back

to 15,000 B.C. 91

In any event,

following the discovery of syphilis in 1500 the condom
became associated with prevention of the pox and with

prostitution.

92

Made of linen or animal intestines, or

after 1844 saw the invention of vulcanization

— rubber,

the

condom was pervasive within all levels of Victorian
society, even if it carried with it

banned by Papal Bull in 1826

a

shady aura 9 7 and was

.

In addition to the problem that birth control would

allow women to partake in sex without the complication of

pregnancy--and thus, according to some turning them into
"prostitutes," 95 was the fact that the middle and upper
class female clients, who doctors served, desired birth

control services.

Faced with

a

fear of public

disapprobation but private practical necessity, the
profession adopted

a

two-faced attitude.

claimed birth control was not
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Publicly, it

medical matter while

professionally (but privately) it
dispensed the needed
goods and services. 96 Also, doctors
avoided research which
could be construed as involving birth
97
control.

Even as

late as 1868, doctors disingenuously
put forward the idea
that "man" did not have the right to
interfere with "life,"

bowing in the direction of the clergy. 98
And yet privately many doctors supported
the use of

any practical means to limit births. 99

By 1850 it was

obvious even to physicians that childbirth
was
and taxing enterprise.

dangerous

a

Limits were medically advisable in

many cases, regardless of professional
concerns or "moral"

problems. 100

Doctors advised prolonged nursing, rhythm

(they had exactly the wrong view of "safe" days)

abstinence.

,

and

These methods avoided most objections, and so

allowed their contradiction-filled ideology and practice to
remain intact. 101
Yet the immense pressure brought to bear on physicians
in favor of birth control produced more and more evidences
of an active professional role in regulating female

reproductive rates.

Physicians, as it were "accidentally

and unknowingly," supplied clients with more "invasive"

birth control technology than their public stance would
lead one to believe was possible.

Pessaries, long used to

prevent conception or induce abortion (1860 B.C. crocodile
dung, wax, various herbs) and the sponge were prescribed
for the vexing "uterine tilt." 102

Although

a

controversial

treatment within the medical establishment, the discussion
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did not venture into the birth control
issue. 103

"bring on

a

Pin s

to

period" which was for "some reason" late
were

also dispensed.

Doctors in public discussions seemed

confused about the nature of these pills,
yet
obvious what they were for. 104

it was

This quandary became

particularly manifest as pregnant women sought
abortion to
remedy their situation and dismissed the moral
quibbles of
doctors by advancing the claim that "quickening" did
not
occur for four and one-half months.

Physicians reported to

one another that many women argued that they had a
right to
an abortion. 105 Both the notions of "quickening" and

'female rights" were obviously and professedly outside the

domain of medicine, and this only made the situation worse,
as the whole point was to avoid contentious issues.

By mid-century doctors acknowledged medically valid

reasons for utilizing birth control and by 1877 it was

common knowledge that birth control was used widely and
doctors were major players within the enterprise.

Yet

political and social considerations drove the profession to
oppose all forms of birth control in the public arena. 106
It should be clear by now that many forms of

contraception were available throughout the nineteenth
century.

Furthermore, public knowledge about the

technologies was extensive.
time.

This was true even in Malthus'

Following on the heels of Malthus' Essay

,

Francis

Place distributed pamphlets (1823) and books which detailed
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the technique of withdrawal and
use of the sponge,

Place
set his enterprise in the context of
helping people within
the institution of marriage, which
helped to legitimate his
107
endeavor.
He linked social reform with birth
control in

order to formulate an answer to Malthus.

Despite one

historian's claim that not until 1870 was birth
control

discussable in polite society, 108 just about anyone
who
could read had ready access to literature on
the

topic and

anyone engaged with the marketplace had access to the

various and diverse technologies of the day.
Nor were mainstream philosophers and social reformers

oblivious to the situation.
at the use of the sponge;

on contraception

In 1797 Jeremy Bentham hinted

1824 saw Mill writing an article

(without attribution)

;

and in 1826 Richard

Carlile blatantly wrote about the subject.

About this time

the marketplace exploded with birth control literature.

Knowl ton published his book The Fruits of Philosophy in
1832 in New York, and 1834 in London.

From 1834-1876 his

work ran through 1,000 copies

Darwin, being well

a

year.

read, in most probability knew about this literature at the

time he read Malthus in 1838. 109

All during the time

Darwin was formulating his theories, Robert Dale Owen's
book, Mora 1 Physiology
1877). 110

condom. 111

,

raced through 75,000 copies

(by

Owen advocated withdrawal, the sponge and the
Even though many Doctors prescribed birth

control for their middle and upper class patients, and the
lower classes relied on the devices and pharmaceuticals
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readily available in the marketplace,
it is true that birth
control remained a controversial topic.
There were cases
of official harassment of those who
advocated contraception
too vocally.

Dr. Charles Knowlton's trial landed him

3

months hard labor in 1876, 112 although this was
due to the
graphic illustration in his book, not, strictly
speaking,
due to his advocacy of birth control. 113

The trial however proved

a

boon to sales.

In three

months, during the trial, 125,000 copies of Knowlton's book
sold.

By 1890 175,000 copies of Besant

circulation.

'

s

pamphlet were in

Charles Brandlagh and Annie Besant,

infuriated by the court's attack on Knowlton, forced the
court to take them to task for their provocative pamphlet

specially created for the situation and through
trial won their case in 1877. 115

jury

a

They contended that is

was hypocrisy to publicly censure what was privately

accepted, and forced the judicial system to acknowledge the

legitimacy of birth control literature.

Whether one considers the brisk trade in pills, herbs,
diaphragms, condoms, syringes, and sponges or the major

enterprise of publishing, birth control was common
knowledge, widely practiced, and semi-off icia 1 ly condoned.
This was so despite the Lord Amberley affair

— in

which his

public support of birth control cost him his seat in

Parliament and removed him from polite society. 116
Doctors, however, because of their pretensions to upward

mobility and their fear of competition were particularly
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loud in public condemnation of those
who would advocate

contraception.

There were those within the field who

regarded the hypocrisy as ridiculous.

Dr.

Henry Albutt in

1880 attempted to gather support among physicians
for the

Neo-Ma 1 thusian movement.

He was attacked and struck from

the medical register for "having published The Wife's

Handbook " in 1886.
went on to make

a

This did not stop him however.

He

sixpence pamphlet in order to distribute

information to the poor.

He proclaimed that the

persecution that followed was due to other Doctors' wishes
to protect their monopoly and maintain pretenses

Thus

even contemporaries made vocal and powerful criticisms of
the situation.

Just how important Malthus was to Darwin in terms of
the applicability of the survival of the fittest doctrine
to humans can be gauged by the location of Malthus'

the Descent

.

work in

The argument that man is descended from the

animal kingdom starts in Chapter
in anatomical structure.

I

with appeals to homology

Chapter II provides the engine

for the descent by invoking Malthus on human increase.

Thus Malthus occupies

a

crucial point in the argument.

Given the vast political discourse on the topic of the
"necessity" of positive checks to human population growth,
it

is clear that

in Victorian terms it was not necessary to

assume that contemporary population controls must be
limited to poverty, disease and lack of food.
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Yet Darwin

.

chose to take this view, without reference to the

controversial nature of the position.

He wrote:

The greater death-rate of infants in the poorest
classes is also very important [in restraining
population growth]; as well as the greater
mortality, from various diseases, of the
inhabitants of crowded and miserable houses, at
all ages. [119]

Darwin treats this situation as

a

stable, transparent fact,

provided by an untainted source--Ma 1 thus
Was this use of Malthus necessary to Darwin's thesis
on "Man?"

Logically speaking, no.

He could have utilized

Malthus to describe the "savage" condition of early or

uncivilized "man."

He could have emphasized his position

on sympathy and allowed that Malthus'

dicta is inapplicable

to humans in advanced society, or he could have argued that

contraception was unacceptable or ineffective and therefore
Malthus' point still applied.

He did neither.

From what has been shown it should be clear that

Darwin had

a

particular conservative political/biological

agenda in mind when he constructed the Origin and his

Descent of Man

.

He opposed socialism, feminism and

a

special status for "man," and his materialist metaphysics

provided

a

basis for rejecting these views and drove him to

reproduce and rely on Malthus' pessimistic ideology.
If Darwin had allowed the possibility of control over

fertility his scientific enterprise as applied to humans
would lose its logic.

The collapse of necessity for

emigration based on over-population would ultimately lead
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to questioning of the need for
Europeans to form colonies

and dominate Natives.

Also, Darwin's reductive psychology

and moral theory would be thrown into
disarray.

Thus just

as doctors feared contraception for its
impact on their

social status, both as professionals and as men,
Darwin's

Descent had much to lose by failing to invoke Malthus'

conservative politics under the guise of scientific purity

3.

Biology and politics

Evaluation of Darwin's place in the creation of racist
biology must take into account the revolutionary nature of
his theory.

For instance, the Victorian doctors' claim

that "man" had no right to "interfere" with God's plan

through the use of contraception falls apart once Lyle's
dicta on only admitting natural causes is adopted.

Furthermore, given knowledge of the role of egg and sperm
in reproduction,

Darwin's new biology called out for

regulation of reproduction.
form of

a

Such regulation could take the

repressive policy of eugenics, or it could give

impetus for alleviating the conditions of the poor.

In

itself, the removal of religion's hold over reproductive

ideology was neither progressive or regressive--but it held
a

liberating potential which Darwin resisted and Wallace

utilized

368

.

If

it

is granted that humans should
exercise their

power in this regard, then the political
agenda of the
conservatives such as Malthus and Darwin—
are put into

—

relief and can be evaluated in terms of
politics.

Thus

when Wallace criticizes colonial practices
one can

understand why Darwin did not wish to discuss the
topic.
To discuss would be to elevate to
consciousness and to

legitimate

Given the existence of political debate and

technologies of contraception, Darwin must be criticized
for failing to address the political content of
Malthus.
In so far as Darwin's use of Malthus promoted a
repression

of the poor,

colonialism and racism, he stands culpable for

promoting these political programs.

The commonly offered

opinion of contemporary scholars that Darwin's politics are

unassailable because "all Victorian men held such views"

is

simply false.

B.

Darwin's Circle

Of the core group of evolutionary scientists— Darwin,

Wallace, Huxley, Lyell, Hooker and Gray, four took

significant voyages in the name of science.

Of the four

within this circle of fellow scientists three had the

opportunity to visit non-European indigenous peoples.
These voyages provided an experiential basis which not only
369
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Illustration 19: Portrait of T.H. Huxley. 120

helped create attitudes about Natives, but which modified

preconceptions and provided evidence for arguments to be
constructed much later.

Given the importance of the debate

over the status of Natives, accounts of these travels

provide

a

window into the Victorian formation of both

biological and racial concepts.
Darwin, on one extreme, spent little time with

"natives."

Wallace, on the other, spent virtually all of

his time living amongst "savages."

Huxley's experience is

especially interesting in this regard, as he visited
Australia and New Guinea--where the "lowest" of "savages"
dwelt
There is

a

second reason for giving the voyage of the

HMS Rattlesnake our attentions.

Since Huxley placed human

culture, especially ethics, outside the domain of biology,
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Illustration 20: Map of Huxley's voyage 121
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it

can be expected that his attitude
towards foreign social

arrangements might differ from Darwin's and
reveal another
facet of Victorian experience of the
"other."

Indeed

,

Huxley's trip and his subsequent writings on

the status of Natives presents
to Darwin and Wallace.

a

position intermediate

On the one hand, at times Huxley

treats "low" human development as if it were akin
to animal

existence (1893)

.

He describes a gradient of consciousness

leading from animals to "man."

Where the cosmopoetic energy works through
sentient beings, there ar ises
that which we
call pain or suffering.
This baleful product of
evolution increases in quantity and in intensity,
with advancing grades of animal organization,
until it attains its highest level in man. [122]
.

Then he draws

a

.

.

line between "civilized man" and "savages."

Further, the consummation is not reached in man,
the mere animal; nor in man, the whole or half
savage; but only in man, the member of an
organized polity. And it is a necessary result
of his attempt to live in this way; that is,
under those conditions which are essential to the
full development of his noblest powers. [123]
In this case

"true" humanity, which includes "real"

suffering, eludes the Native.

However he does not entirely

accept Darwin's cusp of humanity, but displays an

ambivalence.

Despite the quip above, in another work, "On

the Methods and Results of Ethnology"

(1865)

he asserts

that the human mental constitution is essentially uniform,

even if there are variations:
...the minds of men being everywhere
similar, differing in quality and quantity but
not in kind or faculty... [124]
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:

In the end Huxley places an absolute
gap between man and

animal in terms of consciousness, 125

rational speech, 126

and ethics, 126 as we have already noted.

art,

Since he ultimately drew

a

sharp distinction between

the human and the natural, it is to be expected that
the

term "savage" would have the potential to float free of its

biologized moorings.
Homer he calls

a

Nor are his readers disappointed:

"half savage Greek, 12 ^ and he refers to

"many of the best minds of these

days

[1868]" as stricken

like savages before an solar eclipse in their confrontation

with materialism.
(1863)

1561

In terms of craniometries, Huxley

disconnects brain size from human evolutionary

status
It [the Engis skull] is, in fact, a fair average
human skull, which might have belonged to a
philosopher, or might have contained the
thoughtless brains of a savage. [131]

In discussing the burning question of the science of human

origins, or ethnological philology, he points out in "On
the Aryan Question"

[1890]

that all humans share the

ability to learn any language, thus language is no marker
of origin or race:
It

is therefore conceivable that the structure of

this highly complex speaking apparatus should
determine a man’s linguistic potent ia 1 ity ... it is
further conceivable that a particular linguistic
potentiality should be inherited and become as
I do not
.But
good a race mark as any other
for
the
ground
good
think there is any
supposition that an infant of any race would be
unable to learn, and to use with ease, the
language of any other race of men among whom it
History abundantly proves
might be brought up.
the transmission of languages from some races to
.
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.

.

.

°th e r s; and there is is no evidence,
that I know
of, to show that any race is incapable
of
substituting a foreign idiom for its native
tongue. [132]
Yet his use of the term savage was
not always devoid
of condescension and insult: when
contrasting the human to

the natural in Evolution and Ethics

[1893]

he places human

ethical behavior at odds with conduct in the
struggle for
survival:

"the life of. ..a brutal savage." 133

For

a

more

complete understanding of his view of the Native, we
must
turn to his travels.
In Behind the Picture Marnie Bassett covers
the voyage

of the HMS Rattlesna ke from 1846-1850.

Besides telling

a

gripping story, Bassett provides an account that reads like
a

proof arguing for the depravity of the Native.

Right off

[October 1848, Solomon Islands] Benjamin Boyd met his end
at the hands of unseen Natives while seeking food. 134

Given the dangers it does not seem overly odd that
Huxley let most opportunities to go on shore pass him by.

Literature occupied his time.
Anchored in the steaming heat of Rockingham Bay
he found he could do nothing but sleep and read
novels a kind of dreaming. [135]

—

Later, while the ship surveyed the "Inner Passage" he

concentrated on Dante's Inferno 136
.

Initial contact with the Natives was tempered by the

knowledge that they had reasons to hate Europeans, even

if

the ship's artist, Brierly, showed enthusiastic interest.

The process of debarking [equipment and supplies
to the Tam 0 Shanter was closely watched from
'

]
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the shore by a party of nat i ves

— not

said

Bnerly, remembering the blacks far south,
,

debased by long contacts with whites, 'not your
spirit drinking emaciated and worn out creatures
but the real children of the Forest with
all the
excitement of the possibility of treachery or an
attempt on one's life'.
The Fly, he here reminded himself, on her
recent visit to Rockingham Bay, 'killed two men
at this Island [Gould Island]--a slight
circumstance in no way calculated to put one at
ease while on shore among them'. He hoped if
possible to get speech with the natives assembled
to watch the disembarkation, a wish typical of an
interest that on board the Rat t lesnake earned him
the nickname of 'the niggeriser'. [137]

Typically,

Huxley missed it, for he spent the day on

a

small neighbouring island chasing the elusive

cockatoos..."

1

O O

Long inactive, he volunteered for the

first of two Kennedy expeditions.

After six days of rough

exploring" they returned to the ship.

Denied permission

to go on the longer trip, Huxley was disappointed but this

misfortune probably saved his life: only three people
escaped starvation, disease and Native spears. 139

Towards

the end of the rescue mission that ensues the sailors

refuse to go ashore into Native territory. 140
If

Bassett's rendering of the story is indicative of

anything, it is that Native life is deficient in morals and

dangerous.

In one of the most chilling episodes of

Kennedy's doomed flight through the jungle the Natives'
appear to offer

a

solution to the explorers' need for food.

In a few days the blacks returned, bringing a few
of their gins as if to show that they had no
hostile intentions. These women were as wellbuilt as the men; both differed in many ways
from any natives he [Carron] had seen and seemed
to be of a much finer race than those in
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Rockingham Bay... On this visit they offered
fish
too stale to be eaten even by themselves,
and a
paste of roasted mangrove seeds pounded
with
leaves and roots; the paste was accepted, though
disagreeable in taste and gritty with sand.
[141]
It was a trap the hungry men fell

into.

By offering food

unfit to eat, the Natives were sizing up their
prey.

attack soon commenced.

The

Kennedy died of spear wounds and

only his guide, the aboriginal Jackey Jackey, made
it out
of the jungle.

(Three others,

left behind at an earlier

time due to their weakened condition, were rescued by

Jackey leading the crew of the Ariel

.

The voyage of the Ratt l esnak e provided two definitive

instances which could readily be interpreted as
depravity.

a

proof of

Jackey's status at first look seems to prove

that the Native could, with sufficient contact with

Europeans, rise up out of the natural condition his race
was subject to.

Jackey spoke English and managed to

survive where an expert such as Kennedy failed to hang onto
his life.

Furthermore, Jackey's knowledge of the jungle

proved more reliable than that of the English.

In the

return to see if the abandoned men of Kennedy's group had
survived, the map identified one location, while Jackey's

memory indicated another for "Pudding Pan Hill."
...as the Arie l approached the chart's Pudding
Pan Hill, Jackie was quite positive a mistake had
been made; the place they sought, he said was
further south. Vallack and Dobson, consulting
together, hesitated whether to abide by the
printed chart or Jackey's unsupported certainty:
Jackey, seeing their doubt, called them to the
foretop, 'Do you think I am stupid?...' [142]
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Yet his good judgement only proved his depravity, for after

the glory was heaped upon him for his part in the rescue,
he defected:

Not far from the Library [Mitchell Library in
Sydney, Australia], is a tablet put up by the
Colonial Government to commemorate Kennedy and
his companions; on it all, including Jackey, are
individually named, and the figure of Jackey is
sculptured in bas-relief holding the dying
Kennedy in his arms. Jackey' s heroism was widely
praised and he received an official reward of a
small sum of money--a gift of doubtful benefit to
such as he.
After this, his qualities of
courage, skill and devotion--qualities typical of
an unsophisticated intelligent Aboriginal--were
apparently no longer called on; without such
stimulus he went back to his tribe and fell into
idyl ways.
Only a few years afterwards, wrapped
in the traditional blackf e 1 low s blanket, stupid
with drink he fell one day into the camp fire and
died of the resulting burns. [143]
1

This meteoric rise and fall only demonstrated one

half of the required syllogism: that the Native cannot
vault himself up into proper English culture.

The flip

side of the argument is still left standing: that the

worthy fellow knew both forms of life and preferred his
own.

Thus even his drunkenness and ignoble end held an

uncomfortable aspect of judgement--a judgement that had
been proven in

a

fire Englishmen had failed to survive.

Yet the Rattles n ake was not done with this project.

On the 16th of October, 1849, the crew discovered Mrs.

Thompson (born Crawford)

.

This Scotts woman had been saved

from drowning by Natives and she lived amongst them on
14 4
Southern Prince of Wales Island for roughly six years.

Having no contact with Europeans, she learned the language

377

and customs of the savages.

Huxley writes in his diary

that she spoke well of her captors:
Of the kindness and good disposition of
the men
she speaks in the highest terms, and of the
women
too she speaks well but says that some of them
were not so kind. [147]

She had witnessed awful ceremonies
She has already given us a great deal of curious
information about the habits of these people,
with an air of the most perfect truth and
sincerity, and with no little intelligence. One
story was rather startling.
She says that a
little to the N. and W. of us there is a tribe of
very bad natives, and that one night they lighted
a very large fire on their beach as a challenge
to the P. of Wales Id. blacks, to come over and
fight them. Her friends, no wise backward,
lighted a fire on their side to show that the
challenge had been accepted, and one night
embarking all their disposable force in six
canoes landed very secretly on the main. They
stole up on an encampment of their enemies and
falling upon them suddenly killed two men, a
woman and a child. They cut off the heads of
these and returned in great triumph, making a
hideous noise upon a conch, to the island. A
great corobbory was celebrated and the four heads
having been placed on one of their rude ovens
they ate the eyes and pieces of the cheeks of
their enemies "to make them brave" as they said.

The repulsion of ritualized cannibalism aside, the fact
that the woman enjoyed Native society and then rejected it
in favor of a European existence suggests the superiority

of English ways.

Thus Jackey's demise, taken in context,

is but the prolegomenon to the proof that Bassett

constructs, however unknowingly.
Overall, the tenor of Bassett's account fails to

comprehend the complexity of Huxley's motivations.

After

describing the his reluctance to leave off reading books he
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could have read at another time— it is
difficult to

understand why he would suddenly volunteer to
go with
Kennedy.
To some extent, Huxley was prone to
depression,
as all his biographers note,

expected.

so swings in mood were to be

In any event Huxley's diary suddenly mushrooms

during his fourth cruise, the period of May 1849 to January
1850.

Julian Huxley writes:
Although the third cruise only lasted a few weeks
less than the fourth, Huxley's gloom on the
former and his delight in recording every detail
of his contacts with native life during the
latter have led to a great disparity in the two
relevant sections of the Diary.
Indeed the
entries for the fourth cruise take up more than
three times as much space... [149]
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Throughout his diary Huxley expresses
the Natives.

a

desire to meet

His wish is expressed in terms of curiosity

and humor:

We saw natives on the beach and parties of them
engaged in fishing close to the reef, but they
were too far off to make out their ugly mugs.
Some of the canoes had large lateen sails.
I
hope we shall be nearer neighbours. [150]
It

is also tinged with fear, aggravated,

lack of

a

no doubt, by the

common language:
There were a great many bananas ... and like these
yams were planted quite irregularly.
On
returning to the beach I found that the natives
had come round the point and from all I could
hear I suppose they must have imagined that we
were taking French leave with their cocoa-nuts
and yams.
One of them ... appeared very angry...
and posing his spear made up to Robinson .. .who
took it very coolly, just bringing his gun to his
hand in readiness and looking at the fellow, who
on coming closer thought better of it... though
had I been in Robinson's place I should most
undoubtedly have shot the man.
I
don't see the
fun of waiting till you have a spear through you
before you fire. [151]

In several

instances he maintains the view that firing

first to defend oneself, even if fear of the other was

unfounded, is sound policy.
That Yule did rightly in firing cannot I think
admit of doubt.
But it is to be lamented that
the taking of the pig [from the Natives] without
a fair exchange should have put our people in the
position of aggressors. That the natives
intended any hostilities when they came is wholly
absurd, as the fact of bringing their women and
children shows. [152]
Yet despite this policy of shoot-first and regret later,

Huxley comes again and again to the opinion that human
similarity outweighs differences.
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He does not, as Darwin

.

would, place

a

vast divide between savage
and civilized

peoples
The girls were very merry and
unconstrained
U<
Perfectly modest in their behaviour.
TheyY
coo
half lnclined to have a dance
too
but
had
no/’th
not
the courage.
It amused me very much to see
how perfectly women are women
all the world over.

^

Men too, are of an identical sort,
even if they do not
share similar cultural complexities.
The Natives have no idea of moral or
legal
obligation. No fixed punishments are
annexed to
any cr imes ... Unchastity before marriage
is
thought nothing of.
Afterwards, its punishment
depends pretty much on the temper of the husband.
He would be considered quite justified,
however,
in spearing both parties if taken flagrante
otherw ise, Mrs. T. very naively told us
tn8t the husband s wrath would be very likely
regulated by the state of the guisdi Hi [?]
if
that were kept full of yams he would probably
shut his eyes.
It is astonishing how similar man
is to man from "China to Peru". [154]
1

.

Like Wallace he passes no judgement upon the
"strange,"

"violent" or "unacceptable" practices of the Natives.

His

recounting of the cannibalism as described by Mrs. Thompson
above betrays no judgements of his own.

He does not reveal

the desire to "upgrade" the Natives, but rather like

Wallace criticizes the missionaries:
The people seem happy, the means of subsistence
are abundant, the air warm and balmy, they are
untroubled with "the malady of thought", and so
far as I see civilization as we call it would be
rather a curse than a blessing to them.
I could
little admire the mistaken goodness of the
"Stigginses" of Exeter Hall, who would send
missionaries to these men and tell them that they
will all infallibly be damned. [155]
At points he admires their material culture,

especially its beauty.
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Brierly and I spent [Dec. 5th, 1849] the greater
part of yesterday on the island [Mount Ernes
Island, or Trage]...and then visited the houses,
the Wowres "
then we went and sat down in the
beautiful "chapel", studying lights and shades in
most artistic fashion, as we proceeded with our
drawings ... We knew the hot sun was pouring down a
flood of light and heat out side ... The silence and
the gloom heightened the strange appearance of
the fantastic savage monument.
You might have
fancied it a temple for the performance of
strange and horrible savage rites, had it not
looked so utterly peaceful... I shall never forget
the beauty of the place? while in it I felt as if
listening to beautiful music. [156]
.

.

.

This was the second trip to this spot.

Two days before he

had witnessed its charm:

Seeing a native path leading into the bush I
began poking my nose into it... and passing
through a low arched opening, we came at once
into a most beautiful opening in the brush arched
over by magnificent trees and so shade and cool,
with such a "dim religious light" pervading it,
it looked quite like a chapel, and indeed the
name would not be wholly inappropriate, for there
was a strange sort of fantastic monument in this
savage sanctuary.
Suppose a great screen of
posts five or six feet high supporting vertically
a long wall-like plaited mat, cut at each end so
that the upper ends overhung the lower, and their
ends fringed with long hanging strips of grass.
The tops and offshoots of the posts were covered
with huge reddened Fusus shells. The front of
the screen was set with regular series of the
spider shell, also reddened, and stuck up against
the foot of the screen were a number of flat
stones of all shapes carved and painted with
hideous human faces. [157]

Given Huxley's more mature view of human emergence,
it

is not

surprising that even at the distance of many

leagues and the remove of many years, he could still say in
1882

:

...it has been my fate to know many lands and
many climates, and to be familiar, by personal
experience, with almost every form of society,
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from uncivilised savage of Papua and
Australia
and the civilised savages of the slums
and dens
of the poverty-stricken parts of great
cities, to
those who perhaps, are occasionally the somewhat
over-civilised members of our upper ten thousand.
And I have never found, in any of these
conditions of life, a deficiency of something
which was attractive. Savagery has its
pleasures, I assure you, as well as

civilisation

It

[158]

was fitting for him to mention the poor, for early

on in his life

(1839)

as part of his preparation for

medical training he encountered the impoverished people
of
East End London.

—

saw strange things there among the rest,
people who came to me for medical aid, and who
were really suffering from nothing but slow
starvation.
I have not f orgotten--am not likely
to forget so long as memory holds
a visit to a
sick girl in a wretched garret where two or three
other women, one a deformed woman, sister of my
patient, were busy shirt-making.
After the
examination, even my small medical knowledge
sufficed to show that my patient was merely in
want of some better food than the bread and bad
tea on which these people were living.
I
said so as
gently as I could, and the sister turned upon me
with a king of choking passion. Pulling out of
her pocket a few pence and halfpence, and holding
them out, "That is all I get for six and thirty
hours' work, and you talk about giving her proper
food." [159]
I

—

He struggles with the Malthusian dicta,

in the end deciding

that the rationality of enforced eugenics is illusory:

However, I doubt whether even the keenest judge
of character, if he had before him a hundred boys
and girls under fourteen, could pick out, with
the least chance of success, those who should be
kept, as certain to be serviceable members of the
polity, and those who should be chloroformed, as
equally sure to be stupid, idle, or vicious. The
"points" of a good or bad citizen are really far
harder to discern than those of a puppy or a
short-horn calf; many do not show themselves
before the practical difficulties of life
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stimulate manhood to full exertion.
And by that
time the mischief is done.
The evil stock, if it
aC
ie
n Ulti
selection
is nul lified^ [l6 0]

^

'

^'

He preempted the Social Darwinists
by pointing to the

complexities of human development even before
the
rediscovery of Mendel.

Like Darwin he feared the moral

cost of active eugenics would be disruption
of social

cooperation

,

rendering the enactment of Malthus’ hard

reason self-defeating.
Yet even if Huxley argued against devaluing
the lives
of the poor and the savage, he was not immune
to an

ideology of superiority.

Black and White"

(1865)

,

in his article

"Emancipation-

he perpetuates the idea of white

male supremacy:
It may be quite true that some negroes are better
than some white men; but no rational man,
cognisant of the facts, believes that the average
negro is the equal, still less the superior, of
the average white man.

Able to restrain himself no longer, he launches into what
he believes to be a humorous vein:

And, if this be true, it is simply incredible
that, when all his disabilities are removed, and
our prognathous relative has a fair field and no
favour, as well as no oppressor, he will be able
to compete successfully with his bigger-brained
and smaller- jawed rival, in a contest which is to
be carried on by thoughts and not by bites. [162]

Oddly enough, despite the title and initial topic of
the article, Huxley launches into

a

different but related

theme that occupies his mind: sexual equality.
pages, only two and

a

Of the ten

bit pages deal with the race
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:

.

question, the rest belongs to consideration
of the
education of women. His condescending wit
again lashes
out

Let us have "sweet girl graduates" by
all means.
They will be none the less sweet for a little
wisdom; and the "golden hair" will not curl
less
gracefully outside the head by reason of there
being brains within. [163]

Huxley's argument is that women, like blacks, are
inferior
but none the less deserve to be given

a

chance to prove

what powers they might possess.

Recognise the fact that they [girls] share the
senses, perceptions, feelings, reasoning powers,
emotions, of boys, and that the mind of the
average girl is less different from that of the
average boy, than the mind of one boy is from
that of another. [164]
He concludes with a plea for fairness:

The duty of man is to see that not a grain is
piled upon that load beyond what Nature imposes;
that injustice is not added to inequality. [165]
The plea is based upon two points.

justice or equal opportunity.

On the one hand, upon

On the other, that

— slavery based on racial or sexual
characteristics — harms the perpetrator. In this
oppression

he

anticipates Lacan's reading of Hegel's master and slave
dialectic
Thus Huxley presents additional evidence
that an emergentist metaphysics tended to restrain the

virulence of the racism inherent in Darwin's formulation of

evolutionary theory.

It also acted as a break upon sexism,

even if Huxley was not immune from either racism or sexism.
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Given Huxley's love of clever
and biting arguments it is
worth keeping in mind that he often
positioned himself in
order to maximize impact.
Thus when arguing for

evolutionary theory against anti-evolutionists,
he stresses
the similarity of man and ape in
terms of bodily
development. On the other hand, when
discussing moral
theory, he emphasizes uniqueness.

Unlike Darwin, he severs

evolutionary success and what is ethically
best.
There is another fallacy which appears
to me to
pervade the so-called "ethics of evolution."
it
not i° n that because, on the whole, animals
and plants have advanced in perfection of
organization by means of the struggle for
existence and the consequent 'survival of the
fittest'; therefore men in society, men as
ethical beings, must look to the same process to
help them towards perfection
[166]

Huxley reminds the reader that fitness is situational.
Thus it may be the savage that is fittest, should the

climate shift:^^
...if it became hotter, the pleasant valleys of
the Thames and Isis might be uninhabitable by any
animated beings save those that flourish in a
tropical jungle. They, as the fittest, the best
adapted to the changed conditions, would survive.

That he could suggest that the savage might after all
be the fittest version of "man" is not without precedent.

Although he would not praise the Native to the extent that

Wallace would, he was more willing than Darwin to admit the
virtues of the Other.

It is no accident that Huxley and

Wallace should agree on this topic, for they both shared
favorable and rare contact with indigenous peoples and

a

metaphysics that conceptualized human culture as outside
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a

]

the survival of the fittest
doctrine's domain.

Huxley

does waffle on the uniformity of human
consciousness.

Attention to the work of others in Darwin's
circle
reveals further evidence of a connection
between
emergent ist metaphysics and progressive social
theory.
The
work of Asa Gray (1810-1888), evolutionist in
the United
States, focuses on the problem of "man's" status.
He goes

further than Wallace (of the middle period

— marked

by

Wallace's belief in natural evolution of the body, but
an
emergent mind) by claiming

a

special creation for humans.

But, as the author [Darwin] speaks disrepectf ul
ly
of spontaneous generation, and accepts a
supernatural beginning of life on earth ... there
seems as great likelihood that one special
origination should be followed by another upon
fitting occasion (such as the introduction of
man ...
168
[

Of course Darwin only allowed for divine intervention

due to lack of evidence about origins and

placate theists by placing biology on

a

a

strategy to

par with physics.

He has no real need of divine action, as an accidental

combination of the inorganic into the organic was just as
acceptable an origination.
The rub comes with too much emergence or too little.
A "shortage" of emergence is theoretically possible in terms

of the long and branching development of "man."

Thus

a

hierarchy of races might result from one race splitting off
from another and becoming "higher."

"Too much" emergence,

separate special creations of each race, can result in the
same thing.
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Any three or more of the human
races, for
a e ,?P ecies °r not species,
according to
theTen^
the bent of£ the naturalist's mind.
[169]

That is to say that if there was only
one special creation
then differences of race are merely
local, but if there are
several creations then differences are
perhaps significant.
But "Darwin's theory brings us the
other way to the same
result," 170 on his view because Darwin
allows any number
of ways for the races to have evolved.
Thus on Gray's view the mere fact of emergence
does
not require the view that all races are equally
human.

However his religious views tie this knot.
It is only the backwards glance
that reveals
anything a larming
The very first step backward
makes the negro and the Hottentot our bloodrelat ions not that reason or Scripture objects
to that, though pride may. [171]
.

He does draw the line at

.

.

linking apes to humans.

Fortunately, however--even if we must account for
him scientifically man with his two feet stands
upon a foundation of his own. [172]

—

As of 1873 the debate over the turf of atheist biology

was still quite hot.

In his article "The Attitude of

Working Naturalists Toward Darwinism" (The Nation
16,

1873)

a

,

string of evolutionists are discussed.

October
Of

Lyell, Owen, Candolle, Flower, Phillips, Allman, Bentham
(George)

,

Dawson, Spencer, Henslow, and Hodge, only two:

Darson and Owen resist Darwin.
with them support for

a

As for the rest. Gray finds

theist version of Natural

Selection, and claims it is the only good way to proceed.
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Against those who would argue that
Darwinism

is

inherently

atheistical, he points to theist versions:
One would suppose that Dr. Dawson
mi ght discern
at least as much of a divine foundat
ion to Nature
as Herbert Spencer and Mathew
Arnold ...
[

173

]

Further investigation of the circle of
natural ists in terms
of emergence and Social Darwinism
would be int eresting and
add additional depth to our understanding.
At this point

it

is clear that the combination of
religion a nd

emergentist metaphysics provided

resistance to the abuses

a

inherent in Social Darwinism.

C.

Conclusion to Chapter Four

The work of Wallace, Malthus and Huxley tell us much

about Darwin's theory.

Without an understanding of the

roots and wider context of Darwinian evolutionary theory,

Darwin

s

social and political theory tends to remain

hidden or viewed as tangential.

Disagreement over the

boundaries and content of science, biology and religion

provided

a

rich area of debate.

The topic of birth control

by itself demonstrates the complexity of the amalgam of

science and social/political matters.

At the core of the

differences between Wallace and Darwin lies the issue of
reductive materialism.
with

a

Darwin's metaphysics provided him

way to amass evidence and coalesce theory.

Malthus had restricted himself to
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a

description of

If

.

reproduction versus food supply, Darwin
would have had to
invent Malthus' politics.
Ma 1 thus

'

ideological content, once thrown into relief,

makes Darwin's unabashed use of his ideas
indicate the
extent to which biological theory was
entwined with

politics.

Even if one ignores the availability of birth

control devices, procedures and drugs, the fact
remains
that working class critics and others offered an array
of

cogent and interesting objections to Malthus' ideas.

That

Darwin could recapitulate Malthus' work whole, and weave
into

it

doctrine that ultimately argued for oppression

a

of the poor and the Savage is remarkable.

That critics

fail to notice the scientific/social/political needs

driving Victorian science, or dismiss manifest
social and political content as merely commonly held

ideology, is indicative of the rip "pure science" ideology
has on scholars.

Huxley's writings also provide interesting

illumination of Darwin's work.

Since he, too, failed to

mention birth control, and was highly critical of Wallace's

introduction of Spirits to explain the unique status of
humans,

it might be expected that as "Darwin's Bulldog" he

would also offer an ideology of domination akin to
Darwin

'

s

However Huxley's work is more similar to Wallace's
than to Darwin's.

By emphasizing Darwin's view that morals

take "man" outside the domain of nature, at least for
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a

.

time, Huxley fights for the
concept of human emergence and
this philosophical move resulted
in a much more tolerant

attitude towards women, the poor,
and the Native, even if
he argues for white male superiority.
In this way the
commitment to emergence, coupled with
attitudes resulting
from favorable contacts with Native
cultures during his
youth, created a more benign version
of European belief in
their own superiority.
That Huxley argues for
the end of

Empire speaks for itself, even if it is
driven by the
selfish desire to avoid the corrosive effects of

domination
Despite the centrality of the topic, as trained
medical practitioners Huxley and Darwin must have felt

pressure to avoid the birth control issue.
might also incline them to silence.

Sexual politics

On Darwin's part,

admission of the possibility of conscious human control
over reproduction was tantamount to rejection of
cont inuity--and could create problems for his view that

evolution occurs at the individual level only.

Thus the

topic was dangerous and subversive to "purely scientific"

matters in countless ways.

While Huxley would share concerns over medical
hegemony, as we have seen in Evolution and Ethics he argues
that humans do step outside the dictates of Malthus.

explains this leap with appeals to

a

He

vague principle of

sympathy, and to cooperation, with his primary focus upon

ethics as an uplifting agency.
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Ethical behavior is

distinguished from competitive behavior, thus with
this
philosophical distinction Darwinian individualism is
rendered inapplicable to the case of contemporary "man."
Hence Huxley does not specifically need the technology of
birth control to generate difference with animals, although
his view is not compromised or contradicted by the

existence of such measures

— for

enhanced by such technology.
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it

is on the

contrary

.

,
,

.
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CHAPTER

V

CONCLUSION

Part of the charm and integrity of Darwin's
thought is

revealed by the inconsistencies he left visible in
his
work.

He held views which,

if given the upper hand,

would

have overpowered the easy racism inherent in ranking
races

according to skull size or even so-called "complexity
of
culture.

For example, in brilliant passages Darwin

decouples the concept of evolution from that of progress.
However this insight is ambivalently held in the case of
man.

Usually he discards his new understanding of

progress in order to prove that the evolution of human
culture moves through stages of civilization to the

creation of

a

"noblest" society ruled by aristocrats and

captains of industry.
Perhaps one of the tell-tale marks of

a

genius in new

territory is the confusion inherent in the conceptual
project of smoothing out wrinkles but leaving topology
intact so that

a

map may be created for those who follow.

Whether it be: individual versus group selection; absolute

continuity down to atoms versus emergence of unique human
characteristics; or social evolution as an extension of

Malthusian dictates versus the end of Natural Selection at
the doorstep of ethics, these dichotomies found Darwin
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wavering on how to solve
scientific/social/political
issues.
Witnessing Darwin's twists and turns
helps our
understanding of scientific change and

social history, and

demonstrates the folly of those who seek
"uncontaminated"
science
It

is not difficult to demonstrate
that Charles Darwin

was the first Social Darwinist.

Darwin's Natural Selection

not only provided a mechanism for
descent with modification

within the natural world, it also sought to
demonstrate
that poverty was

necessary result of competition for

a

scarce resources within the human domain.

Beyond

justification of low wages for workers and profit taking
by
the upper classes, the field of his biological theory

included

a

sexual politics of male superiority and an

explanation of imperialism in terms of inevitable race war.
What is difficult to understand is how one of the most

scrutinized scientific enterprises of all time has
continued to be portrayed as an essentially non-ideological
project.

Darwin's own claims for such purity are

representative of

a

deep desire within Western science and

philosophy to carve out

a

special status for science within

epistemology
Attempts to explore prominent ideological aspects of
his ideas are often met with denials and when not with

outright rejection then with claims to the effect that "all
men

[!]

of the time shared that ideology so it would be

anachronistic to critique such social and political
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facets

Such

dismissal blinds the investigator
to
intimate connections between biases,
metaphysics,
a

social

theory, scientific theory, and
evidence, as well as to
actual history.
The scholar must be wary for even
this
list is deceptive as it implies
these items enjoy separate
lives.
in the end historical and the
philosophical

critiques of science have failed to bring
Darwin's position
to account, especially with regard
to racism.

Comparison with the ideas of Alfred Russel Wallace
puts Darwin's theory into more proper perspective.

Perhaps

the single most telling contrast lies in
the ramifications
of their divergence over the status of "man."

Darwin's theory of Natural Selection is

reductive materialism which plays

a

a

Central to

radically

key role in shaping the

new science by setting boundaries, organizing evidence,
and

molding theory.

Because all human behaviour is reducible

to a biological base in his theory, all social and

political activities are essentially struggles over scarce
resources in which the largest-brained white males will
dominate.

Others, such as Haeckel, understood the

structure of Darwin's enterprise well enough in order to

regenerate particular and bizarre details even where Darwin
made such items unavailable to his reading public.

While philosophy of science has spent resources
exploring bias in science, it has failed utterly in the
case of Darwin and Wallace to find the true structure of

nineteenth century biology and therefore has failed to
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contribute to our understanding of
Darwin's role in the
creation of a new and virulent form
of racism emerging
around the end of the last century
in the form of Eugenics.
It

is not the case that biases
towards capitalism,

sexism and racism on Darwin's
part can be best understood
as contaminants to an otherwise
"pure" scientific theory.
The materialist agenda is
respectable enough in itself, and

Played an integral role in "purely"
scientific concerns
such as setting research agendas,
organizing evidence and
directing theory. However the "pure"
concerns were part
and parcel of

a

political view.

drive which also propelled

a

particular

Perhaps the best way to describe the

situation is: overdetermined.

While "non-scient if ic

biases informed certain aspects of Natural Selection,

scientific moves generated political ramifications.

The

two cannot be separated, except in exposition.
In the first chapter Darwin's reliance upon
reductive

materialism to organize and define the domain and concerns
of his science is laid out in some detail.

His theory is

all the more complex and interesting due to the internal

inconsistencies and struggles which show themselves

prominently in his treatment of transitional human forms
and the function of morality in restraining eugenics within

Victorian society.

In the latter waffling he finds it

impossible to settle the role of morals, for Victorian
ethics tend to demonstrate what looks like group and
emergent behaviour.

The "inadequate" reproductive efforts
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of the "best" generates further
wrinkles for his view that

human society is reducible to

a

struggle of each against

each for scarce resources in which the best
win.
Such areas of confusion in science get scant attention
for they are usually thought to be aberrations
or defects.

When considering
is

a

major icon of science such as Darwin, it

understandable why such wafflings are down-played.

Given the important locations of wafflings within his
theory, and given the insights which flow from discussion
of such areas,

it must be concluded that confusion plays an

important role in science and should not be summarily

dismissed
The work of Wallace is important not only for putting
the lie to claims of purity on Darwin's part but also

because his alternative metaphysics generated

version of Natural Selection.

a

more humane

The mere existence of his

theory makes the impetus to scientific racism more visible
as one option among many.

The exploration of origins of

scientific racism is barely begun by this dissertation and

hopefully will be taken up by others.

Special attention

should be paid to the role of professionalization in both

medicine and biology in shaping Victorian science.

Emergentism and materialism take on special importance
due to their far-reaching effects.

The emancipatory

potential of emergentist Natural Selection is confirmed

through examination of the work of Huxley.

While it is not

impossible to strip emergentism of its more positive
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aspects, in its context it presented
progressive potential.
The horror Darwin expresses over
Wallace's views on
man" may in part be understood
in the light of anti-

religious bias.

For Darwin the intervention of

ruled out in principle by materialist
concerns.

though he professes

god is

a

Even

willingness to allow divine

a

intervention at the point of creation of
life (or by
extension, the world)
he admits he would be

just as happy

,

with

a

non-religious explanation.

disingenuous, for

a

The equivocation here is

non-religious explanation is superior

because then only one principle need be invoked.

It

is in

the sense of this scientific strategy that the theory
is

essentially atheist.
However Darwin cannot quite bring himself to settle
for

a

strictly materialist explanation of human behavior

and struggles with the relationship between morality and

"hard reason," the logic of evolution.

Wallace's

emergentist leanings tinged with spiritualism and

a

paradoxical connection to phrenology allow for an

alternative explanation of human complexity, even if

it did

not ultimately become the dominant version of Natural

Selection
When assessing the struggle between these two

approaches it is important to keep in mind that both
strategies faced major problems.

In each case there were

claims which were in principle unverif iable

.

Darwin's

hesitation to publish about the psychology of atoms speaks
404

for itself.

Wallace's assertions about "spiritual
influx"
were similarly opaque, even if Darwin
allowed for
the

possibility of divine causes in the creation
of life.
work on Spiritualism allows for an interpretation

New

of

Wallace's involvement in terms of progressive
sexual
politics.

In the end,

it

simply is not the case that

Darwin's approach can be thought of as "pure," and

Wallace's as "impure."
Even

a

limited investigation of the use Darwin makes

of Malthus's attack on the Poor Laws reveals that

reproductive technology of the time had made assimilation
of human sexual practices to those of animals untenable.

Natural Selection's grip on social and political aspects of

human reproduction was controversial at best.

The spillage

of concerns from the medical profession into evolutionary

biology only complicated the issue.

That these topics were

openly debated at the time makes contemporary blindness to
the context all the more glaring.
In conclusion,

it must be said that the work of Darwin

cannot be properly appreciated without knowledge of

Wallace's version of Natural Selection.

Points of

ambivalence and confusion in the texts of both writers
provide key entry points to the deeper structure of their
science.

Special attention must be paid to the

metaphysical views which influenced both writers, as well
as the political context of Malthus' writings and the

influence of newly formed professionalism. Claims for
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purity" in science deserve utmost
skepticism, especially
when scientists or philosophers make
them.
Only when
Darwin's work is placed in this context
will a better
understanding of Darwinism, biology, Victorian
science and
the origins and resistances to
scientific racism be made
possible
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